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 Part one provides a literature review on the development of attitude theory in 
marketing research and addresses concerns regarding the effects of common method 
variance (CMV) in published studies based on the reasoned-action paradigm of consumer 
behavior and decision making.  The results of a marker-variable analysis, logit analysis, 
and reanalysis of path estimates support the validity of self-report survey research 
designs.   
 Part two employs a survey design to develop and validate a scale to measure a 
consumer’s tendency to use a complex decision style (CDS) in conceptualizing and 
negotiating high-stakes decision situations.  Drawing from literature on cognitive style 
theory and complexity science, a complex approach to decision making is characterized 
as being complexity-focused; decision makers tend to rely more heavily on strategies 
such as collaborating with others and integrating a variety of information.  The CDS scale 
is also applied within a conceptual model of choice of elective healthcare treatment, 
specifically, women’s decisions regarding the use of hormone therapy, commonly 





Part one of this dissertation provides a literature review on the development of 
attitude theory in marketing research and addresses concerns regarding the effects of 
common method variance (CMV) in published research based on the reasoned-action 
framework of attitudes. Although much of marketing theory is founded upon cross-
sectional survey research, there are only a limited number of studies that assess the 
pervasiveness of method biases that are a concern in this type of research design. In this 
essay, a relatively new method called the marker-variable technique (Lindell and 
Whitney 2001) is employed in a post hoc manner to examine the influence of CMV in 
published studies based on the reasoned-action framework of attitudes (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975). The analyses are based on an initial sample of 663 correlations from 78 
studies published in business, consumer psychology, and marketing journals from 1994 
to 2005. The overall objective of this research is to infer from previously published 
studies the effects of CMV on relationships between variables (correlations and path 
estimates) within the framework of attitude theory. The results of a marker-variable 
analysis, logit analysis, and reanalysis of path estimates provide evidence that published 
studies within this context are relatively robust against the biasing effects of CMV, which 
helps to support the validity of same-source cross-sectional research designs. 
Part one of this dissertation provides evidence that studies based on cross-
sectional survey research designs are relatively robust against method biases such as 
common method variance. Part two utilizes a survey-based research design to develop 
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and validate a scale to measure a consumer’s tendency to use a complex decision style in 
high-stakes decision situations. Drawing from literature on cognitive style theory 
(Goldstein and Blackman 1978) and the principles of complexity science and complex 
systems (Cilliers 1998; Lewin 1992; Waldrop 1992; Zimmerman, Lindberg, and Plsek 
1998), individuals are hypothesized to differ in the consistent cognitive patterns they use 
to organize and process information in high-stakes decision situations. A complex 
decision style (CDS) is characterized by conceptualizing the decision situation as 
inherently complex and comprised of many connected parts and negotiating the decision 
process in a collaborative and integrative manner. 
Using the scale development paradigm described by Churchill (1979) and 
DeVellis (2003), the CDS scale is developed and validated. Study one uses an 
exploratory methodology with a sample of 58 undergraduate students to generate a pool 
of possible items for inclusion in the CDS scale. After an assessment of the content 
validity of these items, study two was conducted to purify the scale. A sample of 198 
undergraduate students provided preliminary estimates of reliability and scale structure.  
In a third study, the predictive validity of the CDS scale was assessed within the context 
of decisions regarding the use of hormone therapy (HRT). Both mean-level and structural 
relationship strength hypotheses based on CDS are also developed and tested within a 
model predicting women’s intentions to use HRT. To the extent that we can better 
characterize and assess high-stakes decision styles, this information may be used in the 





THE INFLUENCE OF COMMON METHOD VARIANCE IN SURVEY-BASED 
MARKETING RESEARCH BASED ON THE REASONED ACTION 
FRAMEWORK OF ATTITUDES  
 3
CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 
 
The goal of the first part of this dissertation is to quantitatively assess the 
prevalence of common method variance (CMV) in marketing research. Specifically, the 
aim is to infer from previously published studies the effects of CMV on correlations 
between variables within the framework of what can generally be thought of as attitude 
theory. The attitude construct continues to be a major focus of theory and research in the 
social and behavioral sciences in general (Ajzen 2001) and in the marketing literature in 
specific, both strategy (e.g., Chandon, Morwitz, and Reinartz 2005; Netemeyer and 
Bearden 1992) and consumer behavior research (e.g., Herr 1995; Sheppard, Hartwick, 
and Warshaw 1988). Most inquiries into the prediction of behavior from attitudinal 
variables are conducted within the framework of the theory of planned behavior (TPB; 
Ajzen 1991), and its predecessor, the theory of reasoned action (TRA; Ajzen and 
Fishbein 1973). Because there are numerous studies in the marketing literature that are 
founded upon attitudinal frameworks and because the constructs are applicable in a 
number of contexts (e.g., advertising evaluation, salesperson satisfaction, product choice, 
referral intentions), the analyses here focus on studies that are framed within the Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975) paradigm. 
To reexamine the results of past studies, a relatively new method is employed. 
This method, called the marker-variable technique (Lindell and Whitney 2001), is used 
mainly because it allows for the reassessment of CMV biases in past research without 
facing unrealistic constraints (e.g., having access to raw data, the use of multiple methods 
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to collect data, performing complex data analyses) that would be present if we were to 
use other conventional methods such as multi-trait multi-method (MTMM) and 
confirmatory factor (CFA) analyses. A marker variable is a variable that is included in a 
study, but is theoretically unrelated to at least one other variable in the same study. In the 
present analysis, the marker-variable technique is employed in a post hoc manner to 
examine whether significant relationships among attitudinal variables published in past 
research will hold true even after the consideration of CMV.  
The outline of this part of the dissertation is as follows. The first section provides 
a brief literature review on consumer attitudes and the development of attitude theory in 
marketing research. This section also includes a comparison of the various models that 
have been tested in the prediction of behaviors, such as consumer choices, from attitudes. 
In the second section, methodological concerns with the measurement of attitudes using 
same-source cross-sectional survey designs are discussed. A third section briefly 
examines the alternative approaches for assessing CMV. The fourth section includes the 
results of a reassessment of marketing studies using the marker-variable technique, a 
sensitivity analysis, a logit analysis, and a reanalysis of path estimates. Part one of this 
dissertation concludes with a discussion of the research findings, theoretical 
contributions, limitations, and directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ATTITUDES AS PREDICTORS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
 
An attitude is defined as representing a summary evaluation of a psychological 
object captured in such attribute dimensions as good-bad, harmful-beneficial, pleasant-
unpleasant, and likable-dislikeable (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty, Wegener, and 
Fabrigar 1997). Attitudes are useful in that they assist in adaptation to a surrounding 
environmental context (Eagly and Chaiken 1998). In addition, attitudes serve as 
evaluations that direct people toward approach (as a reaction to positive evaluations) or 
avoidance (as a reaction to negative evaluations). Thus, when attempting to understand 
consumer behaviors, such as consumer choice or loyalty, it is essential to assess 
underlying consumer attitudes.  
3.1 Development of Attitude Theory 
 Research on the prediction of individual behavior from attitudes provides strong 
support for the utility of the reasoned action approach. Theories that are based on the 
reasoned action approach include social cognitive theory (Bandura 1991), the health 
belief model (Rosenstock 1974), the information-motivation-behavioral skills model 
(Fisher and Fisher 1992), the theory of interpersonal relations and subjective culture 
(Triandis 1977), the theory of trying (Bagozzi and Warshaw 1990), and the 
prototype/willingness model (Gibbons, Gerrard, and Blanton 1998).  These all share a 
common theme in that the construct of behavioral intentions is critical to the prediction of 
behavior. These theories are based on the notion that behavioral intentions and actual 
behaviors are caused by one’s beliefs about performing the behavior.  However, 
 6
behavioral intentions are also influenced by such considerations as the approval or 
disapproval of the behavior by important others and a sense of control over actual 
performance of the behavior (Ajzen 1991).  
There is growing consensus that these three variables (attitudes, perceived social 
norms, and perceptions of control or self-efficacy) account for the majority of the 
variance in behavioral intentions.  In fact, a number of meta-analytic studies provide 
evidence that intentions can be reasonably predicted by these three predictors (e.g., 
Albarrací 
n, Johnson, and Fishbein 2001; Armitage and Conner 2001; Shepherd, Hartwick 
and Warshaw 1988). In the marketing literature, the TRA (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and 
the TPB (Ajzen 1991), based on these predictors, have been extensively applied to the 
prediction of behavior. The following section of the paper provides a brief review of the 
development of these theories. 
3.1.1 Attitudes and the Expectancy-Value Model 
One of the most fundamental concepts in the marketing literature is that of the 
attitude (Howard and Sheth 1969). In the context of the theories of reasoned action and 
planned behavior, attitudes are integral in the prediction of behavioral intentions (i.e., the 
cognitive representation of a person’s readiness to perform a given behavior) and overt 
behavior. In this sense, attitudes toward a behavior can be thought of as the degree to 
which a person has an overall favorable or unfavorable evaluation of the behavior in 
question (Ajzen 1991).  
The notion that people form attitudes towards particular behaviors led to the 
development of one of the first and most popular models of attitude formation and 
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structure which is known as the expectancy-value model (Feather 1959; Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975). According to this model, attitudes develop automatically and inevitably as 
we encounter an object or are faced with a behavioral decision (Ajzen 2001). A person’s 
overall attitude is determined by evaluations of the attributes associated with the object 
and the strength of these associations: 
 
A = Σbiei      (1) 
 
In this equation, the strength of each salient belief (b) is multiplied by the subjective 
evaluation (e) of the behavioral outcome or object attribute, and the resulting products are 
summed over the number of salient beliefs to determine one’s attitude (A).  Behavioral 
beliefs are the foundation upon which attitudes are formed; however, they are not the 
only type of beliefs which are known to influence behavioral intentions and actual 
behaviors. Other beliefs, such as normative beliefs and control beliefs, have also been 
shown to add to the prediction of behaviors. 
3.1.2 Theory of Reasoned Action 
 The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) assumes that behavioral 
intentions are determined by two independent factors, one of which is attitude toward the 
behavior, as discussed in the previous section. The additional predictor refers to the 
consideration of subjective norms, defined as the perceived social acceptability of 
engaging in a behavior (Ajzen 1991). Subjective norms are based on normative beliefs, 
which refer to the probability that an important referent person or group (e.g., person’s 
spouse, family, friends, coworkers, etc.) approves or disapproves of the performance of 
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the particular behavior in question (Gentry and Calantone 2002). Like the expectancy-
value model of attitudes, these normative beliefs combine with motivation to determine 
an overall measure of subjective norms: 
 
SN = Σnimi   `   (2) 
 
Specifically, the strength of each normative belief (n) is multiplied by the person’s 
motivation to comply (m), and the subjective norm (SN) is determined by the sum of the 
products across the number of important referential agents (Ajzen 1991).  
The TRA has been shown to adequately predict behaviors that are relatively 
straightforward and under circumstances where there are no constraints on action. 
However, when there is the potential of actual or perceived obstacles to performing the 
behavior, intentions based on one’s attitudes and subjective norms may be insufficient to 
predict behavioral performance. The theory of planned behavior (TPB) was developed to 
solve this problem inherent in the TRA. 
3.1.3 Theory of Planned Behavior 
 The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991) has emerged as one of the most 
influential and popular conceptual frameworks for the study of human behavior (Ajzen 
2001, 2002). According to the TPB, people act in accordance with their intentions and 
perceptions of control over the behavior, while intentions are influenced by attitudes 
toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceptions of behavioral control. The 
difference between the TPB and its predecessor, the TRA, is the addition of perceived 
behavioral control (PBC), which allows for the prediction of behaviors that are not under 
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complete volitional control. Performance of these types of behaviors may depend on 
other factors such as the availability of opportunities and facilitators such as time, money, 
and expertise.   
 Perceived behavioral control refers to a person’s perception of his or her ability to 
perform a given behavior. Drawing again from the expectancy-value model of attitude, it 
is assumed that perceived behavioral control is determined by control beliefs, which are 
defined as beliefs that have to do with factors that either assist or impede with 
performance of the behavior (Ajzen 1991). Just as beliefs concerning consequences of a 
behavior are viewed as determining attitudes toward the behavior and normative beliefs 
are viewed as determining subjective norms, beliefs about resources and opportunities are 
viewed as underlying perceived behavioral control: 
 
PBC = Σcipi      (3) 
 
In this equation, each control belief (c) is multiplied by the perceived power (p) of the 
particular control factor to facilitate or inhibit performance of the behavior, and the 
resulting products are summed across the n salient control beliefs to determine the 
perception of behavioral control (Ajzen 1991).  
3.2 Summary of the Development of Attitude Theory 
 Overall, the reasoned action approach to behavioral prediction has gained much 
validity over the years (Ajzen and Fishbein 2004). For example, in a meta-analysis based 
on 185 independent studies (Armitage and Conner 2001), the TPB was found to account 
on average for 39% of the variance in intentions and 27% of the variance in behavior. 
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This suggestion is also supported by research that employs structural equation modeling 
(SEM) with variables included in the TPB. The findings reported usually indicate a high 
proportion of explained variance once measurement unreliability is taken into account as 
well as good fit between the model and the data, particularly in the context of health-
related behaviors (e.g., Blue, Wilbur and Marston-Scott 2001; Levin 1999). However, 
these studies often do not account for the influences of method biases, specifically, 
common method variance in studies conducted within the frameworks of the TRA and 
TPB. 
Behavioral decision-making models such as the TRA and TPB have tended to rely 
on self-report data (Armitage and Conner 2001). In addition, in most applications, 
measures of beliefs, overall evaluations, intentions, and even past behaviors are taken 
with the same or very similar (bipolar or unipolar) evaluative rating scales.  Concerns 
regarding the use of self-reports and the pervasiveness of common method variance are 
common to reviews of questionnaire-based studies and are indicative of a wider debate 
within the academic literature (Ajzen and Fishbein 2004; Armitage and Conner 2001). 
The fear is that since individuals’ reports of their various internal states (cognitions, 
affect, attitudes, intentions, etc.) are collected at the same time using similar measures, 
method variance may inflate the observed correlations between the constructs. The goal 
of this essay is to provide an objective assessment of CMV in past marketing research 
within the framework of studies based on the reasoned-action paradigm of attitudes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS WITH ATTITUDE MEASUREMENT 
 
Method biases occur when investigators are unable to disentangle the variance 
that is attributable to the actual phenomena of interest from the variance that is a by-
product of the particular measure or instrument that was used to collect that data 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003; Spector 1987). The presence of method variance is a source of 
systematic error that may bias the observed correlations between variables (Bagozzi and 
Yi 1993; Lindell and Whitney 2001). To the extent that method variance accounts for a 
sizeable amount of the shared variance among self-report measures included on a survey, 
it is possible that incorrect substantive conclusions will be made pertaining to the 
relationships among the variables (Campbell 1982). One possible outcome is that the 
results may suggest relationships (significant correlations between variables or significant 
path estimates in a model) that would not be significant once method variance is 
accounted for. In addition, effect sizes may be overestimated (e.g., inflated SMCs; 
Kemery and Dunlap 1986). 
One situation in which method variance is likely to artificially inflate the 
correlations among variables included in a study is when they are all assessed using one 
type, or a few very similar types, of self-report measurement scales (e.g., Likert scales 
and semantic differential scales). This leads to the potentiality of common method 
variance (CMV), which is defined as the amount of spurious covariance shared by 
measures specifically because of the common context in which the measures are 
collectively elicited (Buckley, Cote, and Comstock 1990; Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
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Common method bias typically occurs when all of the variables are measured at the same 
or very close points in time. Podsakoff et al. (2003) recently categorized the origins of 
common method variance more specifically into common source effects, item 
characteristic effects, and item context effects. 
4.1 The Influence of Common Method Variance (CMV) in Survey Research 
Common method variance is one of the most frequently mentioned 
methodological concerns pertaining to survey research among social scientists in general 
(e.g., Donaldson and Grant-Vallone 2002; Harrison, McLaughlin and Coalter 1996; 
Williams and Brown 1994), and among marketing researchers in particular (e.g., Bagozzi 
and Yi 1993; Ghosh and John 2005; Im and Workman 2004). Although marketing 
researchers recognize a need to account for CMV, there is very little objective evidence 
that estimates the influence of such biases in published studies. After reviewing the 
available literature, it is apparent that the extent to which CMV impacts research 
conclusions remains ambiguous. There is support both for (e.g., Glick, Jenkins, and 
Gupta 1986; Harvey, Billings, and Nilan 1985; Wagner and Gooding 1987) and against 
(e.g., Malhotra, Kim, and Patil 2006; Spector 1987) the substantial inflation of 
correlations due to CMV.  
4.1.1 CMV in Marketing Research 
It has been shown that common method biases tend not to be uniform across 
constructs or across research domains and many researchers have called for domain-
specific research in this area (Cote and Buckley 1987; Crampton and Wagner 1994; 
Donaldson and Grant-Vallone 2002). In the marketing literature, Cote and Buckley 
(1987) examined the influence of CMV by using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
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disentangle trait, method, and random error variance in social science studies that had 
used Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) multi-trait multi-method (MTMM) analysis. The 
authors found that on average, measures contained 42 percent true score variance, 26 
percent method variance, and 32 percent random error variance, although these 
percentages varied across context. However, given the limitations of the study 
attributable to its limited sampling frame and use of CFA, as well as the fact that almost 
two decades have past since its publication, a more contemporary and comprehensive 
investigation of common method variance in the marketing literature is warranted.  
 The present study is an attempt to infer from previously published studies the 
effects of CMV on correlations between variables within the framework of what can 
generally be though of as attitude theory. Because there are numerous studies in the 
marketing literature that are founded upon attitudinal frameworks and because the 
constructs are applicable in a number of contexts (e.g., advertising evaluation, 
salesperson satisfaction, product choice, referral intentions, etc.), we focus our analysis 
on studies that are supported by the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) paradigm. 
4.1.2 Assessing CMV within the Framework of Attitude Theory 
 It has been suggested a number of times that the presence of common method 
variance tends not to be uniform across constructs or domain areas (Donaldson and 
Grant-Vallone 2002; Glick, Jenkins, and Gupta 1986). In both Feldman and Lynch 
(1988) and Lindell and Whitney (2001), the authors point out the need for more studies 
on common method variance, especially in specialized settings and research areas in 
which context effects are likely.  
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One reason why this study is framed around the TRA and TPB and the constructs 
contained within is because findings from these studies seem especially susceptible to 
common method bias. First, when designing a study used to predict behavior, assess 
behavioral intentions, or elicit evaluations, the researcher is encouraged to create 
measures of each of the constructs that explicitly match in their levels of specificity 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), which makes them especially susceptible to the influences of 
CMV.  The influence of measurement in the context of the TRA and TPB has also been 
demonstrated in prior research. Ryan (1982) found that the procedures used to measure 
attitudinal variables may explicitly account for measurement error that can bias structural 
model results. Specifically, he argues that the similarity of items on a cross-sectional 
paper-and-pencil survey will produce CMV, thereby biasing latent variable relationships 
upward as suggested by the study findings.  
The second reason for choosing to focus on reasoned-action theories is consistent 
with Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) assertion that their model can be used to understand 
and predict most human behavior. Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw (1988) conducted a 
study to examine the robustness of the Fishbein paradigm. They found that when the 
model was used to investigate activities for which the model was not originally intended, 
it performed extremely well in the prediction of goals and in the prediction of choice 
activities. Therefore, even when utilized to investigate situations and activities that do not 
fall within the boundary conditions originally specified for the model, it still seems to 
have strong predictive utility (Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw 1988). In addition, 
Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw (1989) note that a key assumption of the TRA is that all 
other factors that influence behavior do so indirectly, by influencing attitudes, social 
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norms, or other variables included in the model. Thus, the internal TRA and TPB 




MEASURING AND CONTROLLING FOR CMV 
 
In this section of the essay, a sample of the various ways to control for common 
method variance and some of the advantages and disadvantages associated with each of 
these techniques is introduced. The use of the marker-variable technique to reanalyze 
published research results is also justified. 
5.1 Multi-Trait Multi-Method Analysis 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) developed a procedure for detecting method variance 
using a multi-trait multi-method (MTMM) analysis. In order to conduct a traditional 
MTMM analysis, researchers must measure each of the constructs of interest using more 
than one method. The pattern of intercorrelations among the measures constituting the 
MTMM matrix can be used to test for convergent validity, discriminant validity, and the 
presence of method variance. One conventional indicator of CMV is estimated by the 
difference between the monomethod-heterotrait (MH) correlations and the heteromethod-
heterotrait (HH) correlations. Assuming that convergent validity has been demonstrated 
(the tendency of alternate measures of the same construct to correlate), CMV is assumed 
to be present if the MH correlations are significantly greater than the HH correlations 
(Campbell and Fiske 1959; Millsap 1990). 
 This procedure of comparing correlations in a MTMM matrix to assess construct 
validity and the existence of common method effects has several limitations. First, the 
presence of common method variance may inflate diagonal values in the matrix, which 
increases the probability of the data meeting Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) criteria for 
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convergent and discriminant validity (Peter 1981). In addition, one assumption 
underlying this type of analysis is that the different methods used are maximally 
dissimilar or uncorrelated (Williams, Cote, and Buckley 1989). In reality, however, the 
methods might not be that much different, which would lead to the HH correlations being 
similar to the MH correlations. This is because the heteromethod and monomethod 
‘triangles’ in the MTMM matrix will both contain common method variance. In this case, 
subtracting HH correlations from MH correlations will remove both shared trait variance 
and shared method variance, causing the difference between the values to be minimal 
even though common method variance may exist (Millsap 1990; Williams, Cote, and 
Buckley 1989).  
A more practical limitation of MTMM analysis has to do with the requirement 
that each of the constructs be measured using at least two different methods. This forces 
the researcher to use at least twice as many measures as a conventional research design, 
which may lead to decreased response rates and forced limitations in the scope of the 
study (Lindell and Whitney 2001; Malhotra, Kim, and Patil 2006). Another limitation 
with MTMM analysis refers to the fact that it does not allow for a direct estimate of the 
exact level of CMV present in the study. To estimate, and thus control for, a precise level 
of CMV, researchers must use a more advanced procedure such as confirmatory factor 
analysis.  
5.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
An additional approach to assessing common method variance uses confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) (Marsh and Hocevar 1988). The MTMM-oriented CFA procedure, 
unlike the traditional MTMM analysis, gives unique estimates of trait, method, and error 
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variance present in the correlation or covariance matrix (Bagozzi and Yi 1990, 1993). 
The CFA procedure is based on the assumption that the first unrotated factor derived 
from a principal components analysis extracts the greatest proportion of common method 
variance across all variables (Kemery and Dunlap 1986; Podsakoff and Todor 1985). To 
determine whether any meaningful relationships exist after accounting for CMV, the first 
unrotated factor is partialled out of all the correlations among variables and the 
relationships of interest are again examined for significance. 
One problem with this method is that by partialling out the first common factor, 
one may remove true score variance along with any common method variance that is 
present (Kemery and Dunlap 1986; Podsakoff and Todor 1985). Therefore, the actual 
levels of relationships among variables probably lie somewhere between that which is 
present before the common method factor is partialled out, and that which is present after 
it is partialled out. Thus, this method provides a conservative estimate of the relationships 
between predictor and criterion variables (Podsakoff and Todor 1985). A second 
limitation of using CFA is that it may lead to spurious negative correlations after the 
method variance is partialled out, which may be statistically significant when the sample 
size is large and the original correlation is near zero (Kemery and Dunlap 1986). Another 
limitation is related to the additive assumption underlying the CFA approach such that 
variation in the measures can be attributed to a linear combination of traits, methods, and 
errors. However, in certain contexts, traits and methods may interact to determine the 
variation in a particular measure (Bagozzi and Yi 1990). If methods do have 
multiplicative effects, then the CFA model would be inappropriate for examining the 
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particular influence of CMV. The direct product model was developed to account for this 
deficiency. 
5.3 Direct Product Model 
 The direct product model assumes multiplicative, rather than additive, method 
effects (Campbell and O’Connell 1967). In other words, as the relationship between traits 
increases, the influence of method variance also increases. This is in contrast to the 
assumption made in the CFA analysis that CMV effects are constant across variables. 
Bagozzi and Yi (1990, 1993) demonstrated the presence of multiplicative effects and 
argued for the use of a direct-product model (DPM) to represent the interaction of traits 
and methods. Specifically, the DPM hypothesizes multiplicative effects of methods and 
traits such that sharing a method exaggerates the correlations between highly correlated 
traits relative to traits that are relatively independent. However, like the traditional 
MTMM and CFA, the DPM also relies on the costly approach of measuring constructs 
using multiple methods.  
5.4 Harmon’s One Factor Test 
 Unlike the methods mentioned above, Harmon’s one-factor test is useful for 
assessing CMV in a single-method research design (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; 
Podsakoff et al. 2003). In this procedure, all of the variables of interest are entered into an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). If a single factor appears to emerge from the unrotated 
factor solution or if the first factor accounts for the majority of the variance, then 
common method variance may be present.  
Problems with this method are related to the fact that as the number of variables 
included in the study increases, the probability of finding more than one factor also 
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increases. Thus, if moderate or small levels of CMV are present, then it is less likely that 
it will be detected because CMV will not account for the majority of the variance in the 
manifested variables (Kemery and Dunlap 1986; Podsakoff et al. 2003). This problem 
may result in the underestimation of CMV biases. In addition, similar to the CFA 
procedure described above, the first factor is likely to incorporate true score variance in 
addition to CMV. Thus, it is possible that functional relationships will be overlooked 
because they are attributed to the effects of common method bias (Kemery and Dunlap 
1986; Lindell and Whitney 2001; Podsakoff and Organ 1986).  
5.5 Marker-Variable Technique 
Lindell and Whitney (2001; see also Lindell and Brandt 2000) proposed a 
relatively novel approach to quantitatively assess the effects of common method variance. 
Using this method, the researcher includes a special marker variable into the design of the 
study that is theoretically unrelated to at least one of the variables of interest. The a priori 
assumption is that the correlation between the marker-variable and the unrelated variable 
should be equal to zero. After data collection, the correlation between the marker-variable 
and the theoretically unrelated variable (rS) can be used to estimate the effect of CMV. 
Under this assumption, a researcher can recalculate the correlation of a predictor variable 
with a criterion variable after the effects of CMV have been controlled. The influential 
effects of CMV can be assessed by whether or not the originally significant correlations 
are reduced to statistical nonsignificance once CMV has been partialed out. 
 Alternatively, the marker-variable technique may be used in a post hoc fashion 
when a theoretically unrelated variable is not set aside a priori (Lindell and Brandt 2000; 
Lindell and Whitney 2001). A reasonable proxy for rS as described above is the smallest 
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correlation among the manifest variables included in a study (rM1). This is a reasonably 
conservative estimate of CMV bias, mostly because the correlation may be influenced by 
true score variance as well as CMV. Because the post hoc approach does have the 
potential of capitalization upon chance factors, researchers can also use the second 
smallest correlation (rM2) as an even more conservative estimate of CMV. While this 
estimate may slightly overestimate the actual amount of CMV present in the data, its 
upward bias is smaller than that of the common method factor used in Harman’s test 
(Lindell and Whitney 2001).  
 Malhotra, Kim and Patil (2006) recently conducted a study to empirically 
compare alternative methods to assess CMV and to test the validity of the assumptions 
inherent in the use of the marker-variable technique; particularly that one estimate of 
method variance is used in the reestimation of a set of parameters derived from a single 
study. In this study, the authors prepared two versions of a survey questionnaire, one 
web-based and one paper-and-pencil. This allowed them to compare multiple techniques 
(single-factor CFA, marker-variable technique, MTMM, and CFA-based MTMM) that 
have been used to estimate the extent of CMV in collected data. The Web version was 
used to test the single-method techniques for assessing CMV, for example, Harman’s 
single-factor and the marker-variable technique. The paper-and-pencil version was used 
to test the multiple-method techniques, specifically MTMM and CFA-based MTMM. 
The results of this study (n = 227) show that “the marker-variable technique appears to be 
quite robust in violation of its major assumption that the indicators are equally influenced 
by the common method factor” (Malhotra, Kim, and Patil 2006, p. 1871). In fact, the 
overall CMV levels and reestimated parameters based on the use of the marker-variable 
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technique were fairly consistent with those derived from a CFA-based MTMM even 
though the CFA showed that factor loadings attributable to the method factor varied 
across construct indicators. These findings support that the marker-variable technique can 
be quite reliable in estimating the influence of CMV even when the key assumptions are 
not met exactly (Lindell and Whitney 2001).  
To use the marker-variable technique in a post hoc fashion, an estimate of rS (e.g., 
rM1) is partialled out from the uncorrected correlation (rU) between a predictor and 
criterion variable in order to arrive at a CMV-adjusted correlation (rA). In particular, with 
a sample size of n, rA and its corresponding t-statistic can be calculated as follows: 
 
rA = (rU – rM) / (1 – rM)     (4) 
 
tα/2,n-3 = rA / (√ ((1 – rA2) / (n – 3)))         (5) 
 
Using Equations 1 and 2, researchers can examine the impact of CMV on the magnitude 
and significance of a correlation. In addition, it is possible to complete an entire matrix of 
CMV-adjusted correlations using these equations and the original correlations. This 
correlation matrix can then be used as input for path analysis to acquire CMV-adjusted 
path coefficients and explained variance (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996).  
The use of a marker-variable analysis is advantageous because unlike the 
traditional MTMM analysis, it will produce a specific estimate of CMV along with the 
statistical significance of the effect. In addition, the researcher does not have to employ 
the use of multiple methods, as is necessary when using the MTMM or CFA analyses. It 
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is also a significant improvement over CFA because it does not partial out the first factor, 
which is likely to severely overstate the impact of CMV. In addition, the single-factor test 
requires raw data for analysis; however, the marker-variable technique can be performed 
using a correlation matrix, which makes it more convenient in post hoc analyses. Thus, 
the marker-variable method seems to be an appealing alternative to the assessment of 
method biases in general and those in previously published studies in particular.  
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CHAPTER 6 
REANALYSIS OF CORRELATIONS 
 
 To better understand the potential influence of common method variance in 
marketing research, the results of previously published studies based on the reasoned 
action framework are reanalyzed using the marker-variable technique. First, this section 
describes how the studies used in the marker-variable analysis were selected. Second, the 
results of the marker-variable analysis are reported. Third, the results of a sensitivity 
analysis are presented. Finally, the likelihood that an originally statistically significant 
correlation becomes statistically nonsignificant once adjusted for CMV is investigated 
using a logit analysis.  
6.1 Selection of Individual Studies 
 To identify the studies to which the marker-variable technique was applicable and 
the constructs of interest were within the framework of the reasoned-action approach, all 
issues of the following journals from 1994 to Spring of 2005 were examined: Journal of 
Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, Journal of Marketing, Psychology and Marketing, Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Business Research, and Journal 
of Public Policy and Marketing. The focus was only on published studies because the 
intent is not to summarize the results of attitude research but to investigate potential 
biases within published research in this context. A study was included in the analysis if 
(1) both predictor and criterion variables were collected using a single self-report 
questionnaire and (2) the correlations between the research variables were reported. In 
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addition, the dependent variables that were studied had to be either attitudinal (e.g., 
job/product satisfaction, advertising evaluation, etc.), a measure of intentions (e.g., 
purchase intention, intention to quit), or a self-report of actual behavior. This selection 
process yielded a total of 78 papers, specifically, three from Journal of Consumer 
Research, four from Journal of Marketing Research, eleven from Journal of the Academy 
of Marketing Science, twelve from Journal of Marketing, nine from Psychology and 
Marketing, one from Journal of Consumer Psychology, ten from Journal of Retailing, 27 
from Journal of Business Research, and one from Journal of Public Policy and 
Marketing.  
 From the 78 selected papers correlations were identified to be included in the 
marker-variable analysis. The relationships between independent and dependent variables 
are typically hypothesized and tested for significance, thus, it is important to check 
whether those relationships that were originally significant become nonsignificant once 
adjusted for CMV. Thus, only the correlations between the independent variables and 
dependent variables (of interest) that were statistically significant at the level of .05 (two-
tailed) were included in the study. This yielded a total of 663 significant correlations that 
were subject to the subsequent analyses. 
6.2 Results of the Marker-Variable Analysis 
 As recommended by Lindell and Whitney (2001), rM1 was first used as an 
estimate of rM. However, to minimize capitalization on chance that the use of rM1 might 
result in, rM2 was also used as a more conservative estimate of rM. Using both estimates of 
rM, CMV-adjusted correlations and their significance were calculated using Equations 1 
and 2, respectively. Note that in this analysis, the variables were assumed to have no 
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measurement errors. This is because many of the published studies did not report exact 
reliability estimates for all of the variables that were measured. This should also increase 
the conservative nature of the estimates. A summary of the results of the analysis is 
shown in Table 1. The results using rM1 appear in the column named CMV1, whereas 




Results of Marker-Variable Analysis 
 
  CMV Levels 
  CMV1  CMV2 Sensitivity Analysis 
rM  0.12 0.16 0.10 0.20  0.30
Original Studies:    
Average (n)  376.46 376.46 376.46 376.46  376.46
Average (rU)  0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41  0.41
CMV Adjustments:    
Average (rA)  0.33 0.30 0.35 0.26  0.16
Nonsignificant†  11.01 20.06 15.23 31.98  50.08
 
Notes: rU = uncorrected correlation; rA = CMV-adjusted correlation; rM = a shared 
correlation resulting from CMV; CMV1 = the first smallest positive correlation in a 
correlation matrix (rM1); CMV2 = the second smallest positive correlation in a correlation 




 When rM1 was used as the estimate of rM, the average size of rM was found to be 
.12. In addition, the average value of the original correlations (i.e., uncorrected 
correlations) was .41, and the average value of the CMV-adjusted correlations was .33. 
As shown in Table 1, of 663 correlations examined, 11.01% became nonsignificant when 
adjusted for CMV. On the other hand, when rM2 was used, the average size of rM 
increased to .16. Whereas the average value of the original correlations remained the 
 27
same, the average value of the CMV-adjusted correlations was found to decrease to .30. 
Consequently, of the 663 significant correlations, 20.06% became nonsignificant after 
accounting for CMV. In general, the results of the marker-variable analysis indicated that 
a majority of the originally significant correlations would remain significant even after 
controlling for CMV (i.e., approximately 89% in the case of rM1 and 80% in the case of 
rM2).  
6.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis of the Summary Results 
 In the above analysis, rM was estimated using both the first and second smallest 
absolute values in a correlation matrix. Although this is the procedure described by 
Lindell and Whitney (2001), it is still possible that the estimated rM value did not reflect 
the true amount of CMV. Thus, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine how the 
results of the previous analysis would vary with respect to different estimates of rM. In the 
literature, it has been reported that approximately 20% to 25% of the variance in 
measures can be attributable to CMV effects (Cote and Buckley 1987; Roth, Hearp, and 
Switzer 1999; Williams, Cote, and Buckley 1989). This marker-variable analysis 
considers more extreme cases in which rM is estimated at .30. Accordingly, the sensitivity 
analysis is conducted by varying rM from .05 to .30 in steps of .05. 
 The results of the analyses corresponding to three different levels of rM are shown 
in Table 1. As expected, CMV effects on the magnitude of the correlation coefficients 
and their significance were not substantial when the estimated rM value was less than or 
equal to .10. When rM = .10, the difference between the average of the original 
correlations and that of the CMV-adjusted correlations was less than .06. Consequently, 
the probability of a correlation becoming nonsignificant was found to be approximately 
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15%, suggesting that a majority of the corrected correlations would remain statistically 
significant at this range of rM ≤ .10. 
As rM increased to .20, the biases resulting from CMV became more evident. For 
example, when rM = .20, the average of the CMV-adjusted correlations decreased to .26. 
In addition, approximately 32% of the correlations became nonsignificant. Nevertheless, 
these results also indicate that even at this relatively conservative level of rM, more than 
two-thirds (68%) of the corrected correlations remained significant. Note that based on 
Equations 4 and 5, the size of the unadjusted correlation is critical in determining the 
likelihood that the correlation remains significant after controlling for CMV. Given this, 
our results imply that if an uncorrected correlation is relatively large, the CMV-adjusted 
correlation of interest will remain significant. For example, when sample size is about 
average (e.g., n = 376), the average size of a correlation (e.g., rU = .41) will remain 
significant even after taking into account the rM level of .20 (e.g., rM = .20, rA = .26, p < 
.0001). Thus, it can be concluded that as long as uncorrected correlations are moderately 
strong (e.g., rU ≥ .40), research findings based on the original correlations will hold 
against a relatively high level of CMV (e.g., rM = .20). 
On the other hand, in the more extreme condition in which when rM = .30, the 
average of the CMV-adjusted correlations (.16) was less than 40% of its original 
correlation (.41). As shown in Table 1, more than 50% of the correlations became 
nonsignificant when CMV biases were controlled for at a level of rM = .30.  
6.3 Logit Analysis 
 Some researchers have shown that CMV effects vary across study context or 
research domains (Cote and Buckley 1987; Crampton and Wagner 1994). Thus, an 
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important question to consider is whether CMV biases differ across variables typically 
measured within the framework of attitude theory. For example, it is possible that the 
likelihood of a CMV-adjusted correlation becoming nonsignificant changes from one 
area of interest (e.g., research on customer attitudes) to another (e.g., research on 
customer satisfaction). This section examines if the probability of a correlation becoming 
nonsignificant will vary with respect to different types of dependent variables.  
First, a model of the likelihood of an original correlation becoming nonsignificant 
when adjusted for CMV was developed. A logit model is specifically suited to predict the 
probability that an event occurs (Hair et al. 1998). In this case, the logit model included 
seven dependent variables that were most frequently investigated among the selected 
articles. Those variables were attitude, evaluation, satisfaction, job satisfaction, purchase 
intention, behavioral intention, and turnover intention. Each of the variables was 
specified as a determinant that could potentially influence the likelihood of a correlation 
becoming nonsignificant. In addition, the logit model included three key parameters of 
Equations 4 and 5 as control variables, specifically, rU, rM, and n. The key question here 
is whether the types of dependent variables would offer additional explanatory power 
over and above the three known determinants. The specific form of the logit model is: 
 
loge (P/(1-P)) = ΣaiXi      (6) 
 
where P is the probability of a CMV-adjusted correlation becoming nonsignificant, Xi 
denotes a determinant variable, and ai indicates a coefficient. Note that if ai is positive, P 
will increase as Xi increases; if it is negative, P will decrease as Xi increases; if it is 0, no 
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change in P will occur regardless of Xi. We conducted eight logit analyses – one each for 
rM1, rM2, and the six hypothetical rM levels used in the previous sensitivity analysis. The 




Results of Logit Analysis 
 
  CMV Levels 
 
 CMV1 CMV2 Sensitivity Analysis 
rM  0.12  0.16  0.10 0.20 0.30 
Parameter Estimates:     
ATT  1.21  0.94  0.76 0.90 1.73 
EVAL  4.38**  3.65**  1.39 1.07 0.02 
SATIS  2.44  0.54  -0.04 0.23 0.23 
JSATIS  1.35  1.23  -0.77 0.11 0.17 
PINTENT  2.38  1.36  0.64 0.66 0.17 
BINTENT  2.02  0.32  0.23 0.17 0.99 
TINTENT  1.26  0.41  -0.71 -0.25 0.26 
rU  -75.30***  -77.69***  -73.80*** -45.15*** -36.33*** 
rM  68.39***  70.37***  ─ ─ ─ 
n  -0.01***  -0.01***  -0.01**** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
Constant  8.73***  9.95***  17.01*** 14.49*** 14.84*** 
 
Notes: ATT = attitude; EVAL = evaluation; SAT = satisfaction; JSATIS = job 
satisfaction; PINTENT = purchase intention; BINTENT = behavioral intention; 
TINTENT = turnover intention; rU = uncorrected correlation; rM = a shared correlation 
resulting from CMV; CMV1 = the first smallest positive correlation in a correlation 
matrix (rM1); CMV2 = the second smallest positive correlation in a correlation matrix 
(rM2); n = sample size. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed). 
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As indicated by Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2, the logit model fit the data sufficiently 
for all the levels of rM. Because of this, the parameter estimates from the logit analysis 
were considered to be credible. As expected, the coefficient corresponding to the size of 
the original correlation (rU) was negative and significant in all cases. These results can be 
interpreted to mean that as the size of the original correlation increased in magnitude, the 
probability that the correlation would become nonsignificant when adjusted for CMV 
decreased. Similarly, as Table 2 shows, the same rationale applies to the sample size (n). 
In particular, as the sample size increased, the probability that the correlation would 
become nonsignificant when adjusted for CMV decreased. Also as expected, the 
coefficient for the size of the marker variable correlation (rM) was positive and significant 
for both rM1 and rM2. This can be interpreted to mean that as the size of the marker 
variable correlation increased in magnitude, the probability that the correlation would 
become nonsignificant when adjusted for CMV increased. In the sensitivity analysis, the 
marker variable correlation was held constant across studies, and therefore, was not 
included in the analysis.  
Regarding the coefficients related to the dependent variable categories, while a 
few were significant, there were not any substantive conclusions to be made from the 
results. Of the 56 coefficient estimates (seven variables * eight CMV levels), only four 
were significant (7.14%), which can largely be attributed to chance. However, three out 
of these four were associated with the ‘evaluation’ variable. Although it is possible that, 
as compared to the other categories examined, the ‘evaluation’ category may be more 
susceptible to CMV biases, it should be noted that for five of the eight CMV levels there 
was no differential effect. Overall, the results of the logit analyses show that once the size 
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of the uncorrected correlation (rU), the estimate of the marker variable correlation (rM), 
and the sample size (N) were taken into account, the research domains represented by the 
seven types of criterion variables had little influence on the probability that correlations 
would become nonsignificant once CMV was taken into account. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REANALYSIS OF PATH ESTIMATES 
 
 This section presents an investigation of the extent to which CMV inflates path 
estimates and explained variance in addition to correlation coefficients. The method is 
adopted from Malhotra, Kim, and Patil (2006), who were the first to extend the marker-
variable technique to structural equation modeling. The first step is to select studies that 
are appropriate for inclusion in this analysis. The second step is to examine the impact of 
CMV on correlations, path estimates, and explained variance in the selected studies. The 
final step is to test the robustness of these results by conducting a sensitivity analysis.  
7.1 Selection of Individual Studies 
 Because the construct of intention is a key dependent variable that is often 
measured in research based on the reasoned-action framework, studies within our original 
sample that assessed behavioral or purchase intention as a key dependent variable of 
interest were selected for inclusion in the sub-sample. A smaller sample of studies was 
used for this analysis mainly because of the greater sophistication and complexity of the 
method employed. Articles were selected if they reported factor correlations, and each of 
these latent factors were treated as single-item variables without measurement error. Ten 
studies were identified for further analysis.  
First, Akaah, Korgaonkar, and Lund (1995) empirically examined consumers’ 
attitudes toward direct marketing and the extent to which attitudes determine intentions to 
purchase from direct marketers (n = 354). Second, Babin and Babin (2001) examined the 
effects of retail elements on patronage intentions (n = 133). Third, Baker et al. (2002) 
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tested a conceptual framework of the prepurchase process based on store choice criteria 
(n = 297). Fourth, Bansal, Irving, and Taylor (2004) studied the drivers of customer 
switching intentions in the context of auto-repair services (n = 356). Fifth, Hartline and 
Jones (1996) attempted to determine the specific cues that increase overall perceptions of 
quality, value, and intentions to engage in word-of-mouth behavior (n = 276). Sixth, 
Lacher and Mizerski (1994) developed a model of the music consumption experience by 
using emotional and evaluative responses to predict purchase intention (n = 215). 
Seventh, Lotz, Shim, and Gehrt (2003) predicted one’s intention to engage in formal gift-
giving behavior (n = 672). Eighth, Mooradian and Olver (1997) linked consumption-
based emotions with consumer satisfaction and the intention to repeat purchase in the 
context of automobiles (n = 193). Ninth, Shim et al. (2001) predicted both intention to 
use the Internet to search for information and Internet purchase intention with attitude 
toward Internet shopping, previous experiences, and perceived behavioral control (n = 
684). Tenth, Wakefield and Barnes (1996) predicted consumers’ intentions to attend a 
minor league baseball game based on their responsiveness to sales promotions, which 
they found to be a function of variety-seeking tendencies, loyalty to the service provider, 
and perceptions of the value of the service (n = 308). 
7.2 CMV-Adjusted Correlations, Path Estimates and Explained Variance 
 Before estimating the impact of CMV on path estimates and squared multiple 
correlations (SMCs) through a reanalysis, the results of the above studies were replicated 
using path analysis (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996). The original correlation matrices were 
used as inputs and the results were highly comparable to those reported in the selected 
studies. With a few rare and minor exceptions (mostly likely due to the use of different 
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estimation techniques), the path estimates were within ±.02 of the original values 
reported in the studies.  
 In the original marker-variable analysis, both the first and second smallest 
correlations (rM1 and rM2) as published in each study were used as estimates of the level of 
CMV. However, only rM2 was used in this analysis, mainly because it is the more 
conservative of the two (Lindell and Whitney 2001). The rM2 estimate of CMV ranged 
from .01 to .47 across the ten studies. CMV-adjusted correlations were calculated using 
Equation 4 and their significance calculated using Equation 5 as described previously. 
Path analyses were conducted based on the correlations that had been corrected for CMV. 
This resulted in CMV-adjusted structural relationships and levels of explained variance 
(SMCs).  
 As shown in Table 3, 41 originally significant path estimates were analyzed 
across the ten studies. After adjusting for CMV, the average change in magnitude was 
approximately equal to .03. Three of the 41 (approximately 7.32%) originally significant 
path estimates became nonsignificant after being adjusted for CMV. This is most likely 
due to the magnitude of the three original correlations, which ranged from .09 to .11. 
Two of these were significant at a level of .05 and one was significant at a level of .01. 
The average of the 11 original SMCs that corresponded to the ‘intention’ variable across 
the ten studies (one study employed two separate ‘intention’ measures) equaled 
approximately 45.58%. After adjusting for CMV, the average change was approximately 
7.5%. In general, the results of these analyses show that the conclusions made from the 
original estimates would be relatively comparable to the conclusions made from 
estimates adjusted for CMV.  
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Table 3 
Results of Path Analysis 
 
  CMV Levels 
  
Number of originally significant 
parameters that became nonsignificant 
after adjusting for CMV 






rM2  0.10 0.20 0.30 
Akaah, Korgaonkar, and 
Lund (1995) 5 0 0 0 0 
Babin and Babin (2001) 3 1 1 1 2 
Baker et al. (2002)† 6 0 0 0 0 
Bansal, Irving, and Taylor 
(2004) 2 0 1 1 1 
Hartline and Jones (1996) 6 1 0 0 0 
Lacher and Mizerski 
(1994) 4 0 0 0 0 
Lotz, Shim, and Gehrt 
(2003)†† 3 0 2 2 2 
Mooradian and Olver 
(1997) 3 0 0 0 0 
Shim et al. (2001) 6 1 0 1 2 
Wakefield and Barnes 
(1996) 3 
 
0 0 1 3 
 
Notes: rM = a shared correlation resulting from CMV. † This analysis was based on Study 
1; †† This analysis was based on the formal gift-giving model  
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7.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis of the Summary Results 
 Although one can argue that rM2 is a reasonable estimate of CMV, there is the 
possibility that this value does not accurately portray the true amount of CMV reflected 
in the data. A sensitivity analysis is conducted here to test the robustness of the results of 
the reanalysis with respect to different values of rM. We followed the same sequence of 
analyses as discussed above, but the level of rM was varied from .05 to .30 in increments 
of .05. The path estimates determined under the assumption that rM = 0 remained 
relatively robust against a fairly wide range of CMV biases. Four out of the 41 originally 
significant path estimates (approximately 9.8%) became nonsignificant when rM = .05. 
Four (approximately 9.8%) also became nonsignificant when rM = .10. When rM increased 
to .15, five (approximately 12.20%) of the path estimates became nonsignificant. Six 
(approximately 14.63%) became nonsignificant at the level rM = .20. Seven path 
estimates (approximately 17.07%) became nonsignificant when rM = .25 and when rM = 
.30, ten (approximately 24.39%) of the originally significant path estimates became 
nonsignificant. Concerning explained variance, differences in the SMCs between the 
original and adjusted values were not substantial at relatively low levels of CMV (e.g., rM 
≤ .20); however, there were noticeable differences at higher levels of CMV. The average 
of the original SMCs (45.58%) decreased to 40.16% when rM = .10, 34.16% when rM = 
.20, and 26.95% when rM = .30. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS FROM PART ONE 
 
The goal of this part of the dissertation was to examine whether or not the effects 
of CMV in marketing research would invalidate published findings within the context of 
attitude theory. A relatively new method called the marker-variable technique was used 
in a post hoc fashion to quantitatively assess the presence of CMV within a sample of 
studies based on the reasoned-action framework. The results of the marker-variable 
analysis, based on 663 correlations from 78 marketing-related studies, suggest that the 
average correlation between two theoretically unrelated marketing variables will be 
approximately .14 (average of .16 and .12) when a same-source survey design is used. 
However, this level of CMV does not appear to be particularly problematic when one 
considers the number of significant uncorrected correlations that became nonsignificant 
once they were controlled for this estimate of CMV. The results show that most of the 
CMV-adjusted correlations remained significant even after using a conservative estimate 
of rM (i.e., approximately 80%), which may help to dispel some of the criticisms of same-
source survey designs in marketing research. The sensitivity analysis provides further 
support for the argument that published results, even without the consideration of CMV, 
are fairly reliable against a realistic range of CMV biases. The logit analysis confirms 
that as the size of the uncorrected correlation increases, the sample size increases, or the 
magnitude of the marker variable decreases, the probability of the original correlation 
becoming nonsignificant will decrease. In addition, the results of the path analysis are 
even more robust than those from the correlational analysis, suggesting that it may be 
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reasonable to conclude that the problem of CMV may not be as pervasive and influential 
as has been argued in the past.  
8.1 Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
In interpreting the results, the doubly conservative nature of the analyses should 
be noted. First, the use of both rM1 and rM2 to estimate the marker-variable correlation (rS) 
provides a conservative estimate of the level of CMV. Second, not adjusting for the 
presence of measurement error is likely to further inflate the estimates of CMV. Although 
it is possible to adjust the CMV-corrected correlations for measurement errors, this 
method could not be implemented because the majority of the studies analyzed did not 
report exact reliability estimates for all of the constructs of interest. It should also be 
noted that the robustness of the parameters estimated by the path analysis is more telling 
than the significance of the original correlations. Ultimately, the substantive conclusions 
drawn are influenced much more by the parameters of the causal model than by the 
original correlations. Furthermore, the magnitude of CMV biases found in the present 
reanalysis and the interpretation thereof is quite consistent with that of Malhotra, Kim, 
and Patil (2006) in the information systems domain. The convergence of the results of the 
current study, which are based on a substantially larger sample of studies and focuses on 
a separate research domain, compared to those of Malhotra, Kim, and Patil (2006) 
provide confidence in the use of the marker-variable technique within the context of well-
defined models as found in the marketing (Theory of Reasoned Action, TRA) and IS 
(Technology Acceptance Model, TAM) literatures.   
Using Equations 4 and 5, it is possible to figure out a range of values for the 
original correlation (rU) that will remain significant after being adjusted for the presence 
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of CMV given a particular sample size. Considering the assumptions of the marker-
variable technique, this information can then be used to diagnostically assess the 
robustness of study results against various hypothesized levels of CMV. For example, 
assuming a sample size of 350 and an unadjusted correlation of a relatively large size 
(e.g., rU = .40), even when one considers a relatively extreme CMV estimate (e.g., rM = 
.30), the original correlation will remain significant (t = 2.689, p < .01). Thus, researchers 
may use Equations 4 and 5 and the sample size employed in a particular research inquiry 
to calculate the so-called ‘safe zone’ in order to assess the validity of their findings 
(Malhotra, Kim, and Patil 2006).  
 The marketing field has invested a great amount of time and effort in theory 
development and theory building in the area of attitude prediction, specifically around the 
TRA (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and TPB (Ajzen 1991). However, the validity of this 
research, mainly because of its reliance on questionnaire-based research designs, has 
been challenged regarding the possibility of CMV biases. Despite these criticisms, there 
have been only a limited number of studies that quantitatively assess the pervasiveness of 
common method bias in these types of research designs. This paper is an attempt provide 
an objective analysis of such effects in the marketing literature by using a relatively new 
technique to disentangle CMV from true correlations between predictor and criterion 
variables within the context of attitude theory. The findings of the study show that even 
after CMV is taken into account, the majority of the relationships between variables as 
published in these studies based on the reasoned-action framework of attitudes remain 
significant. 
8.2 Limitations and Future Research 
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The above analyses were based on certain assumptions that are inherent in the use 
of the marker-variable technique. First, a fundamental assumption of the marker-variable 
technique is that all measurement items included in a study are equally affected by CMV. 
This may not be the case. However, in their empirical comparison, Malhotra, Kim, and 
Patil (2006, p. 1872) found that “results based on the marker-variable technique were 
found to be quite consistent with those based on CFA-based MTMM.” In light of these 
results, the sensitivity analyses that were conducted, and our interest in retrospectively 
estimating the extent of CMV in studies that have not controlled for method effects a 
priori, we feel that the use of the marker-variable technique in this study is justified. In 
addition, the assumption of equal variance may be fairly plausible within the context of 
our study since measures of predictor and criterion variables are typically similar in terms 
of semantic content, number of items, focus and scope when collected to test hypotheses 
within an attitudinal framework (Harrison, McLaughlin, and Coalter 1996).  
 Another limitation is the possibility that CMV present in the data could actually 
deflate correlations in some studies (Cote and Buckley 1988; Podsakoff et al. 2003; 
Williams, Cote, and Buckley 1989), which is a condition that the marker-variable 
technique does not take into consideration. However, the purpose of this study is to 
determine whether published results are invalidated once we correct for the presence of 
CMV using a marker-variable correlation. Thus, the major concern is that of inflation 
effects due to CMV. There is no cause for concern if a published correlation or path 
estimate is significant even with deflation effects present. If these estimates were 
corrected for CMV then the adjusted parameters would actually be higher in magnitude 
than the originals and remain significant.  
 42
 Although this is a first step in assessing the influence of CMV in contemporary 
marketing research, there are other avenues for future research in this area. First, this 
study only examines the effects of CMV within a limited framework of marketing 
studies, specifically, those based on reasoned-action theories. However, there are many 
other domains in the marketing field that are mainly based on single-source cross-
sectional survey research which may also be susceptible to the influence of CMV (e.g., 
personality research, decision making research). Therefore, future research on CMV 
considering other variables of interest to marketing researchers is warranted.  
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PART TWO 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPLEX DECISION STYLE (CDS) SCALE FOR 
HIGH-STAKES DECISION MAKING AND APPLICATION WITHIN A MODEL 
OF WOMEN’S INTENTIONS TO USE HORMONE REPLACEMENT THERAPY 
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CHAPTER 9 
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
 
This part of the dissertation is intended to improve our understanding of consumer 
behavior in the context of high-stakes decision making using the tenets of complexity 
science and the principles of complex systems. The main goal is to develop a scale to 
measure a consumer’s tendency to employ a complex decision style in the 
conceptualization and negotiation of a high-stakes decision situation. This scale can be 
used to provide new insights into the differences between consumers in the ways that 
they process information and the importance of various behavioral inputs. This 
understanding can be used to tailor decision support systems and marketing 
communications to better match the individual needs and desires of consumers (or 
segments of consumers) who are faced with high-states decisions such as choosing 
whether or not to undergo an elective medical treatment or deciding between financial 
investment options that involve risk and benefit trade-offs.  
The complex decision style (CDS) scale will be developed following the 
paradigm described by Churchill (1979) and DeVellis (2003). Cognitive style theory and 
the principles of complexity science will serve as the theoretical base for understanding 
how consumers may differ in the ways that they conceptually organize and negotiate 
high-stakes decision situations (Goldstein and Blackman 1978). An individual’s cognitive 
style relates to individually preferred strategies involved in the organization and 
processing of information. Similarly, decision style is defined as a preferred mode or 
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mental orientation that is used to conceptualize a decision situation and negotiate the 
decision process to arrive at an acceptable choice (Sproles and Kendall 1986). 
The outline of this essay is as follows. First, the motivations for conducting this 
study as well as a review of cognitive and decision style theory are discussed. The 
theoretical foundation for development of the CDS scale, particularly, complexity science 
theory and the characteristics of complex systems are also reviewed. An initial pool of 
scale items is generated based on past literature and an exploratory research study using a 
sample of undergraduate students. These scale items are meant to capture the variance 
that exists among consumers in the tendency to use a complex decision style in high-
stakes decision situations. Next, a structured questionnaire is developed including the 
pool of initial items and administered to a separate sample of undergraduate students. 
Psychometric properties (e.g., reliability, convergent, and discriminant validity) of these 
initial items are tested via an examination of item means and variances, tests of sphericity 
and sampling adequacy, squared multiple correlations, item-to-total correlations, 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using LISREL 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996). The predictive validity of the CDS scale is also tested using 
both a sample of undergraduate students and a normal population sample. Finally, the 
CDS scale is applied within a conceptual model of consumer choice of elective 
healthcare treatment, more specifically, women’s decisions regarding the use of hormone 
therapy. Mean-level and structural relationship strength hypotheses based on CDS are 
developed and tested within the conceptual model.  
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CHAPTER 10 
CONSUMER DECISION MAKING 
 
The study of decision making has been of primary interest to consumer behavior 
researchers for over 30 years (Bettman 1979; Hansen 1972; Howard and Sheth 1969). 
The magnitude of research on this topic is understandable if one considers the large 
number of consumer choices concerning the selection, consumption, and disposal of 
products and services that are made every day. Like any other type of decision one must 
make, consumption decisions vary in degree of complexity. Most consumer decisions are 
simple and made without much deliberation either out of habit or through the use of 
normative decision strategies (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). However, many other 
consumer decisions may be perceived as cognitively and/or emotionally complex. For 
example, consumers are often faced with decisions regarding medical treatments, 
financial investments, insurance, legal issues, housing, and careers or education that 
involve both serious risks and benefits.  
There is an increasing trend in consumers taking an active role in the process of 
making important, life-altering decisions such as medical and financial investment 
decisions (Kahn and Baron 1995). This stems primarily from an increase in the 
availability and attainability of information that once only experts possessed. Although 
there has been a great deal of consumer decision research concerning how consumers 
make low-involvement choices, less is known about how consumers make complex, 
high-stakes decisions involving risks and benefits (Kahn and Baron 1995). High-stakes 
decisions are defined as those with subjectively important and risky outcomes (Kahn and 
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Baron 1995; White 2005). They typically involve access to a wide amount of 
information, making them complex, and are often also emotionally difficult.  
A theoretical understanding of the ways in which individuals tend to think and act 
in high-stakes decision situations would not only provide insight into the processes 
underlying consumer choices, but it would also be useful in guiding a variety of strategic 
marketing decisions, such as the design of decision support systems and the development 
of communication and education programs (Luce, Payne, and Bettman 1999). To the 
extent that we are able to measure individual differences in the manner of 
conceptualization and negotiation of a decision situation, this may aid in the prediction of 
consumer use and satisfaction associated with various information sources (objective vs. 
subjective), types of information (expert vs. lay), and framing of information (affect vs. 
cognition-based) that are made available to the decision maker.  
10.1 Rational Approach to Consumer Decision Making 
For many years, rational or normative decision theory was the dominant 
framework in economics, political science, finance, marketing, and other fields. The core 
assumption underlying rational choice theories is that individuals are, or attempt to be, 
involved and rational decision makers (Edwards 1954). A rational decision maker is one 
who has well-defined preferences that do not depend on contextual factors, which he or 
she uses to assign subjective values (i.e., utilities) to each option in a choice set 
individually (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Rational choice theory assumes that 
consumers have the ability to use their assigned utilities to compute which choice option 
will maximize their received benefit and select according to this calculation. These 
utilities involve the consideration of (1) the actual (or subjective) value of the benefits to 
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be gained as a result of the choice, (2) the costs associated with the choice, and (3) the 
benefits that could have been gained if one had made an alternate choice. In addition, the 
rational approach to decision making assumes that individual choices are cognitive, 
deliberate and conscious. These rational models of decision making often ignore 
decision-maker characteristics and assume individuals process information and arrive at a 
decision in a similar manner (Leonard, Scholl, and Kowalski 1999). 
10.2 Information-Processing Approach to Consumer Decision Making 
Most research on consumer decision making assumes that individuals are 
predisposed to adopt some form of a rational system as the basis for the decision process. 
However, over the years, research in judgment and decision making has demonstrated 
increasingly more violations of rational choice theory and the importance of behavioral 
influences on choices is now widely studied in a variety of fields (Mellers, Schwartz, and 
Cooke 1998). As an alternative to rational choice theory, the information-processing 
approach to the study of consumer choice (e.g., Bettman 1979) argues that consumers 
make decisions using a wide variety of processing strategies, ranging from normative 
procedures to more heuristic procedures (Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman 2002; 
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Luce, Bettman, and Payne 1997). In other words, 
under this view, consumer decision behavior “is shaped by the interaction between the 
properties of the human information-processing system and the properties of task 
environments” (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998, p. 187). Consumers often act as 
adaptive decision makers and their preferences are highly dependent on person-, context-, 
and task-specific factors (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; 
Loewenstein et al. 2001; Luce 1998; Luce, Bettman, and Payne 1997; Payne, Bettman, 
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and Johnson 1993; Simonson 1989; Slovic 1995; Swait and Adamowicz 2001; Tversky 
1969). Thus, in addition to the characteristics of the decision task itself, responses to a 
choice situation may also be influenced by individual differences.  
10.3 Individual Differences in Decision Making 
As described above, there has been a shift in decision making research. Under the 
rational or normative approach to decision making, theorists depicted individuals as 
behaving in a strict and automatic stimulus-response (S-R) manner. However, under the 
behavioral or information-processing approach to decision making, intermediary 
processes that occur within the individual mediate the relationship between stimuli and 
responses. The stimulus-organism-response (S-O-R) approach maintains that behavior 
may be better understood and predicted by studying these individual differences or 
processing styles (Goldstein and Blackman 1978).  
 One of the mediating processes of much interest between stimulus and responses 
is individual cognition. Most of the research on cognition is conducted under the 
assumption that individual information processors respond to a cognitive representation 
or construction of the environment rather than responding to objective reality (Zajonc 
1968). Kelly (1955) also argued that individuals are consistently in a cognitive state of 
actively organizing and making sense of the world around them. Kelly (1955) was one of 
the first to give meaning to the idea of a construct. Kelly’s (1955) notion of a construct 
was as an individual representation of one’s environment, including the information 
contained in it. Thus, instead of merely responding to an environment in the same, 
robotic-like manner, individuals may represent the same environment in various ways 
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COGNITIVE STYLE THEORY 
 
Information processing style, often termed cognitive style, is one type of 
individual difference variable that may influence an individual’s representation of his/her 
environment and the information contained in it. This individual characteristic is often 
linked to differences in the way in which individuals conceptualize and process 
information in decision situations and decision making behavior. Found below is a brief 
review of (1) definitions of cognitive style, (2) approaches to conceptualizing cognitive 
style, and (3) approaches to measuring/assessing cognitive style.  
11.1 Definition of Cognitive Style 
Goldstein and Blackman (1978, p. 2) conceptualize cognitive style as one of the 
hypothetical constructs that mediate between stimulus and response. Their definition of 
cognitive style refers to “the characteristic ways in which individuals conceptually 
organize the environment.” Harvey (1963) similarly defined cognitive style as the way an 
individual filters and processes stimuli so that the environment takes on psychological 
meaning. Messick (1976, 1984) and Guilford (1980) define cognitive style by drawing on 
these two previous definitions – as an individual preference regarding the manner of 
organizing and processing information.  
 Kirton (1976) defines cognitive style as it relates to the individual’s preferred 
cognitive strategies involved in change and strategies of creativity, problem solving, and 
decision making. Kirton’s (1976) theory (i.e., Adaptation-Innovation Theory) assumes 
that cognitive style is conceptually independent to (1) cognitive capacity, (2) cognitive 
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success, (3) cognitive technique, and (4) coping behavior. In other words, cognitive style 
is bipolar, non-evaluative, relatively unalterable, and relatively consistent (Kirton 1976). 
Although many definitions of cognitive style have been adopted, it is generally viewed as 
a relatively stable disposition which leads to differences in behavior, including 
differences in decision making behaviors (Leonard, Scholl, and Kowalski 1999).  
11.2 Approaches to Studying Cognitive Style 
 There are numerous definitions and measures of cognitive style, which has led to 
some confusion regarding our understanding of this individual difference variable 
(Leonard, Scholl and Kowalski 1999). However, the construct is useful in that it is a 
measurable variable which can be used to describe differences in information processing. 
One important point to keep in mind is that cognitive style is conceptualized as being 
independent of cognitive complexity or ability. In other words, alternative styles are 
conceptualized as equal in the sense that one style is not better or worse than another; 
they are simply different. 
11.2.1 Jung’s Personality Type Theory 
 In the early 1900s, Jung first presented his cognitive style theory in the book 
Psychological Types, which was a result of his efforts to understand individual 
differences among people. Jung’s (1923) theory assumes that individuals’ personalities 
serve a variety of functions. First, there is a perceiving dimension. This dimension is 
concerned with the ways we initially process information that we receive. The perception 
dimension ranges from sensing (S) to intuition (N). Sensing types prefer facts, details and 
structure and are practical, realistic, and present-oriented. They also like to solve 
problems in standard ways. On the other hand, intuition types appreciate an overall 
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meaning of a situation and show a greater concern for implications rather than raw facts. 
They are imaginative and able to quickly recognize relationships in data. They also like 
to solve problems by relying on hunches and spontaneity. 
 Personality also incorporates a judging dimension, which characterizes our 
approach to decision making or our evaluation of information in a problem-solving 
context (the first dimension relates more to the collection of information). This dimension 
ranges from so-called ‘thinkers’ (T) to ‘feelers’ (F). Individuals who judge by thinking 
are objective and logic-oriented. They tend to be fairly unemotional and in control and 
carefully consider all options in decision making. On the other hand, individuals who 
judge by feeling are more personal and value-oriented. They emphasize group values and 
subjective impressions and generally prefer collaboration with others.  
 The third dimension is an attention dimension, which defines preferences for 
internal versus external focus, or more general attitudes or orientations toward life 
(Leonard, Scholl & Kowalski 1999). This dimension ranges from extraverts (E) to 
introverts (I). Extraversion refers to a focus on external stimuli where individual attention 
is directed to the objects and people in one’s environment. Introversion, on the other 
hand, refers to a focus on internal processes, concepts, and ideas.  
11.2.1.1 Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
 The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is a personality inventory that is 
theoretically founded upon Jung’s personality typology (Myers 1962; Myers and 
McCaulley 1985). This personality measurement instrument is widely used in counseling, 
education, and industrial environments. In their instrument, Myers and Briggs introduced 
an additional dimension called judging (J) – perceiving (P), which describes an 
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individual’s preference for organizing or controlling one’s external environment 
(judging) or for understanding these events (perceiving). Thus, the MBTI measures 
personality on four dimensions: sensing-intuition, thinking-feeling, introversion-
extraversion, and perceiving-judging. The low end of each scale is anchored by sensing 
(S), thinking (T), extraversion (E), and judging (J) and the high end is anchored by 
intuition (N), feeling (F), introversion (I), and perceiving (P). 
11.2.2 Harvey, Hunt and Schroder’s Processing Styles 
 In Harvey, Hunt and Schroder’s (1961) Conceptual Systems and Personality 
Organization and later Schroder, Driver, and Streufert’s (1967) Human Information 
Processing, the argument is that people engage in two tasks when they encounter sensory 
inputs from the environment. The first of these activities is differentiation, which refers to 
an individual’s ability to place stimuli along dimensions. The second task is integration, 
which refers to an individual’s ability to combine these dimensions, using rules or 
schemata, to arrive at a behavioral response. Consistent with Goldstein and Blackman’s 
(1978) definition of cognitive style, a person’s ability to differentiate and integrate 
mediates between environmental input and behavioral response.  
 Under this theory, an individual who is low in differentiating and integrating 
ability is described as ‘concrete’. On the other hand, the individual who is high in 
differentiating and integrating ability is described as ‘abstract’. Where an individual is 
placed on this continuum from concrete to abstract determines his/her ‘integrative’ or 
‘conceptual’ complexity. The characteristic processing styles of those who are closer to 
the concrete end of the continuum are described as being reliant on authority, intolerant 
of ambiguity, and rigid.  
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11.2.2.1 Measurement of Integrative Complexity 
 A majority of the tests used to measure integrative complexity are qualitative in 
the sense that they incorporate sentence or paragraph completion assessment techniques. 
For example, the Interpersonal Topical Inventory (ITI) presents subjects with a number 
of sentence and paragraph stems (e.g., “When I am in doubt…,” “When I am 
criticized…”) and asks them to complete the sentence or paragraph (Tuckman 1966). A 
similar test, the “This I Believe” Test (TIB) requires subjects to complete the phrase 
“This I believe about…” where topics such as friendship, guilt, people, and so on are 
inserted into the blank (Harvey 1963). Multidimensional scaling (MDS) techniques have 
also been used to assess integrative complexity by asking subjects to give similarity 
judgments between pairs of objects. The assumption is that the number of dimensions 
that result from an analysis of the similarity judgments correlates with the ability to 
differentiate whereas the obliqueness of the dimensions correlates with the ability to 
integrate (Goldstein and Blackman 1978).  
11.2.3 Witkin’s Field Dependence/Independence Theory 
 Witkin (1950) developed the idea of field dependence and field independence as a 
measure of cognitive style. Field dependence/independence (FD/I) refers to one’s ability 
to separate an item from the field or environment in which it occurs. Individuals who are 
field independent are hypothesized to prefer problem-solving approaches that emphasize 
detail and basic relationships. On the other hand, field dependent individuals prefer 
approaches that are more global and intuitive (Henderson and Nutt 1980).  
11.2.3.1 Rod-and-Frame Test 
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 Early research testing Witkin’s FD/I theory employed the Rod-and-Frame Test 
(RFT) (Witkin et al. 1954). This test places a subject in a dark room and asks them to 
view a lighted rod that is suspended within a lighted frame. Both the rod and frame are 
initially tilted and the subject is asked to direct the experimenter to adjust the rod so that 
it is completely vertical. Those who are able to do this successfully are field independent. 
Those who are not able to put the rod vertical (i.e., they are influenced by the tilted 
frame) are field dependent. In other words, they are not able to easily separate the target 
from its surrounding environment.  
11.2.3.2 Group Embedded Figures Test 
 Witkin and colleagues (Witkin et al. 1971) developed the Embedded Figures Test 
(EFT), which asks a subject to recognize a geometric shape that is embedded within a 
complex background. As a result of an individual’s ability to recognize the shape, he/she 
may be classified as either field independent or field dependent. Even with the 
development of the EFT, the RFT, and overall acceptance of the construct of FD/I, there 
is still disagreement regarding whether or not this construct truly represents a cognitive 
style, or if it is more of a cognitive skill (Paramo and Tinajero 1990). 
11.2.4 Kolb’s Learning Styles Theory  
 Kolb’s (1984) learning cycle model is another approach to classifying types of 
cognitive processing into cognitive styles. This model proposes two bipolar dimensions 
of cognitive processing. The active-reflective dimension has to do with how individuals 
gather and grasp information. This can range from direct participation to detached 
observation. The second dimension, abstract-concrete, has to do with how individuals 
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transform information in order to use it. This can range from dealing with tangible 
objects to dealing with theoretical concepts.  
 Four types of learning styles have been developed using these two dimensions. 
The first, divergers, emphasize concrete experiences and reflective observation. These 
people are drawn towards recognizing problems and generating ideas. Assimilators, 
emphasizing abstract conceptualization and reflective observation, enjoy defining 
problems and formulating theories. The third type, convergers, fall between the abstract 
conceptualization and active experimentation space. These individuals value problem 
solving and the application of new ideas. Lastly, accommodators enjoy implementing 
plans and engaging in new experiences and favor concrete experiences and active 
experimentation. Kolb (1984) suggests that individuals show a preferred learning style. 
Although the terms ‘learning style’ and ‘cognitive style’ have been used interchangeably 
in the literature, Kolb (1984) conceptualizes learning style as just one manifestation of 
cognitive style that occurs within a learning environment. 
11.2.4.1 Learning Style Inventory 
 Kolb (1976) developed the learning style inventory, which was designed to place 
individuals along the continuum between concrete experience and abstract 
conceptualization and active experimentation and reflective observation. This instrument 
asks subjects to complete open-ended statements (e.g., “I prefer…”; “I learn best 
through…”; “I tend to…”) by choosing a response option (e.g., “I prefer hands-on 
learning experiences” versus “I prefer learning through thinking and responding”). Each 
individual is assigned a concrete experience (CE), abstract conceptualization (AC), active 
experimentation (AE), and reflective observation (RO) score based on their responses.  
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11.2.5 Gregorc’s Learning Style Categories 
 Gregorc’s four learning style categories are based on two dimensions: (1) an 
ordering dimension which ranges from sequential to random processing, and (2) a 
perceiving dimension which ranges from concrete to abstract data (Gregorc 1982). In this 
theory, abstract learners draw from a mental representation of their experiences in order 
to process information while concrete learners draw from an immediate reaction to new 
information. Butler (1984) described the four learning style categories as (1) concrete 
sequential, (2) abstract sequential, (3) abstract random, and (4) concrete random. The 
concrete sequential learner is known to be structured, practical, predictable and thorough. 
The abstract sequential learner is logical, analytical, conceptual, and studious. The 
abstract random learner is sensitive, sociable, imaginative, and expressive. Lastly, the 
concrete random learner is intuitive, original, investigative, and able to solve problems.  
11.2.5.1 Gregorc Style Delineator 
 The Gregorc Style Delineator is a self-report measurement inventory used to 
construct a paper-and-pencil graph delineating the four learning categories. Subjects are 
presented with a ‘word matrix’ of 40 words placed into groups of four (10 items each). 
They are asked to rank the words that are most descriptive of themselves on a scale of 
one to four where one denotes the least descriptive and four the most descriptive. Scores 
for each learning category range anywhere from 10 to 40 and are based on a sum of the 
rankings for all 10 items. 
11.2.6 Kirton’s Cognitive Styles 
 Kirton (1976) also developed an approach to identify differences in the way 
individuals prefer to process information. In this theory, the cognitive (or problem-
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solving) styles are referred to as adaptors vs. innovators, which are placed on opposite 
ends of a continuum. With regard to problem definition, adaptors are more inclined to 
wait to be handed a problem, whereas innovators seek problems. With regard to problem 
solving, adaptors can be effective in modifying existing systems in conditions of relative 
stability, whereas innovators derive a challenge from seeking new and possibly 
unexpected solutions. With regard to the implementation of decisions, adaptors utilize 
precise, accurate, methodical, and disciplined approaches whereas innovators appear 
undisciplined with a low tolerance for routine work. With regard to image, adaptors are 
seen as safe, dependable, and conformists whereas innovators are seen as mavericks, 
having a lot of self-confidence, and constantly generating ideas. Again, Adaption-
Innovation theory is meant to describe the ‘how’ or ‘manner’ of cognitive functioning or 
cognitive ‘style’ (Kirton 1989), which is different from level of processing.  
11.2.6.1 Adaption-Innovation Inventory 
 The Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory (KAI) (Kirton 1976) is used to place 
individuals along a continuum that ranges from ‘adaptors’ to ‘innovators.’ The inventory 
consists of 32 items where subjects are asked to indicate the degree of ease or difficulty 
(using five-point scales) with consistently maintaining specific adaptive and innovative 
behaviors over time. Responses to the items are used to calculate an overall score for 
each subject. The score can range from 32 to 160; respondents who score below the mid-
point of this range (96) are termed ‘adaptors’; ‘innovators’ score above this point.  
11.3 Approaches to Studying Cognitive Style in Consumer Research 
 Although a number of scales intended to measure cognitive style in consumer 
research are situationally bound (e.g., Haddock, Zanna, and Esses 1994; Booth-
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Butterfield and Booth-Butterfield 1996; Raman, Chattopadhyay, and Hoyer 1995), there 
are a few scales that have been developed to measure dispositional consumer processing 
styles that manifest across a variety of situations.  
11.3.1 Need for Cognition 
 The Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo and Petty 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, and 
Kao 1984) is intended to measure cognitive processing across situations. It consists of 18 
items and measures the extent to which individuals seek out and use cognitive 
information when making decisions. Subjects are asked to use a 5-point scale to rate how 
characteristic each of the items are of themselves, for example, “I would prefer complex 
to simple problems” and “I only think as hard as I have to.”  
11.3.2 Affective Processing Scale 
 Prompted by research using the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale as described 
above, Sojka and Giese (1997) intended to publish a situation-invariant affective 
processing scale that was analogous to the NFC. According to this scale, it is possible to 
identify four types of individuals from two types of processing styles (affective and 
cognitive). The results of Sojka and Giese’s (1997) study suggest that affective and 
cognitive processing systems are independent yet can operate interactively, which results 
in some individuals being classified as ‘combination processors’. Items used to comprise 
the scale include, for example, “I make decisions with my heart” and “When I recall a 
situation, I usually recall the emotional aspects of the situation.” Respondents are 
instructed to indicate the degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the 13 scale 
items.  
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11.3.3 Rational-Experiential Inventory 
 The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) is a measure of dispositional thinking 
style that has its theoretical foundation in cognitive-experiential self theory (CEST) 
(Epstein et al. 1996). The original REI scale consists partly of items from the Need for 
Cognition Scale (19 items) as well as 12 Faith in Intuition items (Epstein et al. 1996; 
Pacini and Epstein 1999). Methodological improvements to the scale have resulted in 
scales for Experientiality and Rationality to distinguish between rational and experiential 
thinking styles. REI scale items include, for example, “I think there are times when one 




DECISION STYLE THEORY 
 
 Cognitive styles are viewed as relatively stable dispositions which lead to 
differences in behavior in the decision-making process (Leonard, Scholl, and Kowalski 
1999). Cognitive style theory proposes that an individual’s cognitive style relates to 
individually preferred cognitive strategies involved in organizing and processing 
information and therefore also strategies of decision making. Decision style may be used 
to identify different types of decision makers. Identifying these differences helps us to 
determine how the individual thinks about various situations, processes information, and 
makes decisions. Rowe and Boulgarides (1992) also argue that once we know the 
decision style, we may able to predict outcomes in terms of decision behavior.  
12.1 Definition of Decision Style 
 As adopted in the consumer behavior literature, decision style is defined as a 
preferred mode or mental orientation that is used to conceptualize a decision making 
situation and negotiate the decision making process to arrive at an acceptable choice 
(Sproles and Kendall 1986). According to Rowe and Mason (1987), decision style 
encompasses the mental activities of perception, information processing or cognition, 
making a judgment, and coming to closure of the problem. Rowe and Boulgarides (1992) 
define decision style as the way one visualizes and thinks about situations. In general, 
then, decision style is defined as how people think about and make decisions in various 
situations (Zmud 1979). 
12.2 Approaches to Studying Decision Style 
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 Instead of discussing models of decision styles or coping mechanisms that are 
situationally variant (e.g., Arroba 1977; Janis and Mann 1977), this section will focus on 
those that represent a manifestation of cognitive style, that is, decision styles that 
individuals tend to consistently demonstrate across situations.  
12.2.1 Huysman’s Reasoning Style 
 Huysman (1970) proposed that decision makers engage in a preferred style of 
reasoning that is either analytic or heuristic. An analytic decision maker takes problems 
and transforms them into a set of underlying relationships, which are used to develop 
alternative courses of action. On the other hand, a heuristic decision maker uses solutions 
to similar problems that have solved in the past to come up with action alternatives. 
Heuristic decision makers are more likely to employ common sense and intuition when 
solving problems that they face.  
12.2.2 McKenney and Keen’s Decision Styles 
 McKenney and Keen’s (1974) decision style model incorporates two dimensions: 
information gathering and information evaluation. The information gathering dimension 
ranges from perceptive to receptive styles of information acquisition. Perceptive 
gatherers use concepts such as relationships to search for information while receptive 
gatherers are more likely to use details. The information evaluation dimension ranges 
from intuitive to systematic styles of decision making. By combining these dimensions, 
McKenney and Keen (1974) described four so-called decision styles, which they labeled 
‘‘systematic-perceptive,’ ‘systematic-receptive,’ ‘intuitive-perceptive,’ and ‘intuitive-
receptive.’ 
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12.2.3 Mason and Mitroff’s Decision Styles 
 Mason and Mitroff (1973) developed a decision style model that is founded upon 
Jung’s (1923) cognitive style typology as described above. Recall that the MBTI, used to 
operationalize Jung’s typology, categorizes individuals along four dimensions of 
cognitive style: (1) sensing-intuition, (2) thinking-feeling, (3) judging-perceiving, and (4) 
introversion-extroversion. Mason and Mitroff (1973) focused their decision model on two 
decision-oriented tasks: information acquisition and data processing. For information 
acquisition, individuals are classified using Jung’s sensing-intuition dimension. 
Individuals who are sensing prefer structured information and focus on details whereas 
intuitive individuals prefer relying on hunches. For data processing, individuals are 
classified using Jung’s thinking-feeling dimension. Thus, individuals who are thinkers 
prefer analytical and logical modes of evaluation. On the other hand, individuals who are 
feelers use emotions and values to guide their evaluations. By combining these two 
dimensions, Mason and Mitroff (1973) described four categories of decision style: (1) 
sensation-intuition, (2) sensation-feeling, (3) intuition-thinking, and (4) intuition-feeling. 
This framework has been used most often to study the decision-making styles of 
managers (e.g., Henderson and Nutt 1980; Mitroff and Kilmann 1975). 
12.2.4 Driver and Colleagues’ Decision Styles 
 Over twenty years of research on managerial decision making resulted in the 
development of the Driver Dynamic Decision Style model (e.g., Driver, Brousseau, and 
Hunsaker 1993; Driver and Mock 1975; Driver and Streufert 1969). This framework 
proposes that various decision styles may be identified using two factors. First, 
individuals differ in the amount of information they use or consider when making a 
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decision or solving a problem. The second factor involves the number of solutions or 
alternative courses of action that are considered, that is, the level of ‘focus’ employed 
during decision making. The first factor, information use, ranges from a maximizing 
mode where all information available to solving a problem is considered to a satisficing 
mode where new information is only considered until the point where a reasonable 
decision can be made. The level of focus ranges from uni-focus, where decision makers 
narrow in on one specific solution, to multi-focus, where decision makers generate and 
consider a variety of options for dealing with their situation.  
 The combination of the two dimensions described above results in five basic 
managerial decision styles (Driver, Brousseau, and Hunsaker 1993). First, the decisive 
style is a combination of satisficing information use and uni-focus style. These 
individuals make decisions quickly and efficiently. The flexible style is a combination of 
satisficing information use and multi-focus style. These individuals are adaptable and 
intuitive in their decision style. The hierarchic style is a combination of maximizing 
information use and uni-focus style. These individuals make decisions in a methodical 
and logical manner. Their focus is on quality over quantity. The integrative style is a 
combination of maximizing information use and multi-focus style. These individuals, 
unlike hierarchics, focus on quantity over quality. They are much more creative and 
exploratory in their decision style. A fifth category of decision style is termed systemic. 
This is a mixture of both the hierarchic and integrative styles. Systemic decision makers 
use large amounts of information when first approaching a problem, but then prioritize 
alternative courses of action and come up with a solution in a style that is more 
hierarchical.  
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 This framework of decision style has primarily been used with managers and team 
members to promote an understanding of and capitalization on different decision styles. 
The assumption is that successful organizations, departments and teams make the best 
use of the strengths of individuals that employ each of the above decision styles.  
12.2.5 Rowe and Colleagues’ Decision Styles 
 Rowe & Mason’s (1987; see also Rowe and Boulgarides 1992) Decision Style 
Model is actually based on earlier work with Driver (Driver and Rowe 1979) on the use 
of information and level of focus in decision making. This framework is again based on 
two dimensions that are termed cognitive complexity and environmental/contextual/value 
orientation. Cognitive complexity refers to a person’s tolerance for ambiguity versus 
preference for structure. Value orientation refers to a person’s consideration of 
human/social versus task/technical concerns in decision making. The combination of 
these two dimensions results in four decision styles: Directive, Analytical, Conceptual, 
and Behavioral.  
 Directive decision makers are described as having a low tolerance for ambiguity 
and are oriented towards task and technical concerns. These individuals are systematic 
and rule-based in their decision processing. Analytical decision makers have a high 
tolerance for ambiguity and are oriented towards task and technical concerns. These 
individuals are logical and analytical in their decision processing. Conceptual decision 
makers are described as having a high tolerance for ambiguity and are oriented towards 
people and social concerns. These individuals are creative and risky in their decision 
processing. Behavioral decision makers have a low tolerance for ambiguity and are 
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oriented towards people and social concerns. These individuals are instinctual, empathic 
and interactive in their decision processing.  
12.2.5.1 Decision Style Inventory 
 Based on the above framework, the Decision Style Inventory (DSI) was 
developed to measure the decision style of managers. The DSI is composed of twenty 
questions regarding decision-making preferences. Each question has four response 
options corresponding to each of the decision styles. Individuals are asked to rate each of 
the four options (behavioral responses) in terms of the likelihood of its use. These 
questions have to do with typical situations that managers face. Individual scores for each 
decision-making style are computed by summing the scores for the options corresponding 
to that style (8=most preferred option; 4=option considered often, 2=option considered on 
occasion, 1=least preferred option). Thus, the raw scores for each dimension, Directive 
(DIR), Analytical (ANA), Conceptual (CON), and Behavioral (BEH), range from 20 to 
160. Using these scores, the intensity of each style is labeled as very dominant, dominant, 
back-up or least-preferred (Rowe & Mason 1987). However, while the instrument is a 
forced choice instrument, individuals can employ more than one dominant style.  
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CHAPTER 13 
CONSUMER DECISION STYLE THEORY 
 
 Based on the cognitive and decision styles research published in psychology and 
management, the conceptualization of consumer decision styles has received some 
attention recently in the marketing literature (e.g., Bao, Zhou, and Su 2003; Lysonski, 
Durvasula, and Zotos 1996; Wickliffe 2004). Sproles and Kendall (1986, p. 267) defined 
a consumer decision style as “a mental orientation characterizing a consumer’s approach 
to making choices.” Consumer decision styles are described as a part of a consumer’s 
“personality” (Sproles and Kendall 1986; p. 268). In the past, research on consumer 
decision styles has been used to understand shopping behaviors and to develop 
counseling and marketing tools. For example, advertisers and marketers may want to 
target different marketing programs to different consumer groups, based on their common 
decision style.  
13.1 Approaches to Studying Consumer Decision Style 
 Lynsonski, Durvasula, and Zotos (1996) categorize research on consumer 
decision style into three areas: (1) the consumer typology approach (e.g., Darden and 
Ashton 1974; Moschis 1976); (2) the psychographics/lifestyle approach (e.g., Lastovicka 
1982); and (3) the consumer characteristics approach (e.g., Sproles and Kendall 1986; 
Sproles and Sproles 1990). The common idea present throughout all of these approaches 
is that consumers tend to behave in a manner consistent with certain fundamental 
decision-making modes or styles including, among others, concerns regarding brands, 
prices, and quality. 
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 The consumer characteristics approach seems to be the most utilized and powerful 
approach since it focuses on “the mental orientation of consumers in making decisions” 
(Lynsonski, Durvasula, and Zotos 1996, p. 11). It also seems to be the most consistent 
with the definitions of cognitive style and decision style as defined earlier since it deals 
with “cognitive and affective orientations of consumers in their process of decision” 
(Lynsonski, Durvasula, and Zotos 1996, p. 11). However, as described below, much of 
the research that stems from this approach is concerned with identifying general 
consumer orientations toward simple, everyday types of shopping and buying decisions.  
13.1.1 Sproles and Kendall’s Consumer Styles Inventory (CSI) 
 Sproles & Kendall (1986) developed the Consumer Styles Inventory (CSI), which 
is a measurement tool that uses eight decision-making dimensions to explain why 
shoppers behave in certain ways. One of the most important assumptions underlying this 
instrument is that each consumer’s specific decision-making style results from a 
combination of their scores on each of the decision-making dimensions. The CSI contains 
40 Likert-scaled items with response options that range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) (Sproles and Kendall 1986). Examples of items in the inventory include 
“Shopping is a pleasant activity to me,” “I have favorite brands I buy over and over,” 
“The lower price products are usually my choice,” and “I keep my wardrobe up-to-date 
with the changing fashions.”  
 The eight dimensions of consumer style are described by Sproles and Kendall 
(1986) as (1) perfectionism or high quality consciousness, (2) brand or ‘price equals 
quality’ consciousness, (3) novelty or fashion consciousness, (4) recreational and 
hedonistic shopping consciousness, (5) price or ‘value for money’ consciousness, (6) 
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impulsiveness, (7) confusion by over-choice, and (8) habitual or brand loyal orientation. 
Note that Sproles and Kendall (1986; see also Wesley, LeHew, and Woodside 2006) 
speculated that a consumer may use more than one decision-making style across a variety 
of consumption situations; they thought that consumers tend to primarily use two or three 
styles when making choices.  
13.1.1.1 Shim’s Short Form of the CSI 
 Shim (1996) developed a short form of the CSI by choosing 32 statements from 
the original inventory that had the highest loadings for each of the eight consumer 
decision-making styles (4 per each style). The results of this study using the 4-item 
subscales showed slightly greater reliability of the inventory than Sproles and Kendall’s 
(1986) original assessment.  
13.2 Summary of the Literature on Cognitive and Decision Styles 
To summarize, cognitive style is a hypothetical construct that has been developed 
to explain the process of mediation between stimuli and responses. The term cognitive 
style refers to the characteristic ways in which individuals conceptually organize the 
environment (Goldstein and Blackman 1978). Individuals have been shown to vary in the 
consistent cognitive patterns they use to organize and process information; these patterns 
organize behavior as well as internal and environmental cognitive inputs (Guilford 1980; 
Messick 1976; Messick 1984; Zajonc 1968). An individual’s cognitive style relates to an 
individual’s preferred cognitive strategies involved in change and therefore also strategies 
of decision making, which is itself an overlapping concept or facet of the same concept. 
Decision style, then, is a preferred mode or mental model that is used to conceptualize a 
decision situation and negotiate the decision-making process to arrive at an acceptable 
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choice. Consumer decision styles is defined by Sproles and Kendall (1986, p. 268) as “a 
mental orientation characterizing a consumer’s approach to choices.”  
An established scale developed by Sproles and Kendall (1986) used to 
characterize consumer decision-making styles in the United States is named the 
Consumer Styles Inventory (CSI). This scale was intended to measure general 
orientations towards shopping and buying in everyday consumption and identified 
characteristics of consumer decision making that included high-quality consciousness, 
brand consciousness, novelty-fashion consciousness, hedonistic shopping consciousness, 
price shopping consciousness, impulsiveness, confusion, and habitual or brand loyal 
orientation towards consumption.  
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CHAPTER 14 
CONSUMER DECISION STYLES IN HIGH-STAKES CHOICE SITUATIONS 
 
One motivation for developing a new consumer decision style scale is that the 
types of considerations made in simple, everyday consumption scenarios, as assessed by 
the Consumer Styles Inventory (Sproles and Kendall 1986), are not typically important, 
or even relevant, to more complex consumer decision situations such as those involving 
financial investments or healthcare treatment choices. In high-stakes decision situations, 
appraisals that one’s most important lifetime goals (e.g., safety, well-being) are being 
threatened will signal decision complexity (Lazarus 1991).  
As we know from research on adaptive decision making, it is typical for decision 
makers to use different decision making strategies in different situations (Payne, 
Bettman, and Johnson1993; Tversky and Kahneman 1986).  In other words, decision 
makers will adapt to different decision environments based on their goals and effort-
accuracy trade-offs.  When faced with a high-stakes decision, consumers often make 
choices in a ‘rational’ or ‘systematic’ manner (e.g., planful problem solving; Luce, 
Bettman and Payne 1997) with the complexity and importance of the situation serving as 
an incentive to process in a more effortful manner.  However, as we know from the 
research on constructive choice processes, consumers may also significantly deviate from 
behaviors predicted by normative decision models (Kunreuther et al. 2002).  In high-
stakes decision situations, the complexity may act as a deterrent to processing 
systematically and lead one to rely on the use of simpler decision making strategies and 
heuristics such as avoiding trade-offs (Kahn and Baron 1995).  There is also some work 
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that shows that stressful or emotional decisions may make a decision process both more 
effortful (process more extensively) and more limited (process using attribute-based 
criteria and avoiding trade-offs) at the same time (Luce, Bettman and Payne 1997; Luce, 
Payne and Bettman 1999).   
Individual differences in the way that a consumer approaches and negotiates a 
high-stakes decision process can be illustrated by the following quotes (Wong and King 
2008):  
“But, when they tell you you have cancer, and you know… they can’t tell you you 
are going to live through this for sure. They can’t tell you that. And they can’t tell 
you when, whether or not it is going to come back, or when… They can give you 
statistics. Lots and lots of statistics… There are people who read, go to the 
medical schools and read up on things and all that. That’s not my style, you know. 
If I had more time, I wouldn’t have done that anyway, probably.”  
 
“They are going to tell me the same thing… cause it is just a statistic, you know. 
You can read the reports. And he gave me all the literature to read and stuff. 
Which, I browsed through some of it, but I mean I’m not one of those that’s 
gonna… I don’t need to know the details of it, down to the low level. I don’t need 
to be a doctor about it. I need to trust my doctor, and I did. I trusted him.”  
 
“And I talked to several people before I went the surgery route. I talked to a few 
people in my synagogue that I knew had had mastectomies, and who they used 
and what they ended up doing and all that. And I even talked to my gynecologist 
nurse who had had a mastectomy also. So, I had input from several sources, to get 
a good idea of what to expect and what to look for and what they recommended, 
so I wasn’t doing this totally blind. So I found that very helpful too. Did a little bit 
of reading, a little bit of research…that kind of thing.” 
 
“And then, I went and researched every doctor and went for second opinions, 
third opinions, fourth opinions. I think I saw four or five doctors before I decided 
I’m finally going to do it because I wanted to make sure that even though I knew 
in the back of my mind that I was making the right decision, I needed to get other 
people to tell me that I was making the right decision, and they all said the same 
thing, you know, you can have the radiation or have the mastectomy.”  
 
The unique nature of complex decision-making is starting to be recognized (e.g., 
Kunreuther et al. 2002; White 2005; Eoyang, Yellowthunder and Ward 1998). The goal 
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of this essay is to further our understanding of how consumers may differ in the ways 
they think about and approach choices in risky and important decision situations. Because 
high-stakes decisions are characterized by high levels of uncertainty and complexity and 
are often embedded within complex systems, the tenets of complexity science theory are 
used to develop a scale that measures consumer decision style in high-stakes decision 
situations. Specifically, some individuals have a greater tendency to adopt a complex 
approach to high-stakes decision making.  Similar to work in the area of leadership 
behaviors in healthcare organizations (Anderson and McDaniel 2000; Writers for the 
Center for the Study of Healthcare Management; Zimmerman, Lindberg, and Plsek 
1998), the science of complexity is used to provide insight into high-stakes decision-
making as it is experienced by individual decision makers. 
14.1 Metaphors for Studying Complex Systems 
A traditional scientific view of systems and how they operate is based on rational, 
linear-based models. These models parcel the world into ‘machine-like’ systems that 
receive inputs, transform them, and produce outputs (Capra 1996). This approach posits 
that we can understand any type of system and predict its actions by developing simple, 
linear cause-and-effect rules. This mechanistic metaphor of systems has influenced much 
of the past research in physics, biology, economics, medicine and organizations. In 
healthcare specifically, this framework guided the orientation of medicine around organ-
based disciplines and our mostly linear view of disease and treatment.  
For centuries, this Newtonian model of systems has shaped the way people 
believe that systems behave and therefore have constrained the possible ways that people 
think about systems (Begun, Zimmerman and Dooley 2003). Gareth Morgan argues that 
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all science is a metaphor and whatever metaphor we subscribe to is what shapes our 
perspectives on life and the way the world, and the systems contained in it, work 
(Zimmerman, Lindberg and Plsek 1998). Metaphors influence the questions we ask and 
hence the answers we find. A powerful metaphor becomes deeply rooted in our ways of 
understanding and is often implicit rather than explicit. In biological terms, a metaphor is 
the schema by which we make sense of our situation (Zimmerman, Lindberg and Plsek 
1998).  
In contrast to a more traditional way of thinking about complex systems, 
complexity science adopts the dominant metaphor of a system as a living organism, 
rather than the system as a machine. This metaphor creates a new holistic worldview by 
reframing our understanding of the systems we are studying or living within. At an 
abstract level, viewing the world through the lens of complexity science entails seeing 
systems as integrated wholes rather than dissociated collections of parts (Capra 1996). 
This view values connectedness and relationships among parts of a system and the 
context of the system when trying to understand and predict system behavior.  It means 
putting something into the context of a larger whole in order to understand problems or 
make decisions (Capra 1996). 
14.2 Complexity Science Theory 
Complexity science, or the study of complex systems, is defined as the 
understanding of emergent behavior exhibited by interacting systems operating at the 
threshold of stability and chaos (Lucas 2007). Complexity science focuses on how order 
can emerge from a complex dynamic system with a large number of interacting 
components (Nicolis and Prigogine 1989). It challenges the reductionist focus science has 
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had with the law of parsimony and other similarly limiting notions as described above 
(Bütz 1997). Some researchers have proposed that we use the tenets of complexity 
science to guide our understanding of complex systems and the behavior of agents within 
these systems (Zimmerman 1999). In fact, social phenomena, including organizations, 
have been the subject of investigations using methods and metaphors from complexity 
science since the early 1990s (Begun, Zimmerman, and Dooley 2003; Eve, Horsfall, and 
Lee 1997; Goldstein 1994; Kiel 1997; Stacey 1996; Wheatley 1992).  
Complexity science is based on the notion that systems or organizations, such as 
those involved in healthcare, can be categorized as complex adaptive systems (CASs) 
(Anderson and McDaniel 2000). ‘Complex’ implies diversity – a wide variety of 
elements. These elements interact with each other in a great many ways (Waldrop 1992). 
‘Adaptive’ suggests the capacity to alter or change – the ability to produce new 
information by learning from experience. This goes for individuals to species to 
corporations and industries. A ‘system’ is a set of connected or interdependent things. In 
a CAS, the ‘things’ are independent agents that act as information processors (Casti 1997; 
Cilliers 1998; Waldrop 1992; Zimmerman, Lindberg, and Plsek 1998). Embedded within 
a CAS, agents have the capacity to exchange information among themselves and with 
their environment and to adjust their own behavior as a function of the information they 
process.  
14.3 Consumers as Agents within Complex Systems 
Consumers are often faced with making high-stakes decisions within dynamic, 
risky, and complex contexts. These decisions are embedded within complex systems as 
defined above (Zimmerman, Lindberg, and Plsek 1998). In fact, the major antecedent 
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required for complex systems is a large number of agents with the potential to interact 
(e.g., staff of a hospital, members of a cultural or familial group, etc.) (Holden 2005). 
Agents within a complex system are diverse from each other and each possesses 
information that may be useful for another agent in the system (Kauffman 1995). Each 
agent will have a different understanding of the system and will rely on different sources 
of information in cognitive processing (Casti 1997).  
14.3.1 Complex Decision Style 
Similar to previous work in the context of leadership styles and managerial 
decision making (e.g., Allison and Hayes 1996; Sadler-Smith 2004), here complexity 
science is used as a theoretical framework to conceptualize the ways that individual 
consumers (or agents) faced with a high-stakes decision will think about and negotiate 
the decision process to arrive at a preferred choice.  In other words, consumers will vary 
in the extent that they adopt a complex approach to high-stakes decision making. First, 
consumers may differ in the mental models that they use to think about and conceptualize 
a decision situation (Anderson and McDaniel 2000). Some consumers may have a greater 
tendency to apply the metaphors from complexity science, for example, viewing the 
decision situation as an integrated whole, comprised of many connected and interacting 
parts which are continually emergent, dynamic, and unpredictable. In the context of 
consumer decisions, individuals may recognize the decision situation as embedded within 
networks of relationships and a variety of information sources, each operating from and 
possessing its own information.  These information sources may profoundly affect 
choices (e.g., familial, media, or cultural influences) (Wilson, Holt, and Greenhalgh 
2001). 
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In addition, consumers may differ in the ways that they negotiate the decision 
making process to arrive at a preferred choice. Some consumers (i.e., agents) may have a 
greater tendency to apply the complexity principles of diversity and collaboration. For 
example, in the context of leadership behaviors, this means that they would be more 
likely to collaborate around tasks and support shifting leadership roles as processes 
unfold.  Similarly, complex decision makers have a greater tendency to work with, rather 
than against, complexity by negotiating the decision process in a collaborative and 
integrative manner, for example, by collecting information from a wide variety of agents 
in the system and gaining an overall ‘big picture’ view of his or her situation.  
In summary, a complex approach to decision making is characterized as being 
collaborative and integrative, the decision maker tends to feel connected with other 
agents in the system and recognize the inherent unpredictability of the situation. When 
faced with a high-stakes decision situation, individuals will vary to the extent that their 
decision styles are complex. 
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CHAPTER 15 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPLEX DECISION STYLE (CDS) SCALE 
 
Currently, perceptual scales for measuring constructs that are central to 
complexity science do not exist, and if measured at all, they are observed via secondary 
sources (Begun, Zimmerman, and Dooley 2003). The CDS scale is developed to measure 
the degree to which a complex decision style is employed by a consumer in high-stakes 
decision situations. Based on a literature review and the results of study one, decision 
style is defined as a mental orientation characterizing the way a consumer tends to think 
about a decision situation and negotiate the decision process to arrive at a preferred 
choice. Also based on previous literature and study one results, a decision is considered 
to involve high stakes if it has subjectively important, risky, and life-altering outcomes 
(Kahn and Baron 1995; Kunreuther et al. 2002; White 2005). Thus, a complex decision 
style (CDS) is defined as a mental orientation towards high-stakes decisions 
characterized by (1) conceptualizing the situation as inherently complex and comprised 
of many connected parts and (2) negotiating the decision process in a collaborative and 
integrative manner. 
In psychology, the argument of ‘state versus trait’ (Spielberger 1972) posits that 
(1) states are a person’s personality characteristics that are flexibly defined as a function 
of the particular situation that they are in at the moment, whereas (2) traits are a person’s 
personality characteristics that are enduring and define the parameters of an individual’s 
behavior. This scale is intended to measure a trait since it assesses the tendency of an 
individual to consistently employ a complex decision style across all types of high-stakes 
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decision situations. This conceptualization is consistent with the cognitive style literature 
as discussed previously. 
 To develop the CDS scale, the scale development paradigm as proposed by 
Churchill (1979) and DeVellis (2003) was followed. This process consists of four 
separate studies. Study one generates an initial pool of items to measure CDS through a 
detailed literature review and an exploratory questionnaire given to a sample of university 
students. After assessing the content validity of the initial pool of items, study two 
purifies the scale items and assesses the reliability as well as convergent and discriminant 
validity of the purified scale. Study three is conducted to assess the generalizability of the 
scale across high-stakes decision situations and provide an initial assessment of the 
predictive validity of the CDS scale.  A fifth study is conducted to again assess the 
predictive validity of the scale with a normal population sample as well as test differential 
hypotheses based on CDS within a conceptual a model of choice of elective healthcare 
treatment. 
15.1 Study One: Literature Review and Item Generation 
The objective of study one is to refine definitions of important constructs of 
interest and generate a pool of possible items for inclusion in the CDS scale. The first 
goal is to develop a definition for complex decision style. This study consisted of 
reviewing the relevant literature on decision styles and complexity science as discussed 
previously and asking a series of open-ended questions to a sample of undergraduate 
students (n = 58). Please refer to Appendix A for a sample of this questionnaire.  
In the first section of the questionnaire, the respondents were provided with a 
conceptual definition of consumer decision style (Sproles and Kendall 1986) and were 
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asked to describe what they would consider a consumer decision style and give their own 
definition of consumer decision style. Based on their responses, the definition of 
consumer decision style adopted in this essay was further defined. Sproles and Kendall 
(1986) define consumer decision style as a preferred mode or mental orientation that is 
used to conceptualize a decision making situation and negotiate the decision making 
process to arrive at an acceptable choice. Based on the results of study one, this definition 
was revised to include how a consumer ‘thinks about’ the decision situation. Thus, 
consumer decision style is defined as a mental orientation characterizing the way a 
consumer tends to think about or conceptualizes a decision situation and negotiates the 
decision process to arrive at a preferred choice. Also in the first section of the 
questionnaire, respondents were asked whether they felt that individual consumers 
differed in terms of their decision styles. All of the respondents (100%) indicated that 
they felt that consumers differ in terms of their decision styles.  
In the second section of the questionnaire, two examples of what was meant by 
the phrase ‘complex decision making’ were provided to the respondents (e.g., deciding 
which stocks to buy and sell; choosing a healthcare treatment) and they were asked to 
give a definition of and describe how they would characterize a complex decision 
situation. Based on a qualitative analysis of their responses, it was determined that the 
responses were more consistent with the concept of ‘high-stakes’ rather than ‘complex’ 
decision making as has been distinguished in the marketing literature. According to 
Bettman, Johnson, and Payne (1991), the complexity of a decision task increases along 
with increases in (1) the number of alternatives or attributes, (2) the difficulty of 
processing of related information, (3) the uncertainty about the value of some of the 
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attributes, and (4) the comparability of some of the attributes in the set. High-stakes 
decisions are defined as ones with subjectively important and risky outcomes (White 
2005). Thus, although high-stakes decision situations may encompass some of the same 
characteristics of complex decision situations, these decisions are more emotionally 
difficult and stressful for the majority of people and the consequences of these decisions 
have a larger impact on one’s life (Kahn and Luce 2003). These types of decisions often 
involve choices regarding healthcare, housing, insurance, or security and involve a 
substantial amount of thought from consumers as well as a large portion of consumer 
spending (Kahn and Luce 2003). Based on the results of study one, this definition was 
revised to include the characteristic of being ‘life-altering’. Thus, a high-stakes decision 
is defined as a decision that has subjectively important, risky, and life-altering outcomes. 
In the third section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked how they would 
(1) conceptualize a complex decision situation and (2) the process that they would use to 
arrive at a choice in these types of situations. The questions asked were similar to the 
item generation process as described in Richins and Dawson (1992) and Peck and 
Childers (2003). Based on these responses and the literature review, an initial pool of 96 
items were written for possible inclusion in the CDS scale. This initial pool included 21 
items to tap into the way that a consumer thinks about or conceptualizes a high-stakes 
decision situation and 75 items to assess how the consumer negotiates the decision 
process to arrive at a preferred choice. 
15.1.1 Assessing the Content Validity of the Initial Items 
The next step was to assess the content validity of these initial items. This was 
accomplished by asking a group of four marketing PhD students and one marketing 
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professor to evaluate the items for grammatical errors, wording ambiguity, item 
similarity, possibility for ordering effects, and face validity. The participants were also 
provided with definitions of the constructs of interest. Based on their comments, some of 
the items were rewritten to provide more clarity as to the meaning of the item (13 items), 
to correct for grammatical errors (2 items), and to correct for the item being too similar to 
another item (1 item). In addition, one item was removed because the meaning was too 
ambiguous and not able to be clarified through re-wording. This left 95 possible scale 
items to be considered in the item purification study. Among the items, 40 were worded 
in a way that they would be reverse-coded (i.e., tapped into a more ‘traditional’ versus 
‘complex’ decision style). The items were meant to capture variance in either the 
conceptualization (21 items) or negotiation (74 items) of the decision situation. 
15.2 Study Two: Item Purification and Scale Structure 
The purpose of this study was to purify the scale following the procedures 
advocated by Churchill (1979), DeVellis (2003) and Spector (1992). The 95 item CDS 
scale was administered to a sample of 198 undergraduate students to provide preliminary 
estimates of reliability and scale structure. Before answering the scale items the 
respondents were provided a brief description of high-stakes consumer decision making. 
They were then asked to recall and describe “a time when you had to make a high-stakes 
consumer decision”. The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) (Pacini and Epstein 
1999) (40 items loading on 2 factors) was also administered for the purpose of testing for 
discriminant validity. Please refer to Appendix B for a sample of this questionnaire.  
95 males (48%) and 103 females (52%) participated in the study for partial course 
credit. The average respondent was 21.2 years of age with a minimum of 19 and a 
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maximum of 33. A seven-point Likert response scale corresponded to each of the scale 
items. Five responses were deleted either because of obvious inconsistent patterns in the 
responses or a large portion of missing data. This left 193 usable questionnaires for the 
following analysis.  
Before item purification, the group of 21 conceptualization items had a coefficient 
α of 0.586 while the 74 negotiation items had a coefficient α of 0.592. The complete 95 
item scale had a coefficient α of 0.669. Individual scale items were then assessed by 
examining means, variances, squared multiple correlations (SMCs), item-to-total 
correlations and results of an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using principle axis 
factoring with oblimin rotation. This led to the purification of 84 items to arrive at the 
final scale to be used in study three. 
DeVellis (2003) suggests that one should examine the mean and variance of each 
item to check that the means are close to the center of the range of possible responses 
(e.g., 4 on a 7 point scale) and that the variances are relatively high. Extreme mean values 
are not desirable because the item may not be worded strongly enough or may not be 
detecting certain values of the construct. Low variances are not desirable because the 
item may not be differentiating among individuals that possess various levels of the 
construct being measured. Based on these criteria, 11 items with extreme means or low 
variances were deleted from the scale (1 from the group of conceptualization items and 
10 from the group of negotiation items).  
The next step in the item purification process involved examining the correlations 
between items to make sure they met the requirements necessary to apply factor analysis 
(Hair et al. 1998; Bearden, Hardesty, and Rose 2001). The Bartlett test of sphericity was 
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used to obtain the probability that the correlation matrix includes significant correlations 
among at least some of the variables. The null hypothesis is that the intercorrelation 
matrix comes from a population in which the variables are noncollinear (i.e., an identity 
matrix). This test revealed that the data were appropriate for factor analysis (χ2 = 8113.98, 
df = 3486, p < 0.001). Thus, the sample intercorrelation matrix did not come from a 
population in which the intercorrelation matrix is an identity matrix. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin test of sampling adequacy was used to assess each item with regards to its 
probability of perfect prediction by the other variables. Hair et al. (1998) argue that a 
value below .50 (0 to 1 range) is unacceptable. This test resulted in a KMO of .664. 
Squared multiple correlations (SMCs) and item-to-total correlations were 
examined to determine the common variance that each of the items shared with the other 
items (DeVellis 2003; Richins and Dawson 1992). Items with low SMCs and corrected 
item-to-total correlations were removed. This resulted in the removal of 52 items from 
the scale (following guidelines of removal if the SMC was less than 0.30 and the 
corrected item-to-total correlation was less than 0.50). As a result, 32 items were retained 
in the scale (8 to tap into conceptualization and 24 to tap into negotiation).  
15.2.1 Dimensionality and Reliability 
The next step is to examine the dimensionality of the scale items. An exploratory 
factor analysis (principal axis with oblimin rotation) was used (DeVellis 2003; Spector 
1992) and led to the additional purification of 21 items. The EFA yielded a 4 factor 
solution that accounted for 70.65% of the variance.  The factors had an average loading 
of .790 for CDS1, .663 for CDS2, .703 for CDS3, and .828 for CDS4.  Two items were 
chosen to capture variability in the ‘Connected’ dimension (CDS1), which represents the 
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extent to which a person conceptualizes the situation as one that connects them to others. 
Three items represent the ‘Complexity-focused’ dimension (CDS2), which concerns the 
extent to which a person conceptualizes the decision situation as inherently complex and 
unpredictable. Four items describe the ‘Responsive’ dimension (CDS3), which represents 
the extent to which a person is collaborative in his or her decision process.  Two items tap 
into the ‘Integrative’ dimension (CDS4), which captures the extent to which a person is 
open to a variety of information.  These items exhibited the most desirable psychometric 
properties (e.g., high loadings on only one factor; Hair et al. 1998). Consequently, these 
11 items are included in the CDS scale in the confirmatory factor analysis. The total 
coefficient alpha was .688. The coefficient alpha for CDS1 was .767, .697 for CDS2, 
.802 for CDS3, and .816 for CDS4.  These values are greater than or very close to the .70 
cutoff as proposed by Nunally and Bernstein (1994). Hair et al. (1998) state that the 
lower limit for exploratory research may be decreased to .60.  In addition, all of the scales 
have four or less items which warrants less stringent criteria.  
To further purify the scale items and evaluate their structure, a theoretical model 
specifying four latent factors underlying CDS was tested by performing confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) on the correlation matrix using LISREL 8.5 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 
1996). SMCs, standardized residuals and modification indices generated from the CFA 
were examined and warranted no more deletions of scale items. Please refer to Table 4 
for scale properties based on the CFA and to Table 5 for the items included on the CDS 
scale. Overall, the four factors explained 56.58% of the total variance. Measurement 
indices for the model demonstrated acceptable fit: (χ2 = 49.96 (38df), p = 0.093; RMSEA = 
.040; CFI = 0.984, n = 193). An RMSEA of .040 represents reasonable errors of 
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approximation in the population and indicates good fit (Byrne 1998). The CFI exceeded 




Psychometric Properties of the CDS Scale 
 







…collaborating with others .86 (*) 
…arriving at a consensus with 
others .80 (t=11.18) 
…listening to the opinions of 
others .58 (t=8.00) 
…co-participating with others in 




…a situation that is relatively 
unpredictable .51 (*) 
…a situation having relatively 
unknowable outcomes .70 (t=5.53) 
…a situation that gets 
increasingly more complicated 




…focusing on differences among 
others’ opinions .84 (*) 
…focusing on the variation 




…a situation in which I feel 
connected to others .84 (*) 
…an experience that connects 








Items Included in the CDS Scale based on Study Two Results 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
regarding high-stakes decision making. 
 
I think about or conceptualize a high-stakes decision situation as…   





1. A situation that is relatively 
unpredictable. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
2. A situation in which I feel connected to 
others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
3. A situation that gets increasingly more 
complicated as time passes. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
4. A situation having relatively 
unknowable outcomes. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
5. An experience that connects me to 
others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
 
I negotiate the decision making process to arrive at a preferred choice by… 
 
 strongly disagree 
strongly
agree
6. Collaborating with others. 
 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
7. Focusing on differences among others’ 
opinions. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
8. Listening to the opinions of others. 
 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
9.    Focusing on the variation among 
others’ opinions. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
10.   Co-participating with others in the 
decision process. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
11.   Arriving at a consensus with others. 
 1        2        3        4         5         6        7 
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Composite reliability was also calculated and met the .70 threshold for each factor 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1988; Fornell and Larcker 1981; Hair et al. 1998). Specifically, the 
composite reliability was .775 for CDS1, .738 for CDS2, .7812 for CDS3, .816 for CDS4. 
Composite reliability is a measure of the internal consistency of the construct indicators, 
depicting the degree to which they indicate the common latent (unobserved) construct 
(Hair et al. 1998). To measure the amount of variance that is captured by the construct 
compared to variance due to measurement error, AVEs for each factor were calculated. 
The AVE for CDS1 was .634, .498 CDS2, .525 for CDS3, and .690 for CDS4. These all 
came close to or exceeded the .50 cutoff (Fornell and Larcker 1981). All of the factor 
loadings were significant based on a .05 significance level (Hair et al. 1998). As a test of 
discriminant validity between the factors, the squared correlation between the dimensions 
were all less than the AVEs and the confidence intervals around the phi values (φ ± 2 
standard deviations) did not contain 1.0 (Fornell and Larcker 1981).  
Competing measurement models were examined for a one-factor model (χ2 
=316.81, df = 44, p<.01, RMSEA = .180), two two-factor models, one with the 
conceptualization and negotiation dimensions collapsed (χ2 = 220.01, df = 43, p<.01, 
RMSEA = .146) and one with complexity-focused as separate (χ2 = 204.92, df = 43, 
p<.01, RMSEA = .140), a three-factor model where the Responsive and Integrative 
dimensions were combined (χ2 = 128.06, df = 41, p<.01, RMSEA = .105), and a four-
factor model with no correlation between the factors (χ2 = 97.90, df = 44, p<.01, RMSEA 
= .080).  The four-factor model with correlated dimensions provides a better fit relative to 
these competing models. 
15.2.2 Construct Validity 
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Convergent validity of the scale can be assessed by examining the strength of the 
factor loading of each observed item on its proposed factor. First, the coefficient for one 
indicator corresponding to each factor is fixed to 1.00. The t-values corresponding to all 
of the other items are then tested for significance. All of the corresponding t values were 
equal to 4.193 and above (p < 0.001). Since these t-values were all significant, 
convergent validity is confirmed (Mathwick, Malhotra, and Rigdon 2001). To further 
confirm the existence of convergent validity, the SMCs for all of the 11 items averaged 
55.43 percent (Anderson and Gerbing 1988).  
To assess discriminant validity, the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini and 
Epstein 1999) (40 items loading on 2 factors) was included in the survey.  Discriminant 
validity is assessed by fixing the estimated correlation (φ) parameter between the 
construct to 1.0 and then performing a χ2 difference test (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). A 
significantly lower χ2 value for the model in which the correlations are not constrained to 
unity indicates that discriminant validity is met. The chi-square tests that were performed 
reveal that discriminant validity is indicated between both dimensions (Rational and 
Experiential) of the REI and all dimensions (Connected, Complexity-focused, 
Responsive, and Integrative) of the CDS scale as well as the summated 11-item CDS 
scale.  
15.2.3 Second-order Model Comparisons 
To explore a potential hierarchical structure of CDS, a second-order model was 
compared with the first-order model as previously described. Since CDS1 and CDS2 
reflect the manner in which a consumer conceptualizes or thinks about a high-stakes 
decision situation and CDS3 and CDS4 reflect the manner in which a consumer 
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negotiates the decision process to arrive at a choice, it may be argued that the 
conceptualization factors may drive the variance in the negotiation factors. Thus, this 
alternative model was compared with the original four-factor model. This model included 
four paths between the conceptualization factors and the negotiation factors allowing 
both conceptualization factors to load on both of the negotiation factors. The model 
produced a χ2 = 70.32, df = 39, p < 0.01.  These model fit indices were compared with the 
original model (χ2 = 49.96, df = 38, p = 0.093) and showed worse fit. A χ2-difference test 
also provides evidence that the first-order model fits the data better than the second order 
model. Thus, the first-order model was used to test the predictive validity of the scale in 
the studies described below.  
15.3 Study Three: Replication and Reliability of Scale across Decision Scenarios 
 A third study was used to replicate the structure of the CDS scale, to assess the 
generalizability of the scale across decision scenarios and to test the predictive validity of 
the scale using a sample of university students.  In order to have more than two items as 
indicators for each factor, 11 additional items were added to the 11-item scale as derived 
in the previous study.  More specifically, one positive item and one reverse-worded item 
were added to the ‘Responsive’ dimension, making a total of six items.  Again, one 
positive and one reverse-worded item were added to the ‘Complexity-focused’ 
dimension, making a total of five items.  For the ‘Integrative’ dimension, two positive 
items and one reverse-worded item were added, making a total of five items.  For 
‘Connected’, three positive items and one reverse-worded item were added, totaling six 
items in all.  Please refer to Appendix C to find the items which were included in the 
study three survey (Version A).     
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 The CDS scale, as well as a variety of measures used for the predictive validity 
tests, was administered to a new sample of university students, from which we can further 
assess the validity and reliability of the scale.  The initial sample size was equal to 276; 
however, after the deletion of nine responses due to missing and inconsistent data, the 
final sample size was equal to 267.  169 males (63.3%) and 98 females (36.7%) 
completed the survey.  The average age of respondents was 20.86 years old.   
 To assist in assessing the reliability of the scale, four versions of the survey were 
created.  This allowed us to test the generalizability of the scale across high-stakes 
decision situations and also whether responses were consistent whether individuals were 
given just a general definition of high-stakes decision or they were provided with a 
specific scenario.  For version A of the survey, n = 68.  For version B of the survey, n = 
65.  For version C of the survey, n = 67.  For version D of the survey, n = 67.  Each 
survey included two different high-stakes decision scenarios for assessing predictive 
validity – a financial investment decision involving going back to graduate school and a 
health care decision involving choice of chemotherapy treatment.   
 Version A of the survey first asked respondents to answer the items related to 
CDS given just a general definition of high-stakes decisions.  Then they were give the 
investment scenario and asked to answer questions to assess the predictive validity of the 
scale within this context.  They were again administered the CDS scale and given a 
simple reminder of the general definition of high-stakes decisions.  Next they were 
provided with the health care scenario and finished the survey by answering questions to 
assess the predictive validity of the scale within this context.  Version A will allow us to 
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assess the basic test-retest validity of the CDS scale.  In addition, the order of the scale 
items were randomized from the first administration to the second.   
 Version B of the survey started off the same as version A; respondents were first 
administered the CDS scale given a general definition of high-stakes decisions.  Then 
they were provided with the investment scenario and asked to answer questions to assess 
the predictive validity of the scale within this context.  However, then the respondents 
were provided with the health care scenario before being administered the CDS scale for 
the second time.  Version B will allow us to assess whether responses are consistent from 
responding to the items with just a general idea of high-stakes decisions to responding to 
the items given a specific health-care scenario.   
 Version C of the survey was reversed from Version B.  Respondents answered the 
CDS items specifically referring to the investment scenario; however, they were given 
just a brief reminder of the definition of high-stakes decisions before responding to the 
CDS items for the second time (before given healthcare scenario).  Version C will again 
allow us to assess the consistency of responses from responding to the items based on 
high-stakes decisions in general and then with a specific investment scenario. 
 In Version D of the survey, respondents answered the CDS items specifically 
referring to both scenarios.  This will allow us to assess the consistency of their responses 
across two different high-stakes decision scenarios. 
 Before testing the reliability and generalizability of the CDS scale it is important 
to assess if any of the items should be deleted from the scale since new items were added 
prior to this study as well as examine scale structure.  Exploratory factor analysis 
(principal axis with oblimin rotation) was used to examine the dimensionality of the scale 
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items across conditions.  Based on the scree plots and the average variance explained by 
the factors, a three factor solution was decided upon and 11 items (6 new and 5 old) were 
removed that did not load on only one factor.  This leaves an 11 item scale with the 
dimensions ‘Connected’, ‘Complexity-focused’, and ‘Responsive/Integrative’.  
Conceptually, the remaining factors are quite similar to the factors that were derived in 
the previous study; however, it was determined that for the sake of parsimony and 
consistency in results across the data collection conditions, the Responsive and 
Integrative (negotiation) dimensions that were separate in the previous study combine in 
this study and the Complexity and Connectedness (conceptualization) dimensions would 
remain as described in the previous study.   
 Although there were slight variations in the size of item loadings across the 
conditions, the pattern was quite consistent across all conditions.  The solutions generally 
showed three items capturing variability in the ‘Connected’ (CDS1) dimension, which 
represents the extent to which a person conceptualizes high-stakes decisions as situations 
which connect them to others.  Another three items consistently captured the variability 
in the ‘Complexity-focused’ (CDS2) dimension, which concerns the extent to which a 
person conceptualizes the decision situation as inherently complex and unpredictable.  
And five items were chosen to represent the ‘Responsive/Integrative’ (CDS3) dimension, 
which represents the extent to which a person acts in a collaborative and open manner to 
negotiate the decision process.  These items exhibited the most desirable psychometric 
properties and high loadings on only one factor (Hair et al. 1998).  Thus, a total of 11 
items were included in the CDS scale, six tapping into conceptualization of a high-stakes 
decision and five tapping into negotiation of a high-stakes decision.  At this point, the 
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coefficient alpha was .804 across the pooled first administration of the scale and .842 
across the pooled second administration of the scale.   
 To further evaluate the scale structure structure, a model specifying three latent 
factors underlying CDS was estimated in LISREL (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996) using 
confirmatory factor analysis with each of the correlation matrices for the pooled 
investment and healthcare scenarios.  For the investment scenario, χ2 = 81.52 (41df), p < 
.01; RMSEA = .061; CFI = .967.  In addition, 69.22 percent of the variance was 
explained by the scale structure for the investment scenario.  For the healthcare scenario, 
χ2 = 101.91 (41df), p < .01; RMSEA = .075; CFI = .961.  72.11 percent of the variance was 
explained by the scale structure for the healthcare scenario.  Please refer to Figures 1 and 



























































 The consistency of responses from the first administration to second 
administration of the scale will now be tested for each version of the survey.  First the 
basic test-retest reliability within the subset of respondents who completed Version A of 
the survey will be assessed.  The correlation between responses on the summated CDS 
scale equals 0.766 (p < .001) which provides evidence supporting the reliability of the 
CDS scale when it is administered with a brief explanation of the meaning of a high-
stakes consumer decision.   
 Second, the consistency between responses when individuals were first exposed 
to the CDS scale with only a general definition and then given a specific healthcare 
scenario as a point of reference will be assessed.  This can be done by looking at the 
subset of respondents who completed Version B of the survey.  The correlation between 
responses on the complete CDS scale equals 0.500 (p < .001).   
 Third, the consistency between responses when individuals were first exposed to 
the CDS scale with the specific investment scenario as a point of reference and then 
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given only a general definition will be assessed.  This can be done by looking at the 
subset of respondents who completed Version C of the survey.  The correlation between 
responses on the complete CDS scale equals 0.803 (p < .001).   
 Lastly, the consistency between responses to the CDS items across the investment 
and healthcare scenarios will be assessed.  This can be done by looking at the subset of 
respondents who completed Version D of the survey.  The correlation between responses 
on the complete CDS scale equals 0.224 (p < .05).   
 Before moving on to the predictive validity tests, the CDS scale was correlated 
across various demographic factors and with one scale included for a test of discriminant 
validity, namely, the ‘Need for Cognitive Closure’ scale (coefficient alpha = .709).  First, 
the summated CDS scale was correlated with the demographic variables (age, race, sex) 
for each administration.  There were no significant correlations.  Next, CDS and its 
dimensions were correlated with the summated NCC scale for the pooled first and second 
administration conditions.  Again, there were no significant correlations.   
15.4 Studies Three and Four: Predictive Validity of the Scale 
Predictive validity is defined as “the degree to which predictions from a formal 
theoretical network containing the concept under scrutiny are confirmed” (Bearden, 
Netemeyer, and Mobley 1993; p. 5). To gain evidence of predictive validity, various 
antecedent and consequential effects related to the construct of interest must be examined 
(Iacobucci, Ostrom, and Grayson 1995). Since CDS is defined as an individual difference 
variable, we concentrate on testing the predictive validity of the scale with respect to 
consequential effects. Thus, relationships between this individual difference measure and 
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various decision-making variables of interest are predicted.  Please refer to Figure 3 for a 
















The consumer literature also supports the reliance on both professionals as well as 
laypeople for information, recommendations, and word-of-mouth evaluations (Gershoff, 
Mukherjee, and Mukhopadhyay 2007; Gershoff and Johar 2006). According to the tenets 
of complexity science and cognitive style theory, which provide the theoretical 
foundation for the development of the CDS scale, individuals high in CDS are more 
likely to act in a consistently collaborative manner throughout the decision process. 
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Decision agents acting in a complex manner are more likely to value and listen to others’ 
opinions and involve important others in the decision process instead of acting in an 
autonomous manner. They conceptualize the decision situation as one which connects 
them to others in contrast to feeling isolated and alone. Therefore, we expect that an 
individual with the tendency to use a CDS will feel a greater need to seek out and 
consider the opinions of important others throughout the decision process. Thus, a 
positive relationship is expected between CDS and the level of interpersonal information 
search that an individual engages in regarding the decision or choice behavior in 
question.  
 Because they conceptualize the decision situation as relatively unpredictable, 
unknowable, and becoming increasingly more complicated as time passes, high-CDS 
individuals will want to continuously update their information throughout the decision 
process to adapt to changes in the situation. In addition, high-CDS individuals are more 
likely to integrate a variety of information in order to gain an understanding of the ‘big 
picture’ before making a choice. As supported in consumer research, recognizing and 
accepting a greater level of uncertainty about one’s current situating should also lead to 
more extensive search (Cox 1967; Lanzetta 1963). However, external information can be 
broadly classified as coming from both interpersonal sources and impersonal sources (see 
Cho and Lee 2006; Lee and Cho 2005; Murray 1991).  Therefore, we expect that 
individuals high on CDS will also engage in a higher level of impersonal information 
search from a variety of information sources (e.g., TV, magazines, scientific articles, etc.) 
before making a decision.  Thus, a positive association is expected between CDS and the 
level of interpersonal information search regarding the decision and the level of 
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impersonal information search regarding the decision. In addition, because of their 
tendency to engage in a more extensive information search regarding the decision, 
including both subjective and objective sources of information, the expectation is that 
individuals high in CDS will have a higher objective knowledge level regarding their 
choice options compared to individuals low in CDS. Thus, a positive relationship is also 
expected between CDS and an individual’s knowledge level regarding the choice options.  
 Consumer decisions often evoke negative emotions when they require resolution 
of conflicts between valued goals (Luce 1998). Decision-task-related emotion is defined 
as an affective state that results directly from and is focused on a choice with which on is 
currently engaged (Luce 1998). According to Lazarus’s (Lazarus 1991; Folkman and 
Lazarus 1988) theory of emotion elicitation, negative emotion is increased as important 
goals to the decision maker (e.g., health, survival, financial expenses) are being 
threatened or blocked as one’s situation changes. However, it is suggested that there are 
individual differences in the extent to which individuals may generate negative emotion 
in response to a threat (e.g., Olson and Zanna 1982).  
 One way in which individuals may be able to cope with a stressful decision-
making process is by seeking the social support and/or advice of others (White 2005). 
Previous research on social support has suggested that it acts as a ‘psychological buffer’ 
against real or imagined stressful outcomes of one’s decision (Cohen and Wills 1985). 
Hagerty et al. (1993, p. 293) defined a state of connectedness as occurring “when a 
person is actively involved with another person, object, group, or environment, and that 
involvement promotes a sense of comfort, well-being, and anxiety-reduction.” 
Individuals with high levels of connectedness are better able to manage their own 
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emotions and feelings and are less prone to anxiety (Lee and Robbins 1998). Because 
individuals who use a CDS when making high-stakes decisions are more participatory, 
collaborative and responsive to others throughout the decision process and conceptualize 
the experience as one in which they feel connected with others, the expectation is that 
they will experience less negative emotion generated by the decision process.   
In the context of healthcare decisions, an individual’s physician is one distinct 
important agent in the system that may be tapped for information regarding the decision 
and choice options. Although all physicians are required to provide information for 
patients to be able to give informed consent to their treatments, most physicians simply 
meet this threshold but do not exceed it. Since individuals high in CDS have a greater 
desire to co-participate with others throughout the decision process and arrive a 
consensus with others, the belief is that they will be more likely to initiate interactions 
with their physician regarding the decision and their choice options. Instead of acting as a 
passive receiver of a physician’s care, they will be more active in seeking out information 
from their physician as well as spontaneously contacting their physician if they have any 
questions or concerns. They will also be more likely to prefer a shared decision role with 
their physician since they see themselves as connected with the physician in the system.  
Thus, the expectation is that CDS will be positively related to the level of patient-initiated 
physician interaction regarding the decision and to a preference for a shared decision 
making role. Specifically, individuals high in CDS will report a greater amount of 
patient-initiated interaction with their physician as compared to individuals low in CDS.   
In addition, individuals high in CDS will report a greater preference for a shared decision 
making role with their physician in contrast to preference for an autonomous or passive 
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role. These last two variables will only be measured and tested for significance in the 
context of healthcare decisions. 
15.4.1 Predictive Validity with Student Sample 
As an initial test of the predictive validity of the CDS scale, responses from a 
sample of university students presented with one scenario involving choice of elective 
healthcare treatment and one scenario involving choice of financial investment will be 
used. Both of these scenarios represent a high-stakes decision situation which involves 
subjectively risky and important outcomes. For each scenario respondents will be told to 
pretend that they are the decision maker as described and will need to choose a course of 
action.  
The survey used for study four included four measures to check to make sure that 
each decision scenario (investment and health care) was perceived by the respondents as 
being high-stakes.  The respondents were asked to rate the importance of the decision, 
risks associated with the outcomes of the decision, emotionality of the decision, and 
stressfulness of the decision.  For the investment scenario, the average ratings on 7-point 
semantic differential scales (e.g., “not very important” to “very important”) equaled 6.40 
for importance of the decision, 4.31 for the risk associated with the outcomes of the 
decision, 5.34 for ratings of the emotionality of the decision, and 5.81 as the average 
rating for the stressfulness of the decision.  And for the healthcare scenario, 6.70 for the 
importance of the decision, 6.49 for the risk associated with the outcomes of the decision, 
6.53 for ratings of the emotionality of the decision, and 6.55 as the average rating for the 
stressfulness of the decision. All of the average values were statistically greater than the 
midpoint (4) of the scale, which indicates that these decisions were considered to be high-
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stakes, i.e., risky, important, emotional, and stressful.  In addition, for the investment 
scenario, 43.8% chose to enroll in graduate school whereas 56.2% chose to not to enroll 
in graduate school.  For the healthcare scenario, about 61% chose the chemotherapy 
treatment whereas about 39% chose not to take the chemotherapy treatment.  These 
statistics show that for both scenarios there was not a clear-cut choice, which is 
descriptive of a high-stakes decision situation.   
 To test for predictive validity in the fourth study, variables were measured that are 
expected to be associated with consumers’ decision-making behaviors in high-stakes 
decision situations.  Specifically, a positive relationship is expected between CDS and 
level of information search (interpersonal and impersonal) conducted regarding the 
decision, knowledge level, and level of self-initiated physician interaction regarding the 
decision (for the healthcare scenario only).  In addition, a negative relationship is 
expected between CDS and negative emotion elicited from the decision-making process. 
After being presented with each decision scenario, the respondents were asked a 
series of items regarding how likely it is that they would consult a variety of interpersonal 
information sources (7-point scale ranging from not very likely to very likely) about the 
decision they faced (see Duhan et al. 1997). For the investment scenario, personal sources 
included a friend, school advisor, relative, classmate, financial advisor, and social/support 
group member.  For the healthcare scenario, personal sources included friend, doctor, 
relative, classmate, nurse, and social/support group member. They were then asked to rate 
the importance of each of the personal sources of information (7-point scale ranging from 
not very important to very important).   
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To measure impersonal information search, the respondents were asked how 
likely it was that they would consult a variety of impersonal information sources about 
their choice options. Across both scenarios, the list of sources included newspapers, 
magazines, the Internet, books, television programming, statistical reports, 
brochures/pamphlets, and seminars/information sessions.  In addition, they were also 
asked to rate the importance of each of these specific information sources. 
For the predictive validity tests related to information search, each analysis will 
be run using the summated CDS score.  For the first analysis, the summated CDS score 
was correlated with information search regarding the decision of whether or not to enroll 
in graduate school. There were no significant correlations between CDS and the 
likelihood of using personal information sources to search (α = .674) or the importance of 
personal information sources (α = .597).  Likewise, a composite measure of summated 
likelihood of using each personal information sources for information weighted by the 
importance of each personal information source was not significantly related to CDS.  
Regarding impersonal information search, the summated CDS scale was also not 
significantly related to any of the variables.  CDS was also not significantly related to any 
of the personal or impersonal information search variables within the healthcare scenario.  
Thus, the hypotheses regarding the positive relationship between CDS and interpersonal 
and impersonal information search were not supported in this study. 
In order to further assess the predictive validity of the CDS scale in the context of 
the healthcare scenario, respondents were asked to indicate the amount of self-initiated 
physician interaction that they would anticipate engaging in during the process of making 
the decision.  They were also asked questions regarding their preferred level of 
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participation (decision-making role) in the decision with their physician. First, the 
respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood that they would initiate interaction with 
a physician on a variety of factors related to the decision situation such as treatment 
options, risks/benefits, and so on. After running the correlation analysis, the relationship 
between CDS and level of patient-initiated physician interaction was shown to be 
nonsignificant. 
Self-reported preferred decision role was also measured with the prediction that 
CDS will be positively related to preference for a shared role in contrast to an 
autonomous or passive role. A variation of the Problem Solving Decision Making Scale 
(Deber, Kraetschmer, and Irvine 1996; Kraetschmer et al. 2004) was used as one measure 
of preferred decision role. The original scale allows respondents to indicate how much 
they would want to participate in both the problem-solving and decision-making aspects 
of healthcare treatment. Since in this study the main interest is on decision making 
behaviors (problem-solving refers to a situation with one optimal solution), the scale 
items were adopted accordingly.  Each individual was asked to respond to two items with 
a 5-point Likert scale where 1 = the doctor alone, 2 = mostly the doctor, 3 = both equally, 
4 = mostly me, and 5 = me alone. Individuals with a mean score of less than 3 are 
classified as passive, individuals with a mean score of 3 to 3.99 are classified as shared, 
and individuals with a mean score of greater than or equal to 4 are classified as 
autonomous. Based on Spearman’s correlation coefficients, there were no significant 
relationships between CDS and preferred decision-making role. 
15.4.2 Predictive Validity with Normal Population Sample 
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In addition to testing the predictive validity of the CDS scale using a sample of 
university students and their responses to scenario-based questions, predictive validity 
was also assessed in a fourth study using a normal population sample of middle-aged 
women. In this study, respondents were directed to refer to a specific choice that they 
have made in the past, are currently making, or anticipate making in the near future. This 
choice is whether or not to use Hormone Replacement Therapy (HRT). Again, positive 
relationships are expected between CDS and (1) the level of interpersonal and impersonal 
information search conducted regarding the decision to use HRT, (2) self-reported 
objective knowledge regarding HRT use, and (3) the amount of patient-initiated 
physician interaction regarding the decision.  In addition, a negative relationship between 
CDS and the level of negative emotion elicited by the decision making process is 
expected.  
For each decision scenario the respondents also indicated the level of negative 
emotion that they would expect to experience from the decision-making process.  
Specifically, they were asked to respond to a variety of adjective terms using a Likert-
type scale reflecting how well each term described how they would feel if they actually 
had to make the relevant decision (Luce 1998).  The adjective checklist included items 
from the Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) PANAS scale.  Similar to Luce (1998), 
other adjectives were added that are particularly relevant to high-stakes decision making.  
The relationship between elicited negative emotion and CDS was nonsignificant.  
15.4.2.1 Study Four Sample 
 For study four the sample was recruited using a modified snowball technique. 
More specifically, a group of university students and personal acquaintances were asked 
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to identify respondents who meet the sample requirements. The respondents were then 
hand-delivered or mailed a hard-copy of the survey and returned it back either to the 
person who recruited them in a sealed envelope or mailed it directly to the researcher. An 
individual met the sample requirements if they were a woman between the ages of 40 and 
60. McKinlay, Brambilla and Posner (1992) report that the average menopausal 
transition, or the time when vasomotor symptoms peak, occurs around age 47. An NIH 
report documents that the median age of women experiencing the beginning of 
menopause is 50 to 51 years (NIH 2005).  A woman is not considered to be 
postmenopausal until 12 months since her last menstrual cycle, which usually occurs 
naturally between the ages of 45 and 54 (www.menopause.org). As Griffiths (1999) 
points out, there are few adult women under the age of 65 who have not heard of HRT or 
who have not thought about taking it, although it may not yet be relevant for them 
(Griffiths and Jones 1995). After reading a statement of consent and identity 
confidentiality, respondents who agreed to consent to the research were then asked a 
series of self-report questions. 
 After data collection was complete, the initial sample size was equal to 392.  
However, 23 responses were deleted because of obvious inconsistent responses, a large 
amount of missing data, or because they did not meet the sample requirement (i.e., too 
young or too old).  This left a final sample size of 369.  The average respondent age was 
50.38 with a median of 51.  86.4% considered themselves to be of White or Caucasian 
ethnicity, 10.6% Black or African American, 1.1% Hispanic, 0.3% Asian, and 1.6% 
indicated their race/ethnicity as ‘Other’.  4.9% indicated that they were single and never 
married, 81% married, 11.4% separated or divorced, and 2.7% widowed.  In addition, the 
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majority of the respondents had a college degree.  In fact 33.7% had received a college 
graduate degree as their highest level of education, 32.9% had received an undergraduate 
degree, 19.3% some college, 3.3% a trade school degree, 10.6% a high school degree, 
and 0.3% grade school only.  72.1% were employed full time, 14.8% part-time, and 
13.1% not in paid employment.  As far as income, 37.4% indicated that they made over 
$80,000 per year, 15.4% $60,000 to $80,000, 23.7% $40,000 to $60000, 15.5% $20,000 
to $40,000, 3.7% $10,000 to $20,000 and 2.3% less than $10,000.  1.4% indicated that 
they were unsure of their income level.  In addition, 97.8% of the women indicated that 
they had health insurance coverage.  Please refer to Table 6 for a summary of the study 
four sample characteristics.   
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Table 6 
Study Four Sample Characteristics 
 
 Characteristic n % Characteristic n % 
Age    Breast self-exam    
   < 50 162 43.9    Never 23 6.2 
   50-59 187 50.7    1-3 times per year 80 21.7 
   ≥ 60 20 5.4    Once every 2-4 years 146 39.6 
Race/Ethnicity       At least once per month 120 32.5 
   White 318 86.4 Mammogram    
   Black 39 10.6    Never 17 4.6 
   Hispanic 4 1.1    Once every 5 years or more 17 4.6 
   Asian 1 0.3    Once every 2-4 years 65 17.6 
   Other 6 1.6    At least once per year 270 73.2 
Education    Hysterectomy   
   College graduate degree 124 33.7    Yes 84 22.8 
   College undergrad degree 121 32.9 Illness or disease diagnosis    
   Some college 71 19.3    Yes 57 15.4 
   Trade school degree 12 3.3 Menstrual cycle    
   High school degree 39 10.6    Regular (1-3 mos. apart) 142 39.0 
   < High school degree 1 0.3    Irregular (3-12 mos. apart) 33 9.1 
Annual Income       None 51.2 51.9 
   ≤ $20,000 21 657 Menopausal symptoms    
   $20,001-$40,000 55 15.5    None 104 28.6 
   $40,001-$60,000 84 23.7    Mild 112 30.8 
   $60,001-$80,000 57 15.4    Moderate 112 30.8 
   > $80,000 138 37.4    Severe 28 7.7 
Marriage       Very severe 8 2.2 
   Single 18 4.9 HRT Use    
   Married 298 81.0    None 244 66
   Divorced 42 11.4    Current 55 14





 An additional set of questions asked on the survey referred to the individual’s 
reproductive stage, her history of hormone therapy use, the climacteric symptoms that she 
has experienced and level and history of healthcare related to women’s issues.  The 
women were first asked if they were experiencing the symptoms of menopause or 
perimenopause. According to the International Menopause Society and the Council of 
Affiliated Menopause Societies (CAMS), menopause or natural menopause refers to the 
biological event of the cessation of menstruation due to loss of ovarian follicular activity 
(Conboy, Domar and O’Connell 2001). A woman is considered post-menopausal if she 
has not experienced a menstrual cycle in over 12 months. ‘Climacteric’ is the term that is 
currently preferred in the medical field to refer to this phase of life in which a woman 
transitions from a reproductive to a non-reproductive state. The climacteric may extend 
before the perimenopause, through perimenopause, menopause and post menopause. The 
phrase ‘climacteric syndrome’ is used to refer to the symptoms that sometimes occur with 
the climacteric (Utian 1999). However, since this change in terminology is rather recent, 
most individuals are not familiar with the term climacteric and are more familiar with the 
term menopause to refer to these experiences. In this study the term menopause was used. 
In addition to the self-report items, the climacteric status of the sample will also be 
assessed by asking the respondents to indicate how often they are experiencing a 
menstrual period (regularly or 1-3 months apart, irregularly or 3-12 months apart, no 
period for more than 12 months).  Technically, women are considered perimenopausal 
after they are experiencing an irregular period.   
 60.7% of the respondents indicated that they were experiencing what they 
perceived as the symptoms of menopause or perimenopause.  Of those that were 
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experiencing symptoms, 1.7% rated the symptoms as fairly nonexistent, 39.8% rated the 
severity of the symptoms as mild, 44.8% as moderate, 10.5% as severe, and 3.2% as very 
severe.  As a more objective measure of reproductive status, the respondents were also 
asked how often they were experiencing a menstrual period.  39% indicated that they 
were experiencing a regular menstrual cycle, 9.1% an irregular cycle, and 51.9% no 
cycle.  To compare these objective responses to the subjective responses, those who 
indicated that they were experiencing a period either irregularly or experiencing no 
period were combined and re-coded as ‘perimenopausal/menopausal’ (61%).  A cross-
tabulation analysis was then conducted with this variable and responses to the perception-
based question.  The cross-tabulation analysis showed a significant relationship between 
the reports of a subjective experience of symptoms of menopause/perimenopause and an 
objective measure based on menstrual cycle (Pearson’s chi-square = 17.872, df = 1, 
p<.001).  Specifically, 69.7% of those who indicated that they were ‘experiencing’ the 
symptoms of menopause/perimenopause also indicated that their menstrual cycles were 
either irregular or nonexistent.  On the other hand, 30.3% of those who indicated that they 
were experiencing symptoms said that they still had a regular period.  There were also a 
percentage of respondents who indicated that they had either an irregular or nonexistent 
menstrual cycle but were experiencing no symptoms (30.6%).  This may be due to either 
the mild extremity of symptoms, measures taken to relieve symptoms (e.g., HRT), or 
surgical cessation of the menstrual cycle (e.g., hysterectomy).   
 The respondents were also asked to report the level of gynecological care that 
they currently receive and the types of healthcare provisions they take with respect to 
women’s healthcare issues. 55% of the respondents indicated that they had had a 
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discussion about HRT use with their primary gynecological health care provider.  32.5% 
indicated that they regularly (at least once per month) conduct a breast self-exam, 39.6% 
occasionally (every 2-3 months), 21.7% rarely (1-3 times per year), and 6.2% never.  
73.2% indicated that they have a regular (at least once per year) professional breast 
cancer screening (i.e., mammogram), 17.6% occasionally (once every 2-4 years), 4.6% 
rarely (once every 5 years or more), and 4.6% never.  In addition, 78.7% indicated that 
they have a regular (at least once per year) cervical cancer screening (i.e., pap smear), 
17.4% occasionally (once every 2-4 years), 2.5% rarely (once every 5 years or more), and 
1.4% never. 
 The respondents were also asked about their healthcare history, specifically if 
they have ever been diagnosed with a serious disease or illness.  15.4% indicated that 
they had with the most common responses being breast cancer, melanoma, diabetes, high 
blood pressure and other heart related issues.  In addition, 22.8% of our respondents 
indicated that they had had a hysterectomy or endometrial ablation (i.e., removal or 
destruction of the lining of the uterus).   
 The respondents were also asked about their HRT use, namely if they are 
currently using HRT or if they have used HRT treatment in the past. HRT is a general 
term that is commonly used to refer to hormones (estrogen and progesterone or estrogen 
alone) used by women who are going through or have been through menopause (Griffiths 
1999). Regarding hormone therapy (HRT) use, where HRT is defined as estrogen 
treatment or estrogen treatment combined with other hormones such as progestogen, 
progestin or progesterone, 66.1% indicated that they had never used HRT, 14.9% 
indicated that they were currently using HRT, and 19% indicated that they had used HRT 
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in the past.  Thus, a total of 33.9% were either currently using HRT or had used HRT in 
the past. 
 In addition, HRT use was compared within the categories of those who were and 
were not experiencing menopausal symptoms and within the categories of those who 
were and were not experiencing a regular menstrual period.  Specifically, of those who 
indicated that they were experiencing menopausal symptoms (n=221), 63.3% had never 
used HRT, 17.2% were currently using HRT, and 19.5% had used HRT in the past.  Of 
those who indicated that they were not experiencing menopausal symptoms (n=143), 
71.3% had never used HRT, 11.9% were currently using HRT, and 16.8% had used HRT 
in the past.  Of those who reported experiencing an irregular or nonexistent menstrual 
cycle, 49.5% had never used HRT, 22.1% were currently using HRT, and 28.4% had 
used HRT in the past.  Of those who reported experiencing a regular menstrual cycle, 
93% had never used HRT, 4.2% were currently using HRT, and 2.8% reported past use 
of HRT. 
 The healthcare and demographic variables were also correlated which resulted in 
a number of significant correlations (p < .05).  First, between age and hysterectomy 
(.136), breast self-exam (.113), mammogram (.256), and discussion with health care 
provider about HRT (.502).  Education was related to pap smear (.151) and hysterectomy 
(.136).  Mammogram was related to both breast self-exam (.134) and pap smear (.435).  
In addition, discussion with HC provider regarding HRT was related to hysterectomy 
(.179), breast self-exam (.126) and mammogram (.146).   
 In addition, HRT use was correlated with the various demographic and HRT-
related variables.  The significant correlations (p < .05) were between HRT use and age 
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(.470), discussion with healthcare provider about HRT (.530), disease or illness diagnosis 
(-.107), and hysterectomy (-.280).  Both the subjective and objective measures of 
menopausal status were also correlated with the healthcare-related variables.  Severity of 
symptoms was significantly (p < .05) related to discussion of HRT with a healthcare 
provider (.323) and HRT use (.255).  The experience of menopausal symptoms was 
related to discussion with healthcare provider (.189).  In addition, the irregular or 
nonexistent experience of a menstrual cycle was related to frequency of mammogram 
(.132) and hysterectomy (.321).  And, as expected, those who were experiencing a regular 
menstrual period were less likely to have had a discussion with a healthcare provider 
regarding HRT use (-.521).   
15.4.2.2 Replication of the Scale Structure 
 Before testing the predictive validity of the CDS scale within the context of HRT 
use, CDS scale structure is once again examined in order to assess the generalizability of 
the scale and its underlying dimensions to a non-student sample.  LISREL was used to 
estimate a model specifying the three latent factors (Connected, Complexity-focused, and 
Responsive/Integrative) underlying CDS.  A three factor solution with a total of 11 
indicators accounted for approximately 70.27% of the total variance (α = .813).  The 
measurement model also showed good fit with χ2 = 76.09 (41df), p < .01; RMSEA = .057; 
CFI = .969.  Please refer to Table 7 for a summary description of the scale structure as 






Study Four CDS Scale Structure and Final CDS Scale Items 
 







…an experience that unites 
me with others .84* 
…a situation in which I feel 
connected to others .94 (t=19.79) 
…an experience that connects 




…a situation that is relatively 
unpredictable .48* 
… a situation that gets 
increasingly more 
complicated as time passes 
.69 (t=6.09) 
…a constantly changing 




…carefully considering the 
opinions of others .72* 
…focusing on the variation in 
others’ opinions .68 (t=10.41) 
…seeking out divergent 
viewpoints regarding the 
situation 
.63 (t=9.65) 
…soliciting others’ thoughts 
regarding the situation .85 (t=12.94) 
…exploring the diversity 
among others’ opinions 
.864 .868 
.87 (t=13.21) 




15.4.2.3 Predictive Validity in the Context of Decisions Regarding Hormone 
Replacement Therapy (HRT) Use 
 
For the predictive validity tests in this study, a variety of self-report items were 
included in the questionnaire regarding the women’s decisions of whether or not to use 
HRT.  Please refer to Table 8 for a summary of the measures and their correlations.  
Respondents were first asked to report on items that assessed the level of their 
interpersonal information search. The expectation is that there will be a positive 
relationship between CDS and the level of interpersonal information search. To test this, 
respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they consulted in the past or would 
expect to consult in the future a variety of personal sources for information regarding the 
decision of whether or not to use HRT.  These sources included a friend, doctor, 
classmate, relative, nurse and social or support group member.  The ratings were made on 
a 7-point scale where 1 = “a limited extent” and 7 = “a great extent”.  A similar series of 
Likert-scaled questions were provided regarding the impersonal (media-based or 
objective) sources of information that they have consulted or anticipate to consult 
regarding the decision of whether or not to use HRT. These sources included newspapers, 
magazines, the Internet, books, television programming, statistical reports, 
brochures/pamphlets, seminars/information sessions, and radio programming.  Again, the 
expectation is that there will be a positive relationship between CDS and the level of 
impersonal information search.  The summated CDS scale was positively correlated with 
likelihood of consulting personal sources for information (alpha = .798) (β = .329, p < 
.01) and likelihood of consulting impersonal sources of information (alpha = .897) (β = 




Study Four Correlations and Measurement Items 
 
Measure Correlations α 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
1. Objective 
knowledge level  ---      .965 
2. Level of 
interpersonal   
information 
search 
-.035 ---     .798 




.011 .411** ---    .897 
4. Preference for 
shared decision 
role  
.097 .106* .125* ---   na 
5. Preference for 
autonomous 
decision role 
.076 .102 -.019 -.436** ---  na 




.116* .250** .216** .277** -.171** --- .886 
7. Perceived 
negative emotion -.099 .182** .209** -.077 .020 .073 .867 
 
 
As classified by Braddock et al. (1999), the elements of informed decision making 
include a discussion of (1) the patient’s role in the decision making process, (2) the 
clinical issue or nature of the decision, (3) the choice alternatives, (4) the pros (potential 
benefits) and cons (potential risks) of the alternatives, (5) the uncertainties associated 
with the choice options, (6) the patient’s understanding of the choice options, and (7) the 
patient’s preference. The next step in the test of predictive validity is to assess each 
respondent’s level of patient-initiated physician interaction pertaining to the decision of 
whether or not to use HRT. This was accomplished by asking the respondents to provide 
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self-report ratings of the likelihood of initiating an interaction with a health care provider 
regarding four factors related to HRT use (risks, benefits, choice preferences, and costs 
associated with choice options).  Then, a summated scale to measure likelihood of 
initiating a discussion with physician was computed (alpha = .886).  As anticipated, there 
was a positive relationship between CDS and level of patient-initiated physician 
interaction (β = .157, p < .01).    
 The respondent’s preferred role (autonomous or patient-centered, passive or 
physician-centered, or shared) in the decision of whether or not to use HRT is also 
expected to be positively associated with CDS. By definition, passive patients prefer to 
hand over the responsibility for decision making to the physicians whereas autonomous 
patients prefer to keep the responsibility for decision making to themselves. In contrast, 
shared patients prefer to share in the decision making responsibility with their physician 
(Kraetschmer et al. 2004; Say, Murtagh, and Thomson 2005). Preferred role was 
measured by asking the respondents to indicate their extent of agreement or disagreement 
to a series of statements pertaining to their level of participation in the decision process.   
Two items were used to tap into each decision making role (autonomous, passive or 
shared).  As expected, the overall CDS scale was positively related to preferring a shared 
role (β = .180, p < .01) but negatively related to preferring to make the decision ‘all by 
myself’ (β = -.115, p < .05).   
Following a procedure similar to that used in study three, the extent of actual or 
anticipated negative emotion that is elicited from the decision making process was also 
measured.  Referring to their decision of whether or not to use HRT, respondents 
measured the level of negative emotion that was or that they would expect to be elicited 
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from the decision-making process.  This was accomplished by having the women respond 
to adjective terms using a Likert-type scale reflecting how well each term described how 
they would feel if they actually had to make the relevant decision (Luce 1998).  The 
respondents were also asked to rate their overall feeling of negative emotion that they 
experienced or that they anticipate to experience as a result of this decision process.  
Contrary to what was predicted, the CDS scale was positively related to an overall rating 
of negative emotion (3-item scale, alpha = .867) (β = .125, p < .05).  This may be 
explained because high-CDS consumers are more likely to view the decision situation as 
inherently unpredictable and also put forth more effort in their information search, which 
makes it more likely that they will encounter contradictory information. 
 As a final test of the predictive validity of the CDS scale, CDS was expected to 
have a positive relationship with knowledge level regarding HRT. The respondents were 
asked to answer a set of questions (true-false) related to the benefits and risks of HRT use 
as an objective measure of their individual knowledge level. Surprisingly, there was not a 
significant relationship between objective knowledge level and CDS.  So, CDS is 
positively related to information search but not knowledge level.  One explanation for 
this is that through their information search, the women are being exposed to conflicting 
reports related to risks and benefits, so they may not know what to believe as true.  Since 
HRT was introduced about 75 years ago, a steady flow of studies has produced evidence 
of both harmful and beneficial effects, often contradicting one another.  There are also 
conflicting predictions regarding risks and benefits based on whether progestin is taken 
with the estrogen or not. 
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CHAPTER 16 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF CHOICE OF ELECTIVE HEALTHCARE 
TREATMENT 
 
It is commonly espoused that the healthcare field is “perhaps the most complex of 
any area of the economy” (Morrison, 2000, p. xvii). Complexity is reflected in the 
number, variety, and fragmentation of agents involved in the delivery of healthcare 
including potential patients (consumers), actual patients (consumers), professionals, 
provider organizations, buyer organizations, insurance organizations, and suppliers. 
Hundreds of different types of professionals and organizations interact to provide a wide 
variety of services to patients, their families, and their communities. As agents acting 
within this complex environment, individuals are often faced with high-stakes decisions 
involving subjectively risky outcomes.  
Not only is the entire healthcare system becoming more complex, but healthcare 
decision making is becoming increasingly complicated, unpredictable, and patient-
directed. In the past, individual healthcare was mainly controlled by health professionals 
or care providers by identifying the possible ‘causes’ of a disease or infection and taking 
the appropriate steps to remove, treat, or cure them. Today, however, health treatments 
have moved from reflecting a linear cause-and-effect approach to considering a myriad of 
factors (e.g., genetic predisposition, environmental context, lifestyles, values, etc.) in 
order to determine an appropriate course of action (Plsek and Greenhalgh 2001). In 
addition, healthcare decision making is becoming much more self-focused, with health 
professionals instructed to give informed consent and then rely on the patient to make 
their own decision (Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, and Ubel 2005). Because decisions are 
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becoming more consumer-oriented, we must create a better understanding of the inputs 
into patients’ judgments and satisfaction.  
Also adding to the complex nature of individual healthcare decision making is the 
immense amount of information published and made available by a myriad of stakeholder 
groups (government, private-practice, non-for-profit, Internet, etc.). Often times, the data 
from these organizations are conflicting, or may be incomplete or even incorrect. In 
addition, patients are not very adept at understanding individual risks associated with 
different treatment options, especially when they are provided with population (relative) 
estimates instead of absolute risk levels. Numerical information is often poorly 
understood by patients, and even doctors themselves (Bowling and Ebrahim 2001). 
Common errors include compression bias (tendency to overestimate small risks and 
underestimate large ones), miscalibration bias (overestimation of the level and accuracy 
of one’s knowledge), availability bias (overestimation of obvious risks), and optimism-
pessimism bias (tendency of patients to believe that they are at less risk of an adverse 
outcome than people similar to them) (Bogardus, Holmboe, and Jenkel 1999; Bowling 
and Ebrahim 2001).  
Interestingly, the inundation of consumers with information corresponds to an 
increased emphasis on patient empowerment and informed or shared decision making 
(Foundation for Informed Medical Decision Making, www.fimdm.org), and while many 
individuals consider this an improvement in the system, many others do not wish to 
become this involved in high-stakes decisions, especially when it comes to healthcare 
(Say, Murtagh, and Thomson 2006). Previous research has found patient preferences for 
involvement in decision making to vary with age, socioeconomic status, illness 
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experience, and the gravity of the decision. However, as supported through the 
development of the CDS scale, there is also a fundamental difference in the way people 
prefer and tend to approach and negotiate these types of decision situations. In addition, 
this preferred decision style may influence the importance of various inputs into the 
decision making process. A measurement tool such as the decision style scale could be 
especially useful in promoting optimal decision making if it is found to be related to the 
importance of various behavioral influences. 
16.1 Decision to Use Hormone Replacement Therapy  
There are a number of reasons to support the opinion that choices involving 
hormone replacement therapy (HRT) will provide a timely and important arena to study 
high-stakes consumer decision making. First, this decision situation possesses the 
characteristics of a high-stakes consumer decision as described in the literature (Kahn and 
Baron 1995; Kahn and Luce 2003; White 2005). Since HRT was introduced 70 years ago, 
a steady flow of studies has produced evidence of both harmful and beneficial effects 
(Rymer, Wilson and Ballard 2003), which increases the risk involved in a woman’s 
choice of whether or not to take HRT. In addition, use of HRT remains controversial 
because there is uncertainty about the reliability and validity of available information 
regarding treatment (Conboy, Domar, and O’Connell 2001; Rymer, Wilson, and Ballard, 
2003). Thus, outcome uncertainty is involved. Publications released from the heart and 
estrogen-progestin replacement study (HERS; Hlatky et al. 2002; Hulley et al. 1998) and 
the women’s health initiative study (WHI; Writing Group for the Women’s Health 
Initiative Investigators 2002) report a variety of adverse effects and has added to the 
confusion related to HRT. The decision process will also most likely generate negative 
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emotion and stress. As pointed out in the consumer behavior literature, these types of 
decisions are increasingly common in today’s consumer decision environment (White 
2005).  
Second, there are over 30 million women in the United States who are post-
menopausal and are faced with considering the risks and benefits of HRT (Bastian et al. 
2002). In fact, the use of HRT has been most prevalent in cultures where the biomedical 
perspective is dominant, such as in the United States (Spatz et al. 2003). Today most 
women will live approximately one-third of their lives past the stage of menopause (NIH 
2005). The treatment most often offered by healthcare providers to treat climacteric 
symptoms from estrogen deficiency is hormone replacement therapy. Current medical 
standards also advocate the use of HRT as appropriate for all woman of a certain age, not 
just for those who are experiencing climacteric symptoms (Conboy, Domar, and 
O’Connell 2001). Some estimates show that nearly one-half of postmenopausal women in 
the United States have used different forms of HRT at one time (CDC 2007). However, 
this estimate varies by study design and population from only about 15% (Sheehy 1992) 
to 54% (Faulkner et al. 1998). Recent British studies have shown that about 45% of 
women tried taking HRT by the time they were 50 (Rymer, Wilson, and Ballard 2003). 
Another estimate shows that in the United States, about 38% of postmenopausal women 
take HRT (Rymer, Wilson and Ballard 2003). In 2000, 46 million prescriptions were 
written for Premarin (conjugated equine estrogens) making it the second most frequently 
prescribed drug in the United States (Fletcher and Colditz 2002). This suggests that we 
should further examine the important correlates of HRT use and that we can expect 
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enough variance in our sample to allow us to study both the antecedents and 
consequences of the actual or anticipated decision to use (or not to use) HRT.  
Third, women are increasingly encouraged to participate in making decisions 
about HRT; therefore, instead of being a more medicalized, expert-focused decision it is 
becoming a more individualized, consumer-focused decision. This shift in focus 
corresponds with the increasing importance of developing sophisticated decision support 
systems, the effectiveness of which may vary depending on a consumer’s decision style. 
It is often assumed that an increase in dissemination of information and education of 
patients will increase adherence to medical recommendations (Sinclair, Bond, and Taylor 
1993). However, simply educating women or increasing patient involvement may not 
change or improve women’s choices (Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, and Ubel 2005). There 
are a variety of other factors that influence healthcare choices such as ones beliefs about 
health and medicine in general, personal opinions regarding menopause and the 
medicalization of what they perceive as a ‘natural’ condition, and socially influenced 
norms regarding HRT use (Lauver et al. 1999). If the variables that explain women’s 
choices regarding hormone therapy use were better understood, then physicians and 
marketing managers could integrate this knowledge into facilitating optimal choices 
(Lauver et al. 1999). In order to develop more effective interventions to aid in optimal 
decision making, a better understanding of the mechanisms through which these types of 
decisions are made is needed. 
16.2 Conceptual Model Development 
Two general and well-regarded theories of behavior are the theory of reasoned 
action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1973; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and the theory of planned 
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behavior (Ajzen 1988, 1991; Ajzen and Madden 1986; Schifter and Ajzen 1985). These 
models have been used in the prediction of a wide range of behaviors (see reviews by 
Ajzen 1991; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw 1988) and have 
shown strong predictive validity (Ajzen and Fishbein 1973; Albarracín, Johnson, and 
Fishbein 2001; Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw 1988). For example, Armitage and 
Conner (2001) empirically summarized research conducted within the context of the TPB 
and found that the model accounted for 27% and 39% of the variance in behavior and 
intention across 185 separate studies. In addition, attitudes and subjective norms, two of 
the most important predictors included in these models, typically account for 40-50% of 
the variance in behavioral intentions (e.g., Ajzen 1991; Armitage and Conner 2001; 
Sheeran and Taylor 1999; Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw 1988).  
The TPB, and its predecessor, the TRA, are based on the premise that one’s 
behavior is influenced by a set of psychological variables, most importantly intention, 
attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, and 
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs.  These models have been used to effectively 
predict the adoption or continued adherence to many health-related behaviors, including 
the use of medication (Godin and Kok 1996). Specifically, attitudes and subjective norms 
are extremely useful predictors of health-related behaviors (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; 
Finlay, Trafimow and Jones 1997; Trafimow 1994). These behaviors include such things 
as exercising, blood donation, following a diet, using condoms, using drugs, using safety 
equipment, choosing a career, and many more (Ajzen 2001; Armitage and Conner 2001; 
Sutton 1998). As you can see from the list above, it is often applied to situations in which 
people are faced with high-stakes decisions that lead to the performance of certain 
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behaviors (Davis et al. 2002). In fact, Fishbein’s attitude model can be viewed as a multi-
attribute decision theory model in choice situations where the decision is made under 
conditions of risk and utility is additive (Etter 1975).  
 In the past, the TRA and TPB have also been applied to the decision to engage in 
volitional health behaviors, and of particular interest here, the decision to use HRT (e.g., 
Fisher et al. 2000; Quine and Rubin 1997; Spatz et al. 2003). Spatz et al. (2003) assessed 
the behavioral intentions of women to use HRT in various stages of menopause. 
Specifically, the intentions of both premenopausal women and current HRT users were of 
interest. The authors propose that use of HRT is influenced by three major factors, which 
are consistent with Fishbein and Ajzen’s model: (1) a favorable or unfavorable evaluation 
of use of hormone therapy (attitude), (2) perceived social pressure to use hormone 
therapy (subjective norm), and (3) self-efficacy or perceptions of control in relation to 
using hormone therapy (PBC). The authors also point out that by focusing on these 
subjective psychological constructs, they are not denying the importance of other factors 
that may influence one’s decision of whether or not to use HRT such as family conflicts, 
poverty or health (Spatz et al. 2003). In fact, the TPB very practically assumes that other 
determinants influence behaviors indirectly by affecting attitudes, subjective norms, and 
PBC (Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw 1989).  
Fisher et al. (2000), in their study of HRT use, argue that if a woman holds 
positive attitudes towards HRT and perceives that important others support her use of 
HRT, she will be more likely to have intentions to initiate HRT, actually use HRT, and 
maintain use of HRT over time. The authors use the TRA to examine women’s intentions 
to use or to continue to use HRT as a function of their personal attitudes, perceptions of 
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social support, and perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of HRT in a sample 
of pre-, peri-, and post-menopausal women. As followed in this study, Fisher et al. (2000) 
justify the use of their diverse sample of pre-, peri-, and post-menopausal women.  They 
argue that pre-menopausal women (mid-40s) are already searching and paying attention 
to information regarding use of HRT, which is the first step in forming beliefs about HRT 
use that will be utilized in their decision within the next several years. Peri-menopausal 
women (late 40s or early 50s) are in the midst of the actual decision making stage. 
Furthermore, postmenopausal women (late 50s or early 60s) may still be considering 
HRT use because of the long-term protective effects of HRT for cardiovascular disease 
and osteoporosis.  
It is important when designing measures to test a model based on the TPB that the 
target behavior is carefully defined in terms of its target, action, context and time (TACT) 
(Centre for Health Services Research Manual 2004). Thus, in this study the focus is on 
attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and intentions regarding HRT 
use. Consistent with the TPB, the expectation is that attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control will all be positively related to intentions to use or intentions 
to continue to use HRT.  
 In addition to attitudes, which are determined by beliefs regarding the advantages 
(benefits) and disadvantages (risks) of HRT use, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control, there are other variables that may influence attitude towards HRT use 
and intention to use or intention to continue to use HRT. First, in the original formulation 
of the TRA, there was no clear distinction between affective and evaluative responses to 
a behavior (Ajzen 1991). Any summary response towards an attitude object that could be 
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assessed with a bipolar dimension of favorability from negative to positive was 
considered an input into one’s overall attitude (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975). However, in recent years, much research has been conducted to support the 
distinction between perceived pros and cons of performing a behavior (evaluative 
judgments) and positive and negative feelings towards performing a behavior (affective 
influences). The affective-component of attitudes refers to emotions, feelings, and drives 
associated with an attitude object, while the cognitive (or evaluative) component 
addresses beliefs, judgments and thoughts associated with the object (Breckler and 
Wiggins 1989). Affective responses, specifically in the context of HRT use, have rarely 
been empirically assessed as determinants of health-related behaviors (Lauver et al. 
1999). However, in previous quantitative and qualitative studies (e.g., Brett and Madans 
1997; Légaré et al. 2003; Pilote and Hlatky 1995), women express specific emotions or 
feelings directed towards the use of HRT. This is consistent with the affective-cognitive 
dichotomy that reflects a duality between heart and mind that has long been assumed in 
Western cultures (Giner-Sorolla 2004).  
 Empirical evidence supporting the separation of an affective and evaluative (or 
cognitive) component of attitudes has been provided in a number of ways (Verplanken, 
Hofstee, and Janssen 1998). First, studies have shown higher correlations within than 
between measures of each component (Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty 1994; Trafimow and 
Sheeran 1998). Second, there are studies that demonstrate the individual prediction of 
each component to a global measure of attitude (Breckler 1984; Breckler and Wiggins 
1989; Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty 1994; Haddock, Zanna, and Esses 1994). Third, some 
studies illustrate a distinction between affectively-based and cognitively-based attitudes 
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(Edwards 1990; Edwards and Von Hippel 1995). Fourth, there are a number of studies 
that show how each component is differentially related to other constructs, such as 
behavioral intentions or behavior (Millar and Tesser 1986; Simons and Carey 1998). 
Finally, studies based on response times have shown differences in the accessibility of 
affective and cognitive components of attitudes (Verplanken, Hofstee and Janssen 1998). 
These results support the validity of a multi-component model of attitudes (Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993). In the context of this study, the expectation is that women who have more 
positive affective responses toward HRT use will have more positive attitudes towards 
HRT use compared to women who have more negative affective responses toward HRT 
use.  
 In addition to attitudes towards HRT, we expect that an individual’s attitude 
towards menopause in general will also influence an individual’s intention to use or 
continue to use HRT. Menopause signifies the end of a woman’s reproductive life and the 
beginning of an increased risk for the health consequences of estrogen deprivation 
(Matthews 1992). However, it also marks the beginning of a new freedom that comes 
from not having regular menstrual cycles or having to worry about unwanted pregnancies 
(Matthews 1992). Menopause is a biological event by definition, but it is a psychosocial 
one as well (Sommer et al. 1999). It occurs at a time in life when many women are 
experiencing changing roles, responsibilities, and relationships that accompany aging in 
general and the maturation of children (Matthews 1992). These changes are emotional 
and create considerable stress for some women, affecting their identity, self-esteem, and 
social relationships. For others, these might mark the beginning of more fulfilling 
relationships and new challenges that lead to positive psychological growth. Although 
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researchers have documented the negative attitudes that women may have toward 
menopause; some women may actually have positive expectations and beliefs about the 
menopausal experience (Matthews 1992). In this study, we hypothesize that attitudes 
toward menopause in general will be positively related to intentions to use or continue to 
use HRT. Viewing menopause as a positive event will help motivate women to embrace 
the change and effectively treat the symptoms in order to enjoy the positive aspects while 
managing the negative consequences.  
 Individuals often rely on the advice of trusted sources under conditions of high 
perceived risk (Perry and Hamm 1969; White 2005). Similar to social norms, albeit at a 
more personal level, specific physicians’ recommendations for hormones have influenced 
women’s use of hormones positively (Ferguson, Hoegh, and Johnson 1989; Mansfield 
and Voda 1998). Thus, in this study, physician opinion regarding HRT use was also 
measured to test the prediction that physician support regarding HRT use will be 
positively related to intentions to use or intentions to continue to use HRT.   
16.3 Mean-Level Research Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses developed below are based on the influence of CDS on the mean 
level of constructs important in the prediction of intentions to use HRT. Specifically, the 
focus is on attitude towards HRT use and attitudinal ambivalence. 
16.3.1 The Influence of CDS on Attitude towards HRT Use 
 High-CDS individuals are more likely then low-CDS individuals to seek out and 
consider all possible sources of information. They also tend to focus on the differences 
and variation among other’s opinions. In this sense, high-CDS individuals are more likely 
to hear a variety of different opinions and accumulate a higher level of overall 
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information regarding a decision or the alternative choice options at hand. In high-stakes 
decision situations, which typically involve the consideration of risk-laden alternatives, 
individuals will be exposed to both positive and negative characteristics of the attitude 
object or behavior under consideration. High-CDS individuals will encounter an even 
greater level and variety of positive and negative information that they must integrate to 
form an overall attitude. This will lead high-CDS individuals to have more complex or 
well-developed schemas for the attitude object or behavior under consideration.  
Tesser and Leone (1977) suggest that using a complex schema to think about 
attitude objects produces more attitude polarization than using a simple schema (see also 
Chaiken and Yates 1985). Tesser suggested that thought changes the cognitive 
representations of the stimulus by adding evaluatively consistent cognitions, and 
suppressing or losing inconsistent cognitions. Such cognitive changes are not random; 
they are under the direction of a cognitive schema. The schema serves as a blueprint for 
cognitive change. In the absence of schemas there would be few changes and little 
polarization. Hence a well-developed cognitive schema should result in more polarization 
than a poorly developed schema. Note that this research assumes that individuals have an 
automatic approach/avoidance response to a behavior. This is consistent with the 
fundamental work on biased assimilation of mixed evidence and attitude polarization 
(Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979) that posits that people who hold attitudes on important 
issues are more likely to examine relevant incoming information in a biased manner by 
accepting ‘confirming’ evidence and discounting ‘disconfirming’ evidence. Thus, belief 
polarization will increase, rather than decrease or remain unchanged, when mixed or 
inconclusive findings are assimilated.  
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Similarly, work by Fazio and his colleagues (see Powell and Fazio 1984) 
demonstrates that repeated expressions of attitude responses affect attitude accessibility. 
Then, according to the mere-exposure literature (Zajonc 1968), repeated expression 
should lead to greater attitude extremity. In other words, repeated exposure to an object 
can lead to more polarized appraisals of the object assuming that exposure is likely to be 
accompanied by repeated implicit expressions of the evaluation of the object (Downing, 
Judd and Brauer 1992). This evidence supports that of Tesser and his colleagues (Tesser 
and Leone 1977) as described above, who show that extended thought devoted to an 
attitude object results in attitude polarization. In summary, this literature asserts that 
cognitive engagement with a topic, as well as evaluation of mixed evidence associated 
with a topic, are both likely to lead to attitude polarization (Kuhn and Lao 1996). Because 
high-CDS individuals are expected to engage in a higher level of thinking about and 
searching for information regarding the use of HRT, then this will result in more repeated 
explicit or implicit expressions of their opinions regarding HRT use. Because of these 
repeated expressions and the biased assimilation of information, high-CDS individuals 
will experience greater attitude polarization, and less attitudinal ambivalence, regarding 
the use of hormone therapy.  
 
H1: Feelings of attitudinal ambivalence regarding the use of HRT will be lower 
among high-CDS individuals than among low-CDS individuals. 
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H2: High-CDS individuals will have more extreme (favorable or unfavorable) 
overall attitudes regarding HRT use compared to low-CDS individuals who will 
have more moderate or neutral attitudes regarding HRT use.  
16.4 Structural Relationship Strength Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses developed above predicted differences in the mean level of 
attitudinal ambivalence based on CDS. This section will discuss hypotheses developed on 
differences in the strength of mediation relationships between research constructs based 
on CDS.  
16.4.1 The Influence of CDS on Determinants of Attitude towards HRT Use 
 Attitudes can be conceptualized as multi-component entities (e.g., Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993; Thurstone 1928). As depicted in the model of choice of elective healthcare 
treatment, two important inputs into the overall attitude are cognition and affect. The 
cognitive (knowing) component contains the encoding of attributes and beliefs about the 
attitude object and the affective (feeling) component contains the encoding of emotions 
and feelings associated with the object (Millar and Millar 1998). Considerable theoretical 
support has been given for the distinction between affect and cognition (e.g., Breckler 
1984; Breckler and Wiggins 1989, 1991; Zajonc 1980, 1984). The relationship between 
one’s overall or ‘global’ evaluation/attitude and the affective and cognitive components 
has also been explored. This research suggests that it is possible for one’s attitude to be 
more strongly influenced by either the affective or cognitive component. The importance 
of affect versus cognition can depend on what type of behavior is being predicted (e.g., 
Breckler and Wiggins 1989). In addition, there may also be individual differences in 
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whether, across a wide range of behaviors, people may be more under affective or 
cognitive control (e.g., Trafimow et al. 2004). Trafimow et al. (2004) conducted three 
studies that confirmed that some people are more under affective control across a range 
of behaviors whereas other people are more under cognitive control.  
 In the literature on high-stakes decision making, Kunreuther et al. (2002) argues 
that some people may have a tendency to make these types of decisions using heuristics 
or more general rules of thumb. They point out that affect and emotions strongly 
influence decisions involving uncertain outcomes with large consequences (Slovic et al. 
2001; Loewenstein et al. 2001). Decisions that require difficult trade-offs between 
attributes or involve ambiguity as to what would constitute a ‘right’ answer may lead 
some individuals to choose based on the cues that send the strongest affective signals. 
When high-stakes decisions produce high levels of perceived stress or anxiety, as is likely 
for low-CDS individuals, decisions makers may focus on a selective set of cues when 
evaluating options (e.g., Kahn and Baron 1995; Ben Zur and Breznitz 1981; Kahn and 
Luce 2003) and make greater use of simplifying heuristics (e.g., Luce, Bettman, and 
Payne 1997). They may rely on making a choice based on the affective association they 
have with the attitude object or behavior (i.e., use an affect heuristic; Slovic et al. 2001) 
instead of engaging in a more thorough analysis of the situation. Thus, we expect that 
low-CDS individuals will be more likely to rely on affective responses to form an overall 
attitude towards HRT use as compared to high-CDS individuals, who will be more likely 
to rely on cognitive beliefs.  
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H3: The positive influence of cognitive beliefs regarding HRT use on attitude 
towards HRT use will be stronger among high-CDS individuals than among low-
CDS individuals.  
 
H4: The positive influence of affective responses towards HRT use on attitude 
towards HRT use will be stronger among low-CDS individuals than among high-
CDS individuals. 
 
16.4.2 The Influence of CDS on Determinants of Intention to Use HRT 
 One characteristic of high-stakes decisions is that decision makers must resolve 
difficult trade-offs, often involving life-and-death situations, with no obvious right 
answer. When faced with these types of decisions some individuals have the common 
reaction of not wanting to make a decision at all (Kunreuther et al. 2002). Some people 
may say “I’d rather not think about it” or avoid making the decision themselves by 
relying on an agent to make it for them (Kunreuther et al. 2002, p. 263; Schwartz et al. 
2002). In the healthcare literature it has been documented that “some patients just don’t 
want to be involved” (Say and Thomson 2003, p. 543). This may be because they feel 
they lack the knowledge and experience to develop informed preferences or are afraid of 
making the wrong decision. Theroux and Taylor (2003) conducted a study that found that 
women’s need for information, advice and input differed depending on their desire for 
engagement in the decision making process regarding hormone therapy and that some 
women preferred a ‘non-decision-making’ role where they opted to simply follow the 
advice of their doctor, trusting that they would make the best clinical decision for them.  
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 In contrast to high-CDS individuals, who have a desire to search for information, 
independently integrate conflicting opinions, and act in a more hands-on manner 
throughout the decision process, low-CDS individuals are likely to depend on more 
general inputs to make a decision. In other words, they do not want to ‘get their hands 
dirty’ with all the details. Because they are hesitant to embrace the inherent 
unpredictability and complexity of the situation, they attempt to cope by minimizing the 
amount of cognitive thought that goes into the decision making process, and more 
specifically, into detailing and evaluating the risks and benefits of engaging in the 
particular behavior under consideration.  
 By discussing the situation with others and engaging in an extensive information 
search, high-CDS individuals will gain confidence in their opinions and their 
individually-created attitude towards the behavior. Thus, they will be more likely to use 
this attitude as an input into their intention to engage in the behavior. In contrast, low-
CDS individuals will either avoid creating an attitude in the first place or have less 
confidence in this attitude and will rely on more general inputs, such as their physician’s 
opinion, attitudes towards menopause and medicine in general. In other words, they will 
have a stronger reliance of pre-existing knowledge structures. Thus, we expect that 
attitude towards HRT will be a stronger predictor of intentions to use HRT for high-CDS 
individuals compared with low-CDS individuals. In contrast, attitude towards menopause 
in general, attitude towards medicine in general, and physician opinion regarding HRT 
use will be a stronger predictor of intentions to use HRT for low-CDS individuals 
compared with high-CDS individuals.  
 
 137
H5: The positive influence of attitude towards HRT use on intention to use HRT 
will be stronger among high-CDS individuals than among low-CDS individuals.  
 
H6: The positive influence of attitude towards menopause in general on intention 
to use HRT will be stronger among low-CDS individuals than among high-CDS 
individuals.  
 
H7: The positive influence of physician opinion regarding HRT use on intention 
to use HRT will be stronger among low-CDS individuals than among high-CDS 
individuals.  
 
A central feature of most high-stakes decisions is that they are high in procedural 
uncertainty. In other words, individuals have relatively little experience dealing with 
them and are highly uncertain about how to resolve them (Hogarth, Michaud and Mery 
1980). A natural adaptation to these types of situations is to adopt the decision strategies 
used by others or follow established social norms (e.g., Kahn and Baron 1995). These 
important others that may affect the consumer decision process may be either known or 
unknown to the decision maker, present during the choice task or simply imagined 
(McGrath and Otnes 1995; Ratner and Khan 2002). Trafimow and Finlay (1996, 2001) 
have argued that not only can behaviors be under attitudinal or normative control, but 
people may be as well. In a study measuring attitudes, subjective norms, and intentions 
for 30 behaviors, 21% of the respondents were found to be normatively controlled 
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persons. Finlay, Trafimow and Jones (1997) confirmed this assertion within the domain 
of health-related behaviors.  
Individuals may differ in the level of social influence over their decisions 
(Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel 1989) so that some tend to conform more to the 
expectations of others. However, this is different than seeking out opinions and 
information from important others as inputs into one’s own individual evaluation. In the 
case of informational interpersonal influence, individuals accept information from others 
as evidence about reality (Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel 1989; Deutsch and Gerard 
1955). People may acquire this information from direct contact with others or indirectly 
by observing the behaviors of others.  
Interpersonal influence can also be manifest in a value-expressive form. Value-
expressive influence happens when individuals use important other’s norms, values and 
behaviors as a model for their own attitudes and behaviors (Mourali, Laroche, and Pons 
2005a, 2005b). As argued in the marketing literature, one way in which consumers may 
make difficult decisions in a ‘non-decision-making’ manner is by “following the 
recommendation of others, imitating the purchase made by others, conforming to 
purchase-specific group norms, and complying to a request by others” (Formisano, 
Olshavsky, and Tapp 1982, p. 475). Similar to our previous argument, low-CDS 
individuals are more likely to use heuristics as inputs into intention formation compared 
to high-CDS individuals. Relying on subjective norms is one manner in which low-CDS 
individuals can avoid complicating the situation by conducting an extensive information 
search or involving others in their decision making process. In other words, it is one 
effective way of choosing “not to engage in decision making” (Formisano, Olshavsky, 
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and Tapp 1982, p. 478). Thus, we predict that subjective norms will be more influential 
on intentions for low-CDS individuals compared to high-CDS individuals.  
 
H8: The positive influence of subjective norms regarding HRT use on intention to 
use HRT will be stronger among low-CDS individuals than among high-CDS 
individuals. 
 
16.5 Analysis of the Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Tests 
 For the analysis, we will first assess the properties of each measurement 
instrument and establish measurement invariance between two groups: low-CDS 
individuals and high-CDS individuals. With measurement equivalence confirmed, the 
structural relationship strength hypotheses will be tested. The influence of common 
method variance will also be assessed.  
16.5.1 Analysis of the Conceptual Model of Decision to Use HRT 
 The first step in the analysis of the conceptual model and hypotheses is to assess 
the properties of each measurement instrument.  Please refer to Appendix D to see each 
measurement instrument in more detail.  This was done by performing a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) on the data using LISREL (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996) in order to 
check the validity and reliability of the measurement items.  Please refer to Table 10 to 
see the measurement item characteristics in more detail after the removal of items based 
on modification indices produced by LISREL.  The chi-square of the measurement model 
was 390.05 with 168 degrees of freedom (df).  The fit indices indicated that the model has 
good fit (CFI = .97, RMSEA = .060).  As indicated in Table 9, all of the measurement 
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items had a completely standardized factor loading (CSL) greater than 0.60 as suggested 
by Bagozzi and Yi (1988).  To check the reliabilities of the latent variables, composite 
reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE) were calculated.  All scales 
exhibited acceptable reliabilities that exceed the recommended cutoff values of CR > 
0.70 and AVE > 0.50.  These results indicate satisfactory construct validity and reliability 
of the measures.  To examine the discriminant validity between the constructs, the square 
root of the average variance extracted was compared with the correlations between 
constructs.  Please refer to Table 10 to see these correlations.  All of the square roots of 
the average variance extracted were higher than the correlations with one exception 
between affective responses and attitude.  However, this seems to pose little concern 
because, by definition, the two constructs are destined to be strongly correlated in many 






Measures for Conceptual Model Test 
 
Items Mean S.D. CSL α CR AVE 
Cognitive beliefs       
I think that using HRT is safe (vs. unsafe). 3.64 1.59 0.96 0.81 0.84 0.65 
I think that using HRT is valuable (vs. worthless). 4.12 1.39 0.67    
I think that using HRT is unhealthy (vs. healthy).* 3.81 1.50 0.76    
Affective responses       
Using HRT makes or would make me feel anxious (vs. not 
worried).* 
3.33 1.57 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.63 
Using HRT makes or would make me feel comfortable (vs. 
uneasy). 
3.70 1.65 0.78    
Using HRT makes or would make me feel nervous (vs. 
relaxed).* 
3.51 1.52 0.73    
Attitude towards menopause       
I associate the arrival of menopause with a sense of relief. 3.78 1.74 0.79 0.85 0.84 0.64 
I have positive feelings towards menopause. 4.04 1.51 0.80    
Menopause is something to look forward to. 3.46 1.64 0.81    
Subjective norms       
People who are important to me would recommend that I use 
HRT. 
3.41 1.65 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.84 
People who are important to me would encourage me to use 
HRT. 
3.25 1.66 0.95    
People who are important to me would think it is appropriate 
for me to use HRT. 
3.38 1.70 0.87    
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Items Mean S.D. CSL α CR AVE 
Perceived behavioral control       
If I wanted to, using HRT would be very easy. 4.97 1.70 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.77 
I am confident that I could use HRT if I wanted to. 5.24 1.51 0.92    
Attitude towards HRT       
My overall attitude towards HRT use is bad (vs. good).* 3.63 1.72 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.92 
My overall attitude towards HRT use is positive (vs. 
negative). 
3.61 1.71 0.99    
My overall attitude towards HRT use is favorable (vs. 
unfavorable). 
3.63 1.71 0.99    
Intention       
I expect to use or continue to use HRT in the future. 3.12 1.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 
I intend to use or continue to use HRT in the future. 3.11 1.98 1.00    
It is likely that I will use or continue to use HRT in the future. 3.17 2.02 0.94    
I plan to use or continue to use HRT in the future. 3.09 2.00 1.00    
 *These items were reverse-coded. 
   CSL = completely standardized factor loading;  α = Cronbach’s alpha; CR = composite reliability;  





Correlations between Model Constructs 
 
 Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Cognitive 
beliefs 0.81       
2. Affective 




0.15** 0.03 0.80     
4. Subjective 




0.17** 0.28** -0.13** 0.32** 0.88   
6. Attitude 
towards HRT 0.62** 0.86** 0.02 0.66** 0.31** 0.96  
7. Intention 0.47** 0.73** -0.03 0.74** 0.34** 0.77** 0.98 




 The next step is to examine the structural relationships in the model and assess 
model fit.  The model had a chi-square value of 406.07 with 173 degrees of freedom (df), 
p < .01.  The fit indices showed that the model has an acceptable fit (RMSEA = .061, CFI 
= .97) based on the criteria published by Jaccard and Wan (1996) who suggest cutoff 
values of CFI > 0.90 and RMSEA < 0.08.  Please refer to Table 11 to see the values of 
the completely standardized LISREL estimation of each path.  Also refer to Figure 4 for a 
visual depiction of the structural model.  First, the path from cognitive beliefs regarding 
HRT use to attitudes towards HRT use was positive but nonsignificant (λ = .09, ns).  
However, the path between affective responses towards HRT use and attitude towards 
HRT use was also positive but significant (λ = 0.82, t = 14.17, p < .01).  In addition, the 
144 
 145
results indicated that attitude had a positive and significant effect on intentions to use or 
continue to use HRT (β = 0.49, t = 11.78, p < .01).  Also as predicted, subjective norms 
regarding HRT use positively and significantly predicted intentions to use or continue to 
use HRT (λ = 0.40, t = 9.57, p < .01).  However, neither perceived behavioral control (λ = 
.07, ns) or attitudes towards menopause in general (λ = -.01, ns) had a significant effect 




Structural Model Path Coefficients  
 
Structural relationships in the model 
Model fit Chi-square 406.07 
 df 173 
 CFI 0.97 
 GFI 0.90 
 RMSEA 0.06 




Cognitive beliefs → Attitude 0.09 1.86 
Affect response → Attitude 0.82 14.17* 
Attitude towards menopause → Intention  -0.01 -0.37 
Subjective norms →Intention 0.40 9.57* 
Perceived behavioral control 0.07 1.94 
Attitude towards HRT → Intention 0.49 11.78* 























































 It is also important to assess the significance of structural relationships in the 
model after accounting for the effects of common method variance.  In order to estimate 
the level of common method variance present in the data, a marker variable (material 
values scale; Richins and Dawson 1992) scale was embedded into the survey.  The 
average correlation between this marker variable and the other variables included in the 
conceptual model (r = .109) was treated as an estimate of the level of common method 
variance present in the data.  Based on this estimate and three more levels included for a 
sensitivity analysis, CMV-adjusted correlations were calculated using the equation 
presented in Part One.  As you can see from the results of the analysis shown in Table 12, 




CMV Path Analysis 
 
 CMV Levels 




Coefficients: 0.00 0.109 0.20 0.30 
Affect → Attitude 0.65* 0.64* 0.63* 0.61* 
Attitude → Intention 0.47* 0.46* 0.43* 0.28* 
Subjective norms → 




 The nonsignificant relationship in the model between cognitive beliefs and 
attitudes towards HRT use was a surprising result.  However, consumer information 
processing can be influenced by both ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ factors.  In fact, some research on 
high-stakes decision making has shown that complexity and ambiguity as to what would 
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constitute a ‘right’ answer in a high-stakes decision situation can often lead individuals to 
make choices by focusing on affective cues (Kunreuther et al. 2002).  This may be the 
case in this context regarding HRT use since most of the information that has been 
published regarding the risks and benefits of HRT is contradictory and often reported in 
the form of statistical probabilities which can be difficult to understand as a consumer.  In 
addition, other research (e.g., Trafimow et al. 2004) shows that some behaviors, 
especially experiential ones such as those associated with healthcare, may be more under 
affective than cognitive control.  Another explanation may have to do with the fact that 
individuals frequently treat the likelihood of outcomes associated with high-stakes losses 
as sufficiently low that they are not even worth worrying about.  In others words, they 
may assume that these events would “not happen to me” so perceptions of HRT as 
harmful and unsafe may not have as much influence on these decisions (Kunreuther et al. 
2002).  
 When affective responses are removed from the structural model and cognitive 
beliefs are left in alone then the path between cognitive beliefs and attitudes towards 
HRT use becomes significant.  Please refer to Figure 5 for a visual depiction of this 
model.  Thus, cognitive beliefs may be important in determining attitudes towards HRT 






















































Structural Model with Affective Responses Removed 
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 One explanation for the nonsignificant path between perceived behavioral control 
and intentions regarding the use of HRT in this study may be that there was not much 
variance in the PBC construct.  An overwhelming majority of the respondents indicated 
that they had health insurance which will assist in payment for HRT.  In addition, the 
sample was fairly well-educated and had a high income level.  Thus, most of the 
respondents also indicated high levels of perceived behavioral control (mean = 5.12 on a 
7 point scale).  In addition, attitudes towards menopause in general did not significantly 
impact attitudes towards HRT although a positive relationship was predicted.  This shows 
that the ways in which a woman feels about menopause does not affect her propensity to 
use HRT.   
16.5.2 Analysis of the Mean-Level Hypotheses Based on CDS 
 To test whether CDS was related to feelings of attitudinal ambivalence, 
ambivalence was measured on the survey using a 4 item scale regarding how ‘torn’ one 
feels about the behavior in question.  Using a t-test (t = -4.43, p < .01) to assess the mean 
difference in the level of ambivalence between the high and low CDS-groups, it was 
shown that the high-CDS individuals had a significantly higher level of feelings of 
ambivalence using the summated scale (mean = 16.24) compared to low-CDS individuals 
(mean = 13.80).  Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.  This is a surprising result; 
however, there is some research to support that individuals make less, rather than more, 
polarized judgments about attitude objects for which they possess more extensive 
schemas.  In addition, the large amount of information captured in these well-developed 
schemas makes it more likely that some of the information will be perceived as good and 
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some as bad regarding the behavior in question, which would make feelings towards 
HRT use more ambivalent (Linville 1982; Linville and Jones 1980).   
 Consistent with the above result, Hypothesis 2 was also not supported.  There was 
actually no difference between the high-CDS and low-CDS groups regarding the variance 
of attitudes towards HRT use.  This was assessed with the use of Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances (F = .517, p = .472). A nonsignificant F-value rejects the 
hypothesis that there is a difference in variances in attitudes across the two groups. 
16.5.3 Analysis of the Relationship Strength Hypotheses Based on CDS 
 To test the relationship strength hypotheses within the conceptual model, we must 
first ensure that both high (n=189) and low (n=180) CDS individuals perceive the 
measurement instrument in a similar manner (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998).  If this 
is not the case then we may mistake what are essentially measurement inequalities with 
substantive differences between groups as related to the structural relationships between 
variables in the model.  Thus, these hypotheses are each involved with determining if 
there is a hypothesized interaction based on CDS impacting the strength of the path 
between constructs included in the model of decision regarding the use of HRT.   
 The first step in assessing for measurement invariance is to test for configural 
invariance.  Basically, this involves an assessment of the extent to which the observed 
variables fit the latent constructs in each group through a multigroup CFA in which the 
factor loadings in each group are allowed to vary freely.  Configural invariance requires 
the same patterns (zero or nonzero) of item loadings across groups.  In fact, the χ2 value 
of the configural invariance model (χ2 = 509.48) is the same as the sum of the χ2 values 
assessed independently based on the low-CDS (χ2 = 311.14) and high-CDS (χ2 = 198.34) 
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groups.  This configural invariance model serves as a baseline against which more 
stringent forms of measurement invariance are evaluated.  Please refer to Table 13 to see 








2 df Invariance Test RMSEA CFI NNFI 
   Δ χ2 df p-value    
CFA  
(Low-CDS) 311.14 168 n/a n/a n/a 0.069 0.96 0.96 
CFA  
(High-CDS) 198.34 168 n/a n/a n/a 0.031 0.99 0.99 
1. Configural 
invariance 509.48 336 n/a n/a n/a 0.053 0.98 0.97 
2. Full metric 
invariance 526.66 350 17.12 14 0.25 0.052 0.98 0.97 
 
 The next step is to test for metric invariance, which involves establishing the 
equivalence of item loadings.  This step is necessary in order to meaningfully compare 
structural relationships across groups.  Full metric invariance was tested by imposing the 
same factor loadings on each model.  The χ2 value of this model equaled 526.66 with 350 
degrees of freedom (df).  As shown in Table 13, the difference in the chi-square between 
Model 2 and Model 1 is not statistically significant (Δχ2 (14) = 17.12, p > 0.05), 
indicating that the requirement of metric invariance is met.   
 The results of the multi-group structural equation model are shown in Table 14.  
The model fit indices are within the boundary of the criteria suggested by Jaccard and 
Wan (1996) with χ2 = 700.76, df = 398, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.064, CFI = 0.96.  In 
addition, the pattern of significance of the structural paths is consistent with that found 
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earlier with the pooled sample.  The hypotheses regarding group differences in structural 
relationships were evaluated using chi-square difference tests. As you can see from Table 
14, none of the relationship strength hypotheses were supported.   
 
Table 14 
Relationship Strength Hypotheses Tests 
 
Parameter Low-CDS High-CDS Δ χ2 (1) Hypotheses Support? 
Cognition → 
Attitude 0.10 0.09 0.02 H3 No 
Affect → Attitude 0.83* 0.78* 0.07 H4 No 
Attitude → 




-0.10 -0.05 1.41 H6 No 
Subjective norms 
→ Intentions 0.34* 0.43* 0.88 H8 No 
PBC → Intentions 0.06 0.07 n/a n/a n/a 




However, these results may be in part due to the inclusion of respondents who fell 
into the middle range of the CDS scale.  To determine whether this was the case, the 
middle 40% of the respondents based on their scores on the CDS scale were removed 
from the analysis.  This left 112 respondents in the low-CDS group and 115 respondents 
in the high-CDS group.  First, measurement invariance was again established between the 
two groups and the multi-group structural equation model was reanalyzed.  Please refer to 
Table 15 for the development of measurement invariance and Table 16 for the results of 
the hypotheses tests.  As you can see from the results, after removing the middle 40%, 
two of the structural relationship strength hypotheses were supported based on chi-square 
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difference tests.  First, supporting Hypothesis 3, the positive influence of cognitive 
beliefs regarding HRT use on attitude towards HRT is stronger among high-CDS 
individuals than among low-CDS individuals.  In addition, in support of Hypothesis 4, 
the positive influence of affective responses regarding HRT use on attitude towards HRT 










2 df Invariance Test RMSEA CFI NNFI
    Δ χ2 df p-value    
CFA  
(Low-CDS) 112 270.73 168 n/a n/a n/a 0.074 0.98 0.97 
CFA  
(High-CDS) 115 172.74 168 n/a n/a n/a 0.016 1.00 0.99 
1. Configural 
invariance 
 443.47 336 n/a n/a n/a 0.053 0.98 0.98 
2. Full metric 
invariance 
 454.94 350 11.47 14 0.65 0.052 0.98 0.98 
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Table 16 
Hypotheses Tests with Middle 40% Removed 
 
Parameter Low-CDS High-CDS Δ χ2 (1) Hypotheses Support? 
Cognition → 
Attitude 0.12 0.28* 7.86 H3 Yes 
Affect → 
Attitude 0.80* 0.61* 10.39 H4 Yes 
Attitude → 




-0.06 -0.08 0.01 H6 No 
Subjective norms 
→ Intentions 0.27* 0.34* 0.94 H8 No 
PBC → 
Intentions 0.09 0.07 n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: *p < 0.05      
 
 
Although physician opinion was not included in the structural model since only 
about half of the sample reported being aware of their physician’s opinion, we can still 
test whether CDS is related to the correlation between physician opinion and intentions to 
use HRT.  Hypothesis 6, which predicts that the positive influence of physician opinion 
regarding HRT use on intention to use HRT will be stronger among low-CDS individuals 
than among high-CDS individuals, was tested using an assessment of the differences in 
correlations.  First, the correlations between intentions to use HRT and physician opinion 
for both the low (r = 0.516, n = 99) and high (r = .414, n = 102) CDS groups were 
transformed to Fisher’s z-scores.  Then the difference between the z-scores was divided 
by the standard error of the difference.  If this resultant z-value is greater than 1.96 then 
the difference between the correlations is significant.  In this case, however, the value 
equaled 0.911 which was not significant, thus there was no difference in adherence to 
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physician opinion across the two groups.  In addition, after removing the middle 40% of 
the respondents, the mean-level hypotheses remained unsupported.   
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CHAPTER 17 
CONCLUSIONS FROM PART TWO 
 
 The first goal of this part of the dissertation was to provide a comprehensive 
literature review on cognitive styles and decision styles, with particular emphasis on the 
various approaches to assessing consumer decision styles. A description of complexity 
science and the characteristics of complex systems, focusing on consumers as agents that 
interact within a CAS, were also provided.  Then, the need for a scale to assess decision 
styles within high-stakes decision situations was justified and the scale was developed. 
Study 1 was used to generate an initial pool of items to measure complex decision style 
(CDS). These items were derived either from the literature review or from responses to 
an exploratory questionnaire distributed to a group of university students. Study 2 was 
conducted for the purpose of purifying the scale items and assessing the reliability and 
convergent and discriminant validity of the purified scale. Study 3 further assessed the 
psychometric properties of the purified scale and tested the predictive validity of the scale 
with a sample of university students. Study 4 also tested the predictive validity of the 
scale with a normal population sample as well as provided a context for applying the 
scale within a conceptual model of consumer choice of elective healthcare treatment.  
17.1 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 There has long been interest in consumer literature regarding the ways in which 
consumers make decisions (Bettman 1979). Most of this research is under the assumption 
that consumers engage in decision making with the same goals and using the same 
information processing styles. However, in high-stakes decisions, this may not always be 
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the case and consumers may differ in respect to their preferences regarding the 
organization and negotiation of the decision situation. Today, healthcare patients are 
much more involved in their health decisions, mainly because of the overwhelming 
amount of information they can search for and use from healthcare providers, media 
sources, and the Internet (Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, and Ubel 2005). As shown in 
previous studies, people tend to use a number of sources of information when making 
healthcare decisions (e.g., Conboy, Domar, and O’Connell 2001; Griffiths 1999). 
However, as Deber (1994) highlights, there is an often overlooked discrepancy between 
the push for increased patient autonomy and existing literature that appears to suggest 
that many patients may not wish to be active participants in health decision making. 
There is even evidence to suggest that certain individuals may experience disutility or 
increased negative emotions from being involved in decision making about the treatment 
of their health problems (Robinson and Thomson 2001).  
 As recent literature on HRT decision making has pointed out, it is also not exactly 
clear how women make their decisions about menopause (Murtagh and Hepworth 2005). 
In the context of hormone therapy, decision-making is extremely complex due to the 
continuing controversies and uncertainty about the effects and efficacy of HRT. Trade-
offs related to potential benefits, such as reduced risk of osteoporosis and improvements 
in quality of life, and potential risks, such as increased risk of breast cancer and recurrent 
coronary events in women with existing coronary artery disease complicate HRT 
decisions (Bastian et al. 2002). Moreover, decision making in healthcare is a process 
distributed across a number of constituents and embedded in constructions of the illnesses 
and medical treatments under consideration (Murtagh and Hepworth 2005).  
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 Assumptions are made that healthcare professionals are aware of the information 
needs of individual patients (Luker et al. 1995). However, unless we know what types of 
information are important to people then what is perceived as ‘relevant’ or ‘helpful’ 
information may not always be provided.  Empirical evidence suggests that there is a 
difference in perception of what the person wants to know and what the healthcare 
professional thinks the person wants to know (Lauer, Murphy, and Powers 1982), with 
objective information often being perceived by people as unhelpful rather than 
constructive and supportive. In addition, considering the errors that many people make 
when evaluating scientific statistics and objective information, choices may actually 
transform into risks to individual well-being, although ‘choice’ has long been a principal 
demand of the women’s health movement (Lippman 1999).  As is shown in this study, 
attitudes towards healthcare behaviors may be more strongly influenced by general 
affective responses than by cognitive beliefs regarding the behavior under question.  This 
has important implications for how we may want to frame behavioral interventions and 
decision support systems. 
 One final important implication of this work has to do with this shift towards 
more consumer-focused decision making.  Often, the assumption is that we provide 
consumers with information, typically statistical probabilities, and place the 
responsibility on them to make an informed, rational choice.  However, what is often 
overlooked is that when making these decisions, individuals operate within networks of 
relationships and information sources that have profound effects on the information they 
encounter and the ultimate choices that they make.  In the terms of complexity science 
this is known as a “shadow system” which may be fairly predictable for some (e.g., 
 159
soliciting the opinion of a spouse or primary physician) but more ambiguous or shifting 
for others (e.g., gathering information from the Internet or a trip to an alternative 
practitioner).  From the standpoint of a physician trying to give an expert opinion, there is 
often a strong temptation to try to override or discredit the shadow system, but this just 
ignores how powerful its influence can be and the fact that the patient cannot simply walk 
away from or ignore it.  A more productive approach is to recognize and map the shadow 
system and try to work alongside it.  The implication of this work is that we can use the 
CDS scale to assist in the prediction of individuals who are more likely to have elaborate 
shadow systems that may influence their decision making. 
 In sum, the goal of this work is to provide a better understanding of the 
motivations behind individual differences regarding their information search, preferred 
role with others, and emotional reactions in high-stakes decision situations. Decision 
support tools can be made to vary widely, from those that support objective information 
exchange and active engagement in making treatment choices to those that provide 
normative information and support for emotional distress (Robinson and Thomson 2001). 
By developing the CDS scale to assess differences in consumer decision style in high-
stakes decision situations, we may be able to better match the assistance that is provided 
to individual preferences. In the context of healthcare, if the components of a good 
clinical encounter are in place, the outcomes for patients are generally more positive 
(Salkeld et al. 2004).  
17.2 Limitations and Future Research 
 There are several limitations to this research.  First, the scale development process 
was carried out using mainly student subjects.  Although in a fourth study the scale 
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structure was replicated and predictive validity tested with a normal population sample, it 
is possible that the use of student subjects led to bias in the scale development process.  
For future research it may be useful to conduct the scale development process within a 
normal population sample.  One could first conduct exploratory research with a normal 
population talking to them about their experiences in making high-stakes decisions in 
order to generate scale items. 
 In addition, the predictive validity tests included in study three were all shown to 
be nonsignificant.  This may have been partly a function of the research design since 
student subjects were provided with a fairly long survey at the very end of a one-hour 
required research session.  There is the possibility that lack of motivation and effort may 
have led to overall inconsistent responses to items on the questionnaire, which influenced 
these tests.  It may be useful to conduct future research to assess the predictive validity of 
the scale in an experimental study which may overcome some of the limitations of self-
reports.  Then important variables such as level of information search and level of 
physician interaction may be directly assessed. 
 Another limitation of the research involves the fact that there may have been other 
important variables that influence the decision of whether or not to use HRT that were 
not included in the conceptual model used in this study.  The variables included here 
were chosen based on a thorough review of the existing qualitative and quantitative 
literature explaining women’s choices regarding HRT; however, today there is a shift 
towards considering a wide variety of factors such as one’s morals and values, family 
history, and so on before making a choice.  It would be useful to conduct future 
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qualitative research in order to better understand the drivers of HRT use, both at an 




Questionnaire for Study One 
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Please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers to these questions.  It is 
important that I gather extremely descriptive information, so try to answer all questions 
meaningfully and truthfully.  Also, please try to fill up the space provided with each of 
your responses.  Your answers will not be tied to your identity so please be candid in 
your responses to the questions.  The information collected here is for research purposes 
only; it is not intended for commercial or any other use and will not be shared or sold. 
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Instructions:  In each section, please read the questions carefully and answer with a 
descriptive and meaningful response.  Try to fill up all of the space provided with each 
answer (you may use the back of the page as necessary).  Some of the questions may be 
abstract; please answer them to the best of your ability.  There is no time limit to the 
study, you are free to work at your own pace and continue until you have completed all 
sections.  If you have any questions raise your hand and the moderator will come to your 
seat.  When you are finished, please bring the survey to the front of the room.  You are 
then free to leave quietly.   
 
Part I.   Please read each definition and respond to the following questions.   
 
Consumer Decision Making Style refers to a mental orientation characterizing a 
consumer’s approach to choices. 
 








2) Give your own definition of consumer decision making style.  Please DO NOT 








3) In your opinion, do consumers differ in terms of their decision making styles?  
















Part II.   Please read each scenario and respond to the corresponding questions. 
 
Consumers are often faced with fairly simple decisions.  For example, deciding what 
to eat for lunch or choosing a brand of toothpaste to purchase.  Sometimes 
consumers are confronted with fairly complex decisions.  For example, deciding 
which stocks to buy and sell or choosing a health care treatment.   
 
 






































4) Describe the process that you, as a consumer, use to arrive at an acceptable choice 














Part V.  Please provide the following demographic information about yourself. 
 
 












Questionnaire for Study Two 
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Your answers will not be tied to your identity so please be candid in your responses to the 
questions.  The information collected here is for research purposes only; it is not intended 
for commercial or any other use and will not be shared or sold. 
 169
General Instructions:  In each section, please read the questions carefully and answer 
with a descriptive response.  Try to fill up all of the space provided for each open-ended 
answer (you may use the back of the page as necessary).  If you are responding to a scale 
item, please do so in a meaningful way.  Some of the questions may be abstract; just 
answer them to the best of your ability.  There is no time limit to the study, you are free 
to work at your own pace and continue until you have completed all sections.  Please turn 
the pages of the questionnaire only one at a time.  If you have any questions raise your 
hand and the moderator will come to your seat.  When you are finished, please bring the 
survey to the front of the room.     
 
 
Part I.    
 
Consumers are often faced with making important, life-altering decisions.  High-stakes 
consumer decisions are defined as those that have subjectively important and risky 
outcomes.  In these decision situations, consumers may feel that an important lifetime 
goal (e.g., safety, health, well-being, etc.) is being threatened.  These decisions also tend 
to be emotionally difficult and generate stress.  They typically involve making difficult 
tradeoffs among attributes associated with the choice options.  Examples of high-stakes 
consumer decisions include decisions regarding medical treatments, financial 
investments, careers or education, insurance, legal issues, housing and security, among 
others.   
 
Recall a time when you had to make a high-stakes consumer decision.  Please describe 























Try to put yourself back in this or any other high-stakes consumer decision situations you 
have experienced.  Try to recall (1) how you consistently tend to think about or 
conceptualize the decision situation and (2) how you negotiate the decision making 
process to arrive at a preferred choice.  Keeping this in mind, please indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  The scales range from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
 
I think about or conceptualize a high-stakes decision situation as… 
 
           strongly                              strongly 
                        disagree                    agree  
 
1. A situation that provides the opportunity to build 
relationships with others. 
 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
2. A situation that helps define my individual self-
concept.  
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
3. A loosely defined problem. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
4. A situation that gets increasingly more complicated as 
time passes. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
5. A learning experience. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
6. A structured problem. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
7. A situation in which I apply what I already know to 
the current problem. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
8. A situation that is relatively unpredictable. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
9. A situation that is relatively controllable. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
10. A situation having relatively clear-cut outcomes. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
11. A situation in which I feel connected to others. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
12. A situation that becomes simpler as time passes. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
13. A situation having relatively unknowable outcomes. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
14. An individual decision making experience. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
15. A group decision making experience. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
16. An engaging experience.  1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
17. A situation in which possibilities are continuously 
emerging. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
18. A situation in which I feel relatively independent. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
19. A situation in which I feel isolated from others.   1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
20. A situation in which I can apply what I have learned 
from the past because nothing much changes. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 




I negotiate the decision making process to arrive at a preferred choice by… 
 
          strongly                strongly 
                       disagree                   agree  
 
22. Taking charge of the decision making process. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
23. Trying to control the decision making process. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
24. Predicting cause-and-effect scenarios. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
25. Trying to forecast the future. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
26. Developing an overall understanding of the problem. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
27. Focusing on the problem as a whole. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
28. Employing routine decision making behaviors. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
29. Carefully examining the characteristics of each 
choice option. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
30. Behaving in a machine-like manner. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
31. Being open to all possible choice options. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
32. Examining each part of the problem separately. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
33. Being open to all possible sources of information. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
34. Being responsive to others’ concerns. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
35. Behaving in a flexible manner. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
36. Adapting to changes in the situation. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
37. Collaborating with others to arrive at a preferred 
choice. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
38. Arriving at a consensus with others. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
39. Listening to the opinions of others. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
40. Listening to my own ‘gut’ feeling. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
41. Focusing on agreement among others’ opinions. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
42. Focusing on differences among others’ opinions. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
43. Focusing on the variation in others’ opinions.  1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
44. Keeping a clear objective in mind throughout the 
decision process.  
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
45. Co-participating with others in the decision making 
process. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
46. Focusing on consistencies among others’ opinions. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
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47. Trying to make the best possible decision. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
48. Constantly revising my objectives as the decision 
process unfolds. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
49. Focusing on internal motivations. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
50. Focusing on objective information. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
51. Focusing on personal values. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
52. Relying on expert knowledge and opinions. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
53. Relying on internal wants and needs. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
54. Seeking feedback on my opinions from others. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
55. Using a rational decision-making approach. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
56. Using a creative decision-making approach. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
57. Using an impromptu decision-making approach.   1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
58. Using an innovative decision-making approach. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
59. Trying to stay ‘level-headed’ throughout the decision 
process. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
60. Using a formal decision-making approach. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
61. Behaving in a spontaneous manner. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
62. Trying to stay flexible throughout the decision 
process. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
63. Adapting to new information that becomes available. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
64. Staying consistent with previous decisions I have 
made.    
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
65. Trying to ‘make sense’ out of the overall situation. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
66. Taking one step at a time. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
67. Exploring multiple viewpoints.  1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
68. Behaving in a rigid manner. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
69. Taking the shortest path towards finding a solution. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
70. Trying to predict the consequences of my future 
actions. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
71. Focusing on variation in my behavior in past similar 
situations. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
72. Focusing on how I normally behave in past similar 
situations. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
73. Looking for contradictions in available information. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
74. Carefully considering all variables that may affect the 
outcomes of the decision. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
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75. Individually determining the best course of action. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
76. Keeping an overall objective in mind rather than 
focusing on specific details.     
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
77. Relying on outside experts to provide factual 
information. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
78. Relying on outside experts to give guidance and 
direction. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
79. Forming an overall understanding of the problem 
using diverse viewpoints. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
80. Using a novel decision making approach. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
81. Communicating with others to facilitate the decision 
process. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
82. Individually collecting information. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
83. Focusing on my personal values. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
84. Focusing on objective information. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
85. Relying on my intuition. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
86. Knowing that I have come up with the best possible 
solution. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
87. Using a ‘tried and true’ decision making approach. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
88. Making a ‘good enough’ decision. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
89. Encouraging the expression of others’ opinions. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
90. Focusing on factual information. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
91. Trying to make sense of the information that is 
available. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
92. Trying to find specific solutions from the information 
that is available. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
93. Focusing on discrepancies among available 
information sources. 
1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 
94. Focusing on consensus recommendations. 1        2        3         4        5        6         7 
 














Part II.    
 
This section of the questionnaire asks you to respond to statements that relate to your 
personality, behaviors, and consumer styles.  Please use the scales provided to respond to 
the statements.   
 
              strongly                  strongly 
                      disagree                            agree  
 
1. Getting very good quality is very important to me. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
2. Nice department and specialty stores offer me the best 
products. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
3. To get variety, I shop at different stores and choose 
different brands. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
4. Going shopping is one of the enjoyable activities in my 
life. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
5. The lower price products are usually my choice. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
6. I take the time to shop carefully for best buys. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
7. I prefer buying the best-selling brands. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
8. I really don’t give my purchases much thought or care. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
9. The more I learn about products, the harder it seems to 
choose the best. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
10. I have favorite brands I buy over and over. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
11. Sometimes it’s hard to choose which stores to shop. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
12. I make shopping trips fast. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
13. I usually have one or more outfits of the very newest 
style. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
14. I am impulsive when purchasing. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
15. I change brands I buy regularly. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
16. I look carefully to find the best value for the money. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
17. A product doesn’t have to be perfect, or the best, to satisfy 
me. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
18. It’s fun to buy something new and exciting. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
19. I go to the same stores each time I shop. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
20. The well-known national brands are best for me. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
21. In general, I usually try to buy the best overall quality. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
22. I enjoy shopping just for the fun of it. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
23. I carefully watch how much I spend. 1           2           3            4            5 
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24. A product doesn’t have to be perfect, or the best, to satisfy 
me. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
25. When it comes to purchasing products, I try to get the 
very best or perfect choice. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
26. Shopping at stores wastes my time. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
27. Once I find a product or brand I like, I stick with it. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
28. I make special effort to choose the very best quality. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
29. I shop quickly, buying the first product or brand I find that 
seems good enough. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
30. The most advertised brands are usually very good choices. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
31. Shopping is not a pleasant activity for me. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
32. Often I make careless purchases I later wish I had not. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
33. There are so many brands to choose from that often I feel 
confused. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
34. My standards and expectations for products I buy are very 
high. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
35. All the information I get on different products confuses 
me. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
36. The more expensive brands are usually my choices. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
37. I keep my wardrobe up-to-date with the changing 
fashions. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
38. I buy as much as possible at sale prices. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
39. I should plan my shopping more carefully than I do. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
40. Fashionable, attractive styling is very important to me. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
41. The higher the price of a product, the better its quality. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
                  
          definitely not                   definitely   
         true of myself              true of myself 
 
1. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth 
about something. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
2. I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
3. I enjoy intellectual challenges. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
4. I am not very good at solving problems that require 
careful logical analysis. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
5. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
6. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
7. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. 1           2           3            4            5 
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8. I am not a very analytical thinker. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
9. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong 
points. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
10. I prefer complex problems to simple problems. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
11. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives 
me little satisfaction. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
12. I don’t reason well under pressure. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
13. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most 
people. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
14. I have a logical mind. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
15. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
16. I have no problem thinking things through carefully. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out 
problems in my life. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
18. Knowing the answer without having to understand the 
reasoning behind it is good enough for me. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
19. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
20. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to 
me. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
21. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
22. I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
23. Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in 
figuring out problems in my life. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
24. I believe in trusting my hunches. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
25. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
26. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of 
action. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
27. I trust my initial feelings of people. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
28. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my 
gut feelings. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
29. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make 
mistakes. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
30. I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
31. I think there are times when one should rely on one’s 
intuition. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
32. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on 
feelings. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
33. I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for 
important decisions. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
34. I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make 
decisions. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
35. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut 
feelings to find an answer. 
1           2           3            4            5 
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36. I would not want to depend on anyone who described 
himself or herself as intuitive. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
37. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most 
people’s. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
38. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
39. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if 
I can’t explain how I know. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
40. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are 
accurate. 







Indicate how easy or hard it would be for you to present yourself to others consistently 
and for a long time in the ways described by the statements. 
 
A person who…      very easy              very hard 
 
1. Conforms. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
2. Will always think of something. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
3. Enjoys detailed work. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
4. Would sooner create something than improve it. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
5. Is prudent when dealing with authority or general opinion. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
6. Never acts without proper authority. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
7. Never seeks to bend (much less break) the rules. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
8. Likes bosses and work patterns which are consistent. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
9. Holds back ideas until they are obviously needed. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
10. Has fresh perspectives on old problems. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
11. Likes to vary set routines at a moment’s notice. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
12. Prefers change to occur gradually. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
13. Is thorough. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
14. Is a steady plodder. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
15. Copes with several new ideas and problems at the same 
time. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
16. Is consistent. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
17. Is able to stand out in disagreement alone against a group 
of equals and seniors. 
1           2           3            4            5 
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18. Is stimulating. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
19. Readily agrees with the team at work. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
20. Has original ideas. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
21. Masters all details thoroughly. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
22. Proliferates ideas. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
23. Prefers to work on one problem at a time. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
24. Is methodical and systematic. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
25. Often risks doing things differently. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
26. Works without deviation in a prescribed way. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
27. Likes to impose strict order on matters within own 
control. 
1           2           3            4            5 
 
28. Likes the protection of precise instructions. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
29. Fits readily into ‘the system’. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
30. Needs the stimulation of frequent change. 1           2           3            4            5 
 
31. Prefers colleagues who never ‘rock the boat’. 1           2           3            4            5 
 


























In order to help us better interpret your responses to the questionnaire, please answer the 




Male _____ Female _____ 
 






Black_____  White_____ American Indian_____     Hispanic_____    Asian_____      Other_____ 
 




5. Marital status: 
 
Single_____ Married_____ Divorced_____    Widowed_____ 
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Your answers will not be tied to your identity so please be candid in your responses to the 
questions. The information collected here is for research purposes only; it is not intended 
for commercial or any other use and will not be shared or sold. 
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:   
 
In each section, please read each item carefully and answer by circling the appropriate 
number or filling in the blank. There are no right or wrong answers; please just answer 
with a meaningful and honest response. Some of the questions may sound repetitive or 
even the same; please answer all of them. There is no time limit to the study, you are free 
to work at your own pace and continue until you have completed all sections. Please turn 
the pages of the questionnaire only one at a time. If you have any questions raise your 
hand and the moderator will come to your seat. When you are finished, please bring the 
survey to the front of the room.     
 
 
PART I:     
 
Consumers are sometimes faced with making important, life-altering decisions. These 
types of decisions are called high-stakes consumer decisions and have important and 
risky outcomes for the consumer. In these decision situations, consumers may feel that an 
important goal, for example, one’s health, safety or well-being, is being threatened. These 
decisions also tend to be emotional and generate stress. They typically involve making 
difficult tradeoffs in order to arrive at a choice. Examples of high-stakes consumer 
decisions include decisions regarding medical treatments, financial investments, careers 
or education, insurance, legal issues, housing and security, among others.   
 
Take a minute to think about any high-stakes consumer decision situations you have 
experienced in the past. Try to recall (1) how you tend to think about or conceptualize 
these decision situations and (2) how you tend to negotiate the decision making process 
to arrive at a preferred choice.  Keeping this in mind, please indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
  I think about or conceptualize a high-stakes decision situation as… 
                      
            Strongly      Strongly 
                         disagree        agree  
 
1.  An experience that unites me with others. 
 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2. A situation that is relatively unpredictable. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3. A situation in which I feel connected to others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4. A situation that gets increasingly more complicated as 
time passes. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5. A situation that is relatively stable. 
 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6. An experience that connects me to others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
7. A situation having relatively unknowable outcomes. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
8. An opportunity to build relationships with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
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9. A constantly changing situation. 
 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
10. A relatively autonomous experience. 
 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
11. An opportunity to bond with others. 
 




I negotiate the decision making process to arrive at a preferred choice by… 
  
                   Strongly    Strongly 
                       disagree                    agree  
 
12. Collaborating with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
13. Focusing on differences among others’ opinions. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
14. Carefully considering the opinions of others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
15. Focusing on the variation in others’ opinions. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
16. Independently determining the best course of action. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
17. Co-participating with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
18. Seeking out divergent viewpoints regarding the situation. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
19. Arriving at a consensus with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
20. Soliciting others’ thoughts regarding the situation. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
21. Exploring the diversity among others’ opinions. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 






Below you will be provided with a specific example of a high-stakes consumer decision 
scenario. Please read the scenario and, as best as you can, place yourself into the role of 
the decision maker as described. You will then be asked to answer a series of questions 
related to your thoughts and anticipated actions.  
 
Suppose that you are a senior in college and have just inherited a lump 
sum of money from a grandparent. You have been thinking a lot about 
your future lately and have considered going back to graduate school. 
This is now an option for you given the money you received. However, 
you know that going back to school will take most all of this money and 
you will have to live modestly for the next two to three years. Going 
back to school will also not allow you to do other things such as buy a 
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new car, start a savings account, accumulate work experience, bring 
home a salary, and have your own apartment. But going back to school 
would be beneficial for you in other ways. You will receive a valuable 
degree, experience a new campus, avoid the stress of a new job, have 
more vacation time, and learn more about the subjects that interest you. 
Of course, there is absolutely no way of knowing if going back to school 
is more valuable than the work experience you would gain by taking a 
job or vice versa. To make this choice even more difficult, you have 
already received a good job offer from a company you like and have also 
already been accepted to school of your choice. To meet the mandatory 
deadlines, you will have to make your choice of whether or not to go 
back to school within the next two weeks. 
 
Now put yourself in the role of this decision maker to answer the following 
questions. 
 
How would you rate the importance of this decision? 
 
Not very important Very important 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How would you rate the risk associated with the outcomes of this decision? 
 
Not very risky Very risky 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How would you rate the emotionality of this decision? 
 
Not very emotional Very emotional 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How would you rate the stressfulness of this decision? 
 
Not very stressful     Very stressful 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
How likely is it that you would consult each of the following personal sources for 
information regarding this decision?  
   
     Not very likely    Very likely 
 
1. Friend 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2. School advisor 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
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3. Relative 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4. Classmate 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5. Financial advisor 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6. Social or support group member 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
 
How important to you is information from the following personal sources? 
 
     Not very important   Very important 
 
1. Friend 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2. School advisor 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3. Relative 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4. Classmate 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5. Financial advisor 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 




How likely is it that you would use each of the following impersonal sources to 
search for information regarding this decision?  
 
     Not very likely    Very likely 
 
1.  Newspapers 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2.  Magazines 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3.  Internet 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4.  Books 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5.  Television programming 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6.  Statistical reports  1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
7. Brochures / Pamphlets 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 







How important to you is information from the following impersonal sources? 
 
    Not very important    Very important 
 
1. Newspapers 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2.  Magazines 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3.  Internet 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4.  Books 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5.  Television programming 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6.  Statistical reports  1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
7. Brochures / Pamphlets 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 






In high-stakes decision situations, such as the one described above, you can be presented 
with many different types of information, for example: 
 
• Information about the drawbacks of choosing to engage in the behavior (going 
back to school) 
• Information about the benefits of choosing to engage in the behavior (going back 
to school) 
• An advisor or expert opinion on what choice you should make 
• Information about the choices of others who were in a similar position 
 
 
How important to you are the following types of information? 
 
         Not very important     Very important 
 
1. Information about the drawbacks 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2.  Information about the benefits 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3.  An advisor or expert opinion 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 









Putting yourself back into the role of the decision maker as presented in the 
scenario, what is the choice that you would make?   (Place check mark in the 
appropriate blank) 
 
 Enroll in graduate school  ____ 
 Not enroll in graduate school ____ 
 
 
Now indicate how well each adjective term below describes how you would feel if 
you actually had to make this decision. 
 
 
 Very slightly  
or not at all 
 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. Worried 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
 






Recall that high-stakes consumer decisions are defined as those that have important and 




Again, try to recall (1) how you tend to think about or conceptualize these decision 
situations and (2) how you tend to negotiate the decision making process to arrive at a 
preferred choice.  Keeping this in mind, please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements. 
 
I think about or conceptualize a high-stakes decision situation as… 
                      
               Strongly                Strongly 
          disagree                                 agree  
 
1. An opportunity to bond with others.  
 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2. A situation having relatively unknowable outcomes. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3. A situation in which I feel connected to others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4. A constantly changing situation. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5. A situation that is relatively stable. 
 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6. An opportunity to build relationships with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
7. A situation that is relatively unpredictable. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
8. An experience that connects me to others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
9. A situation that gets increasingly more complicated as 
time passes. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
10. A relatively autonomous experience. 
 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
11. An experience that unites me with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
I negotiate the decision making process to arrive at a preferred choice by… 
 
             Strongly                      Strongly 
                disagree                         agree 
 
12. Co-participating with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
13. Focusing on the variation in others’ opinions. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
14. Carefully considering the opinions of others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
15. Avoiding contradictory information. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
16. Independently determining the best course of action. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
17. Collaborating with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
18. Exploring the diversity among others’ opinions. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
19. Arriving at a consensus with others. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
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20. Seeking out divergent viewpoints regarding the 
situation. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
21. Soliciting others’ thoughts regarding the situation 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 






Below you will be provided with another specific example of a high-stakes consumer 
decision scenario. Please read the following scenario and, as best as you can, place 
yourself into the role described. Again, you will be asked to answer a series of questions 
related to your thoughts and anticipated actions.   
  
Imagine that you are faced with the stark news that you have been 
diagnosed with melanoma, which is a serious form of skin cancer. The 
first step in treatment is the surgical removal of the melanoma under or 
directly below the skin; however, following this procedure you are given 
the optional choice of chemotherapy treatment. Your chemotherapy 
would be offered as a preventative treatment – to try to stop your 
melanoma from coming back in the future if you had cancer cells in your 
lymph nodes that went undetected. Chemotherapy may prolong life by 
several months or even years if this was the case. However, treating 
melanoma with chemotherapy is still experimental; it is not proven that 
it helps prevent melanoma from coming back. Because chemotherapy 
can kill normal blood cells along with cancer cells, patients may have an 
increased chance of infection and abnormal bleeding after injuries, 
which can be very dangerous. Furthermore, the chemotherapy itself may 
be associated with adverse effects such as nausea, vomiting, hair loss, 
mouth sores, and fatigue, leading to a reduction in quality of life. A 
considerable proportion of patients experience side effects without 
gaining much benefit. Your surgery is scheduled for two weeks from 
today. Before then, you must make a decision whether or not you want 
to receive the chemotherapy treatment. 
 
Now put yourself in the role of this decision maker to answer the following 
questions. 
 
How would you rate the importance of this decision? 
 
Not very important Very important 
 






How would you rate the risk associated with the outcomes of this decision? 
 
Not very risky Very risky 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How would you rate the emotionality of this decision? 
 
Not very emotional Very emotional 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How would you rate the stressfulness of this decision? 
 
Not very stressful     Very stressful 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely is it that you would consult each of the following personal sources for 
information regarding this decision?  
 
     Not very likely    Very likely 
 
1. Friend 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2. Physician 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3. Relative 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4. Classmate 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5. Nurse  1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6. Social or support group member 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
 
How important to you is information from the following personal sources? 
 
    Not very important    Very important 
 
1. Friend 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2. Physician 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3. Relative 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4. Classmate 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5. Nurse 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 




How likely is it that you would use each of the following impersonal sources to 
search for information regarding this decision?  
 
     Not very likely    Very likely 
 
1.  Newspapers 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2.  Magazines 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3.  Internet 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4.  Books 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5.  Television programming 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6.  Statistical reports  1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
7. Brochures / Pamphlets 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
8. Seminars / Information sessions 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
 
How important to you is information from the following impersonal sources? 
 
    Not very important    Very important 
 
1. Newspapers 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2.  Magazines 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3.  Internet 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4.  Books 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5.  Television programming 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6.  Statistical reports  1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
7. Brochures / Pamphlets 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 














Again, putting yourself in the role of this decision maker, please answer the following 
questions. 
 
How likely is it that you would initiate a discussion with your physician regarding 
the risks associated with the choice options in this decision situation? 
 
Not very likely            Very likely 
 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely is it that you would initiate a discussion with your physician regarding 
the benefits associated with the choice options in this decision situation? 
 
Not very likely            Very likely 
 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely is it that you would initiate a discussion with your physician regarding 
your choice preferences in this decision situation? 
 
Not very likely            Very likely 
 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Overall, throughout the decision making process, how much interaction with your 
physician would you initiate? 
 
A limited amount of interaction  A large amount of interaction 
 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Given the risks and benefits associated with your choice options, who should decide 
how acceptable those risks and benefits are for you? 
 
The doctor alone _____ 
Mostly the doctor _____ 
Both equally _____ 
Mostly me  _____ 
Me alone  _____ 
 
Given the risks and benefits associated with your choice options, who should decide 
whether or not you should take the chemotherapy treatment? 
 
The doctor alone _____ 
Mostly the doctor _____ 
Both equally _____ 
Mostly me  _____ 





In high-stakes decision situations, such as the one described above, you can be presented 
with many different types of information, for example: 
 
• Information about the drawbacks of choosing to engage in the behavior (going 
back to school) 
• Information about the benefits of choosing to engage in the behavior (going back 
to school) 
• An advisor or expert opinion on what choice you should make 
• Information about the choices of others who were in a similar position 
 
How important to you are the following types of information? 
 
         Not very important          Very important 
 
1. Information about the drawbacks 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2.  Information about the benefits 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3.  An advisor or expert opinion 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 






Putting yourself back into the role of the decision maker as presented in the 
scenario, what is the choice that you would make?   (Place check mark in the 
appropriate blank) 
 
 Choose the chemotherapy treatment ____ 
 Not choose the chemotherapy treatment ____ 
 
 
Indicate how well each adjective term below describes how you would feel if you 
actually had to make this decision. 
 
 Very slightly  
or not at all 
 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
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4. Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. Worried 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
 






How much experience have you had making high-stakes consumer decisions in your 
own personal life?  
 
A very low amount of experience  A very high amount of experience 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 





Have you been diagnosed with a serious illness in the past two years? 
 
 Yes  _____  
 No _____ 
 
Have you had to undergo surgery in the past two years? 
 
 Yes _____  
 No _____ 
 
Have you been hospitalized in the past two years? 
 
 Yes _____  






Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 
              Strongly disagree                 Strongly agree 
 
1. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me 
to enjoy life. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
2. I dislike unpredictable situations. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
3.  I tend to put off important decisions until the last 
moment. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
4.  I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many 
different things. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
5.  Even after I have made up my mind about something, I 
am always eager to consider a different opinion. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
6.  I usually make important decisions quickly and 
confidently. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
7. I enjoy having a clear structured mode of life. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
8. When considering most conflict situations, I usually see 
how much both sides could be right. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
9. I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or 
intentions are unclear to me. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
10. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of 
unexpected actions. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
11. I like to have a place for everything and everything in 
its place. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
12. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many 
different opinions on the issue as possible. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
13. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason 
why an event occurred in my life. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
14. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I 
know what to expect of them. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
15. I would describe myself as indecisive. 
 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
16. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits 
my temperament. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
17. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel 
very upset. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
18. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a situation without 
knowing what might happen. 
1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
19. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. 1        2        3        4         5         6        7  
 
20. I tend to struggle with most decisions. 
 











In order to help us better interpret your responses to the questionnaire, please answer the 




 Male  _____  
 Female  _____ 
 






 Black  _____    
 White  _____    
 American Indian _____    
 Hispanic  _____    
 Asian  _____   
 Other  _____ 
 
Were you raised in the United States? 
 
 Yes _____ 
 No _____ 
 
Are you currently employed full-time or part-time? 
 
 Employed full-time _____ 
 Employed part-time _____ 
 Not employed  _____ 
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Ms. Tracey King, Ph.D. Candidate & Instructor in Marketing 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Naresh Malhotra, Regents Professor of Marketing 






You are being asked to participate in an academic research project that investigates 
consumer decisions regarding healthcare.  Some of the questions will refer to various 
healthcare and medical experiences.  The researchers listed above will be the only people 
who have access to your responses.  Your answers will not be tied to your identity in any 
way so please be candid in your responses to the questions. The information collected 
here is for research purposes only; it is not intended for commercial or any other use and 
will not be shared or sold.  The results of the project will only be reported in summary 
form; no individual responses will be reported.  By filling out the survey you are offering 
your research consent. If you have any questions please contact Ms. Tracey King (770-




GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:   
 
In each section, please read all of the instructions and each of the items carefully and 
answer by circling the appropriate number, filling in the blank, or placing a check-mark 
on the appropriate line.  There are no right or wrong answers; simply answer with a 
meaningful and honest response. Some of the questions may sound repetitive or even the 




In this section you will be asked a series of questions related to how you think about and 
make high-stakes consumer decisions.  A definition of high-stakes consumer decisions is 
given in the box below.  One example of a high-stakes consumer decision is your decision 
of whether or not to use hormone therapy, commonly referred to as HRT.  Here, HRT 
refers to estrogen treatment or estrogen treatment combined with other hormones such as 
progestogen, progestin or progesterone.  The expectation is that this is a decision that 
you are currently facing, have recently faced, or will face in the near future.   
 
 
Consumers are sometimes faced with making important and life-altering consumption 
decisions. These types of decisions are called high-stakes consumer decisions and have 
important and risky outcomes for the consumer. In these decision situations, consumers may 
feel that an important goal, for example, one’s health, safety or well-being is being threatened. 
These decisions also tend to be emotional and generate stress. They often involve making 
difficult tradeoffs in order to arrive at a choice. Examples of high-stakes consumer decisions 
include decisions regarding medical treatments, financial investments, careers or education, 
insurance, legal issues, housing and security, among others. 
How much experience have you had making these types of high-stakes consumer 
decisions in your own personal life?  
 
 
A limited amount of experience 
    
 
A large amount of experience 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The decision of whether or not to use hormone therapy (HRT) possesses the characteristics of 
a high-stakes consumer decision.  HRT use has both harmful and beneficial effects and 
remains controversial.  Because of the difficulty in being able to predict how HRT will impact 
each woman individually, outcome uncertainty is also involved.  In addition, the decision 
process may be emotional and generate stress for some women. 
Now try to recall how you tend to think about or conceptualize high-stakes consumer 
decisions such as the decision of whether or not to use HRT.  Also recall how you tend to 
negotiate the decision making process to arrive at a preferred choice.  Keeping this in 




I think about or conceptualize a high-stakes consumer decision situation as… 
 
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1.  An experience that unites me with others. 
 1     2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. A situation that is relatively unpredictable. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. A situation in which I feel connected to others. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. A situation that gets increasingly more complicated 
as time passes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. An experience that connects me to others. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. A constantly changing situation. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I negotiate the decision making process to arrive at a preferred choice by…       
   
 
 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
7. Carefully considering the opinions of others. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Focusing on the variation in others’ opinions. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Seeking out divergent viewpoints regarding the 
situation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Soliciting others’ thoughts regarding the situation. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Exploring the diversity among others’ opinions. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
SECTION II:  
 
In this section you will be asked a series of questions regarding your perceptions of 
medicine and health-related issues. 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding menopause in general: 
  
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. I associate the arrival of menopause with a sense 
of relief. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I associate the arrival of menopause with a sense 
of regret. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I have positive feelings toward menopause. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4. Menopause is a natural life event. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Menopause is a dreaded life event. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Menopause is something to look forward to. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding medicine in general: 
 
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. In general, my first response is to take 
medication for the treatment of my illnesses. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. If I am not feeling well, I will typically take 
medicine to feel better.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. In general, I view medical treatment as 
positive. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The treatment of medical conditions using 




In this section you will be asked a series of questions related to your perceptions of 
hormone therapy (HRT) use.  Recall that HRT use refers to estrogen treatment or 
estrogen treatment combined with other hormones such as progestogen, progestin or 
progesterone. 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding HRT use: 
 
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. I believe that using HRT helps reduce 
menopausal symptoms such as hot flashes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I am concerned that using HRT results in an 
increased risk of uterine cancer in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I believe that using HRT helps reduce the risk 
of heart disease in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I believe that using HRT helps reduce the risk 
of osteoporosis in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I am concerned that using HRT results in an 
increased risk of breast cancer in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please indicate your likelihood of using or continuing to use HRT based on the 
following outcomes associated with HRT use: 
 
How likely are you to use or continue to use HRT 
to the extent that it… Extremely unlikely Extremely likely 
1. Reduces menopausal symptoms such as hot 
flashes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Increases the risk of uterine cancer in the 
future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 202
3. Reduces the risk of heart disease in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Reduces the risk of osteoporosis in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Increases the risk of breast cancer in the 
future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Please indicate your beliefs, feelings, and overall attitude regarding HRT use: 
 
1. I think that using 
HRT is… Harmful Beneficial 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Safe Unsafe 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Valuable Worthless 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Healthy Unhealthy 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Dangerous Safe 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
3. Using HRT 
makes or would 
make me feel… 
Not worried Anxious 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Pleasant Unpleasant 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Uneasy Comfortable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Relaxed Nervous 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Unrewarded Rewarded 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
4. Overall, my 
feelings towards 
HRT use are… 
Negative Positive 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5. My overall 
attitude towards 
HRT use is… 
Good Bad 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Negative Positive 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Unfavorable Favorable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding HRT use: 
 
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. I have strong mixed reactions both for and 
against HRT use, all at the same time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I do not find myself feeling torn between the 
trade-offs associated with HRT use. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel a strong amount of conflict regarding 
my reactions to HRT use.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am very much undecided in my reactions to 
HRT use. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I have a completely one-sided reaction 
towards HRT use. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I would describe my thoughts and feelings 
towards HRT use as ambivalent. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding the use or continued use of HRT: 
 
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. People who are important to me would 
recommend that I use HRT. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel under some social pressure to use HRT. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. People who are important to me would 
encourage me to use HRT. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. People who are important to me would think it 
is appropriate for me to use HRT. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. The people in my life who opinions I value 
would approve of my use of HRT. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding the use or continued use of HRT: 
 
 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. If I wanted to, using HRT would be very easy. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I am confident that I could use HRT if I 
wanted to. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. For me, using HRT would be difficult even if 
I wanted to. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The decision to use HRT is beyond my 
control. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I feel that the decision of whether or not I use 
HRT is mostly up to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. There are a lot of factors not under my control 
that would restrain me from using HRT. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding the use or continued use of HRT in the future: 
 
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. I expect to use or continue to use HRT in the 
future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I intend to use or continue to use HRT in the 
future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. It is likely that I will use or continue to use 
HRT in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I plan to use or continue to use HRT in the 




In this section you will be asked a series of questions regarding your anticipated, current, 
or past use of HRT.  As mentioned before, HRT refers to estrogen treatment or estrogen 
treatment combined with other hormones such as progestogen, progestin or 
progesterone.   
 
Please indicate your current status regarding HRT use (choose only one option): 
 
I have never used HRT in the past and I do not intend to use HRT in the future.   _______ 
I have never used HRT in the past but I do intend to use HRT in the future. _______ 
I am currently using HRT. _______ 
I have used HRT in the past and I do not intend to use HRT again in the future. _______ 
I have used HRT in the past and I do intend to use it again in the future. _______ 
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If you are currently using HRT or have used HRT in the past, please indicate the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your 
satisfaction with HRT.  If you have never used HRT, please move on to the next 
page. 
 
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. Using HRT effectively relieved my 
menopausal symptoms. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I am satisfied with the side effects related to 
HRT use.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am satisfied with the ease and convenience of 
using HRT. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Using HRT has positively impacted my quality 
of life. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Overall, I am satisfied with using HRT.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am likely to recommend the use of HRT to a 
friend who is experiencing menopausal 
symptoms. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Please indicate your actual or anticipated feelings regarding the decision to use 
HRT.  If you have never used HRT, try to predict how you would feel if/when you 
had to make this decision.  If you are currently using HRT or have used HRT in the 




 Very slightly 
or not at all A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
14. Distressed 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Excited 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Upset 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Scared 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Enthusiastic 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Worried 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Alert 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Anxious 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Inspired 
 




1 2 3 4 5 
24. Determined 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Afraid 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. Uneasy 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding your actual or anticipated decision regarding HRT use: 
 
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. I experienced or would experience a large 
amount of negative emotion from making this 
decision. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Making this decision did not or would not 
generate much negative emotion for me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. This decision making process generated or 
would generate a high level of negative 
emotion for me.  




In this next section you will be asked a series of questions related to your information 
search and knowledge level regarding the decision of whether or not to use HRT.  If you 
have already made this decision, please refer to your own experiences.  If you expect to 
make this decision in the future, please refer to your anticipated actions. 
 
To what extent did you consult or would you consult the following personal sources 
for information regarding this decision?  
 
 A limited extent A great extent 
7. Friend 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Doctor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Relative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Classmate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Nurse  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Social or support group member 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Overall, how important to you is information from personal sources? 
 
Not very important 
    
Very important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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To what extent did you use or would you use the following impersonal sources to 
search for information regarding this decision?  
  
 A limited extent A great extent 
1. Newspapers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Magazines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Internet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Books 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Television programming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Statistical reports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Brochures / Pamphlets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Seminars / Information sessions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Radio programming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Overall, how important to you is information from impersonal sources? 
 
Not very important 
    
Very important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   
 
Overall, how knowledgeable do you feel about the decision of whether or not to use 
HRT? 
 
Not very knowledgeable Very knowledgeable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Please read the following statements about HRT use and answer to the best of your 
ability: (Answer ‘true’ if you believe the statement is correct; answer ‘false’ if you 
believe it is incorrect) 
 
 
 True False I don’t know 
1. The use of estrogen alone may decrease chances of a 
heart attack. 
 
_____ _____ _____  
2. The use of estrogen alone may increase risk of breast 
cancer. 
 
_____ _____ _____ 
3. The use of estrogen reduces the risk of postmenopausal 
osteoporosis. _____ _____ _____ 
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4. The use of estrogen combined with progestogen may 
increase chances of a heart attack. _____ _____ _____ 
5. The use of estrogen is safer if progestogen is taken with 
it. 
 
_____ _____ _____ 
6. The use of estrogen combined with progestogen may 
increase risk of a stroke. _____ _____ _____ 
7. The use of estrogen combined with progestogen may 
increase risk of a blood clot. _____ _____ _____ 
8. The use of estrogen combined with progestogen may 
decrease chances of a hip fracture. _____ _____ _____ 
9. The use of estrogen combined with progestogen may 
decrease chances of colon cancer. _____ _____ _____ 
10. The use of estrogen alone is associated with a higher risk 





This section includes a series of questions regarding your interactions with health care 
providers. 
 
Have you had a discussion about HRT use with your primary gynecological health 





If you answered ‘yes’ to the above question, then who initiated the discussion about 




Health care provider _____ 
 
I believe that my primary gynecological health care provider’s recommendation is 
for me to… 
 
Use HRT  _____ 
Not use HRT _____ 
I’m not sure _____ 
 
How likely is it that you initiated or would initiate a discussion with a health care 
provider regarding the following factors related to HRT use? 
 
 Very unlikely Very likely 
1. The risks associated with the choice options. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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2. The benefits associated with the choice options. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Your choice preferences. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The costs associated with the choice options. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 




 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. I would prefer to make the decision regarding 
HRT use all by myself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I would prefer to have a doctor make the 
decision regarding HRT use for me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I would prefer to share the decision making 
regarding HRT use with my doctor. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I would prefer to actively participate with my 
doctor in the decision making process 
regarding HRT use. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I would prefer leaving the decision regarding 
HRT use up to my doctor. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I would prefer to make the decision regarding 




In this section you will be asked questions regarding your health, medical history and 
personality. 
 






Overall, how would you rate the severity of your menopausal symptoms? 
 
None Mild Moderate Severe Very 
severe 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
How often are you experiencing a menstrual period? 
 
Regularly (occurring 1-3 months apart) _____ 
Irregularly (occurring 3-12 months apart) _____ 





Have you been diagnosed with a serious disease or illness?  If yes, please list.   
(Feel free to list more than one if applicable) 
 
Yes _____ _______________________________________________________ 
No _____  
 





How often do you conduct a breast self-exam? 
 
Never _____ 
Rarely (1-3 times per year) _____ 
Occasionally (once every 2-3 months) _____ 
Regularly (at least once per month) _____ 
 
 
How often do you have a breast cancer screening (e.g., mammogram)? 
 
Never _____ 
Rarely (once every 5 years or more) _____ 
Occasionally (once every 2-4 years) _____ 
Regularly (at least once per year) _____ 
 
 
How often do you have a cervical cancer screening (e.g., pap smear)? 
 
Never _____ 
Rarely (once every 5 years or more) _____ 
Occasionally (once every 2-4 years) _____ 
Regularly (at least once per year) _____ 
 




Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
1. It is important to me to have really nice things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I would like to be rich enough to buy anything 
I want. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I’d be happier if I could afford to buy more 
things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can’t 
afford to buy all the things I want. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. People place too much emphasis on material 
things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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In order to help us better interpret your responses to the questionnaire, please answer the 
following questions about yourself. 
 















Single and never married _____ 
Married    _____ 
Separated or divorced  _____ 
Widowed   _____ 
 
Highest education level completed: 
  
Grade school _____ 
Junior high _____ 
Some high school _____ 
High school degree _____ 
Trade school degree _____ 
Some college _____ 
College undergraduate degree _____ 
College graduate degree _____ 
 
Are you currently employed full-time or part-time? 
 
Employed full-time _____ 
Employed part-time _____ 
Not in paid employment _____ 
 
Annual income level: 
 
Less than $10,001 _____ 
$10,001 to $20,000  _____ 
$20,001 to $40,000 _____ 
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$40,001 to $60,000 _____ 
$60,001 to $80,000 _____ 
More than $80,000 _____ 
 




I don’t know _____ 
 
 






(*Paper included in the marker-variable analysis of part one) 
 
*Abdul-Muhmin, Alhassan G. (2005), “Instrumental and Interpersonal Determinants of  
Relationship Satisfaction and Commitment in Industrial Markets,” Journal of 
Business Research, 58 (5), 619-28. 
 
*Ackfeldt, Anna-Lena and Leonard V. Coote (2005), “A Study of Organizational 
Citizenship Behaviors in a Retail Setting,” Journal of Business Research, 58 (2), 
151-59. 
 
*Agustin, Clara and Jagdip Singh (2005), “Curvilinear Effects of Consumer Loyalty 
Determinants in Relational Exchanges,” Journal of Marketing Research, 42 
(February), 96-108. 
 
Ajzen, Icek (1988), Attitudes, Personality, and Behavior, Buckingham: Open University 
Press. 
 
_____ (1991), “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50 (2), 179-211. 
 
_____(2001), “Nature and Operations of Attitudes,” Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 
27-58. 
 
_____ (2002), “Perceived Behavioral Control, Self-efficacy, Locus of Control, and the 
Theory of Planned Behavior,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32 (4), 665-
683. 
 
Ajzen, Icek and Martin Fishbein (1973), “Attitudinal and Normative Variables as Predictors 
of Specific Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27 (1), 41-57. 
 
_____ and _____ (1980), Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
_____ and _____(2004), “Editorial Comment: Questions Raised by a Reasoned Action 
Approach,” Health Psychology, 23 (4), 431-434. 
 
Ajzen, Icek and Thomas J. Madden (1986), “Prediction of Goal-Directed Behavior: Attitudes 
and Perceived Behavioral Control,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 453-
474. 
 
*Akaah, Ishmael P., Pradeep K. Korgaonkar, and Daulatram Lund (1995), “Direct 
Marketing Attitudes,” Journal of Business Research, 34 (3), 211-19. 
 214
 
Alba, Joseph W. and Amitava Chattopadhyay (1985), “The Effects of Context and Part-
Category Cues on the Recall of Competing Brands,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 22 (3), 340-349. 
 
Albarracín, Dolores, Blair T. Johnson, and Martin Fishbein (2001), “Theories of 
Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior as Models of Condom Use: A Meta-
Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin, 127 (1), 142-161. 
 
Allison, Christopher and John Hayes (1996), “The Cognitive Style Index: A Measure of Intuition 
Analysis for Organizational Research,” Journal of Management Studies, 33 (1), 119-135. 
 
Anderson, James C. and David W. Gerbing (1988), “Structural Equation Modeling in Practice: A 
Review and Recommended Two-Step Approach,” Psychological Bulletin, 103 (3), 411-
423. 
 
Anderson, Ruth A. and Reuben R. McDaniel (2000), “Managing Health Care Organizations: 
Where Professionalism Meets Complexity Science,” Health Care Management Review, 
25 (1), 83-92. 
 
*Andrews, J. Craig, Richard G. Netemeyer, Scot Burton, D. Paul Moberg, and Ann 
Christiansen (2004), “Understanding Adolescent Intentions to Smoke: An 
Examination of Relationships Among Social Influence, Prior Trial Behavior, and 
Anti-tobacco Campaign Advertising,” Journal of Marketing, 68 (July), 110-23. 
 
Armitage, Christopher J. and Mark Conner (2001), “Efficacy of the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour: A Meta-Analytic Review,” British Journal of Social Psychology, 40 
(4), 471-499. 
 
Arroba, Tanya (1977), “Styles of Decision Making and Their Use: An Empirical Study,” British 
Journal of Guidance and Counseling, 5 (2), 149-158. 
 
*Babakus, Emin, Ugur Yavas, Osman M. Karatepe, and Turgay Avci (2003), “The Effect 
of Management Commitment to Service Quality on Employees’ Affective and 
Performance Outcomes,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 31 (3), 
272-86. 
 
*Babin, Barry J. and Laurie A. Babin (1996), “Effects of Moral Cognitions and 
Consumer Emotions on Shoplifting Intentions,” Psychology and Marketing, 13 
(8), 785-802. 
 
*_____ and _____(2001), “Seeking Something Different? A Model of Schema 
Typicality, Consumer Affect, Purchase Intentions, and Perceived Shopping 
Value,” Journal of Business Research, 54 (2), 89-96. 
 
 215
*Babin, Barry J. and James S. Boles (1996), “The Effects of Perceived Co-Worker 
Involvement and Supervisor Support on Service Provider Role Stress, 
Performance, and Job Satisfaction,” Journal of Retailing, 72 (1), 57-75. 
 
*_____ and _____ (1998), “Employee Behavior in a Service Environment: A Model and 
Test of Potential Differences between Men and Women,” Journal of Marketing, 
62 (April), 77-91. 
 
Bagozzi, Richard P. and Paul R. Warshaw (1990), “Trying to Consume,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 17 (2), 127-140. 
 
Bagozzi, Richard P. and Youjae Yi (1988), “On the Evaluation of Structural Equations Models,” 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 16, 74-94. 
 
_____ and _____ (1990), “Assessing Method Variance in Multitrait-Multimethod 
Matrices: The Case of Self-Reported Affect and Perceptions at Work,” Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 75 (5), 547-560. 
 
_____ and _____(1993), “Mutlitrait-Multimethod Matrices in Consumer Research: 
Critique and New Developments,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2 (2) 143-
170. 
 
*Baker, Julie, A. Parasuraman, Dhruv Grewal, and Glenn B. Voss (2002), “The Influence 
of Multiple Store Environment Cues on Perceived Merchandise Value and 
Patronage Intentions,” Journal of Marketing, 66 (April), 120-41. 
 
Bandura, Albert (1991), “Social Cognitive Theory of Self-Regulation,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50 (2), 248-287. 
 
*Bansal, Harvir S., P. Gregory Irving, and Shirley F. Taylor (2004), “A Three-
Component Model of Customer Commitment to Service Providers,” Journal of 
the Academy of Marketing Science, 32 (3), 234-50. 
 
Bao, Yequing, Kevin Zheng Zhou, and Chenting Su (2003), “Face Consciousness and Risk 
Aversion: Do They Affect Consumer Decision-Making? Psychology and Marketing, 20 
(8), 733-755. 
 
*Barksdale, Hiram C., Julie T. Johnson, and Munshik Suh (1997), “A Relationship 
Maintenance Model: A Comparison between Managed Health Care and 
Traditional Fee-for-Service,” Journal of Business Research, 40 (3), 237-47. 
 
Bastian, Lori A., Colleen M. McBride, Laura Fish, Pauline Lyna, David Farrell, Isaac M. 
Lipukus, Barbara K. Rimer, and Ilene C. Siegler (2002), “Evaluating Participants’ Use of 
a Hormone Replacement Therapy Decision-making Intervention,” Patient Education and 
Counseling, 48, 283-291. 
 
 216
Bearden, William O, David M. Hardesty, and Randall L. Rose (2001), “Consumer Self-
Confidence: Refinements in Conceptualization and Measurement,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 28 (June), 121-134. 
 
Bearden, William O, Richard G. Netemeyer, and Mary F. Mobley (1993), Handbook of 
Marketing Scales: Multi-item Measures for Marketing and Consumer Behavior Research, 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Bearden William O., Richard G. Netemeyer, and Jesse E. Teel, Jr. (1989), “Measurement of 
Consumer Susceptibility to Interpersonal Influence,” Journal of Consumer Research, 15 
(March), 473-481. 
 
Begun, James W., Brenda Zimmerman, and Kevin Dooley (2003), “Health Care Organizations 
as Complex Systems,” in Advances in Health Care Organization Theory, ed. S. M. Mick 
and M. Wyttenbach, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 253-288. 
 
Ben Zur, Hasida and Shlomo J. Breznitz (1981), “The Effect of Time Pressure on Risky Choice 
Behavior,” Acta Psychologica, 47 (2), 89-104. 
 
Bentler, Peter M. (1992), EQS: Structural Equations Program Manual, Los Angeles, CA: 
BMDP Statistical Software. 
 
Bettman, James R. (1979), An Information Processing Theory of Consumer Choice, Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Bettman, James R., Eric J. Johnson, and John W. Payne (1991), “Consumer Decision Making,” 
in Handbook of Consumer Theory and Research, ed. T. S. Robertson and H. H. 
Kassarjian, Prentice-Hall. 
 
Bettman, James R., Mary Frances Luce, and John W. Payne (1998), “Constructive Consumer 
Choice Processes,” Journal of Consumer Research, 25 (3), 187-217. 
 
Blue, Carolyn L., JoEllen Wilbur, Mary Marston-Scott (2001), “Exercise among Blue-
Collar Workers: Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior,” Research in 
Nursing and Health, 24 (6), 481-493. 
 
Bogardus, Sidney, Eric Homboe, and James F. Jenkel (1999), “Perils, Pitfalls, and Possibilities in 
Talking about Medical Risk,” JAMA, 281 (11), 1037-1041. 
 
*Boles, James S. and Barry J. Babin (1996), “On the Front Lines: Stress, Conflict, and 
the Customer Service Provider,” Journal of Business Research, 37 (1), 41-50. 
 
*Boles, James S., Julie T. Johnson, and Hiram C. Barksdale (2000), “How Salespeople 
Build Quality Relationships: A Replication and Extension,” Journal of Business 
Research, 48 (1), 75-81. 
 
 217
Booth-Butterfield, Melanie and S. Booth-Butterfield (1996), “Using Your Emotions: Improving 
the Measurement of Affective Orientation,” Communication Research Reports, 13. 
 
Bowling, Ann and S. Ebrahim (2001), “Measuring Patients’ Preferences for Treatment and 
Perceptions of Risk,” Quality in Health Care, 10 (Suppl I), i2-i8. 
 
Braddock, Clarence H., Kelly A. Edwards, Nicole M. Hasenberg, Tracy L. Laidley, and Wendy 
Levinson (1999), “Informed Decision-Making in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back 
to the Basics,” JAMA, 282 (24), 2313-2320. 
 
*Bradford, Kevin D., Anne Stringfellow, and Barton A. Weitz (2004), “Managing 
Conflict to Improve The Effectiveness of Retail Networks,” Journal of Retailing, 
80 (3), 181-95. 
 
*Brady, Michael K., J. Joseph Cronin, and Richard R. Brand (2002), “Performance-only 
Measurement of Service Quality: A Replication and Extension,” Journal of 
Business Research, 55 (1), 17-31. 
 
*Brady, Michael K., Charles H. Noble, Deborah J. Utter, and Gerald E. Smith (2002), 
“How to Give and Receive: An Exploratory Study of Charitable Hybrids,” 
Psychology and Marketing, 19 (11), 919-44. 
 
*Brashear, Thomas G., James S. Boles, Danny N. Bellenger, and Charles M. Brooks 
(2003), “An Empirical Test of Trust-Building Processes and Outcomes in Sales 
Manager-Salesperson Relationships,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 31 (2), 189-200. 
 
*Brashear, Thomas G., Elzbeita Lepkowska-White, and Cristian Chelariu (2003), “An 
Empirical Test of Antecedents and Consequences of Salesperson Job Satisfaction 
among Polish Retail Salespeople,” Journal of Business Research, 56 (12), 971-78. 
 
Breckler, Steven J. (1984), “Empirical Validation of Affect, Behavior, and Cognition as Distinct 
Components of Attitude,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4 (6)7, 1191-
1205. 
 
Breckler, Steven J. and Elizabeth C. Wiggins (1989), “Affect versus Evaluation in the Structure 
of Attitudes,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25 (3), 253-271. 
 
_____ and _____ (1991), “Cognitive Responses in Persuasion: Affective and Evaluative 
Determinants,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 180-200. 
 
Brett, Kate M. and Jennifer H. Madans (1997), “Use of Postmenopausal Hormone Replacement 
Therapy: Estimates from a Nationally Representative Cohort Study,” American Journal 
of Epidemiology, 145 (6), 536-545. 
 
 218
*Brown, Tom J., Thomas E. Barry, Peter A. Dacin, and Richard F. Gunst (2005), 
“Spreading the Word: Investigating Antecedents of Consumers’ Positive Word-
of-Mouth Intentions and Behaviors in a Retailing Context,” Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 33 (2), 123-38. 
 
*Brown, Tom J. and Peter A. Dacin (1997), “The Company and the Product: Corporate 
Associations and Consumer Product Responses,” Journal of Marketing, 61 
(January), 68-84. 
 
*Bruner, Gordon C. and Anand Kumar (2005), “Explaining Consumer Acceptance of 
Handheld Internet Devices,” Journal of Business Research, 58 (5), 553-58. 
 
Buckley, M. Ronald, Joseph A. Cote, and S. Mark Comstock (1990), "Measurement 
Errors in the Behavioral Sciences: The Case of Personality/Attitude Research," 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 50 (Autumn), 447-74.  
 
*Burton, Scot, Donald R. Lichtenstein, Richard G. Netemeyer, and Judith A. Garretson 
(1998), “A Scale for Measuring Attitude Toward Private Label Products and an 
Examination of Its Psychological and Behavioral Correlates,” Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 26 (4), 293-306. 
 
Butler, Kathleen A. (1984), Learning and Teaching Style: In Theory and Practice, Columbia, 
CT: The Learner’s Dimension. 
 
Bütz, Michael R. (1997), Chaos and Complexity: Implications for Psychological Theory and 
Practice, Washington, DC: Taylor and Francis. 
 
Byrne, Barbara M. (1998), Structural Equation Modeling with LISREL, PRELIS, and SIMPLIS, 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Cacioppo, John T. and Richard E. Petty (1982), “The Need for Cognition,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116-131. 
 
Cacioppo, John T., Richard E. Petty and Chuan Kao (1984), “The Efficient Assessment of Need 
for Cognition,” Journal of Personality Assessment, 48 (3), 306-307. 
 
Campbell, Donald T. and Donald W. Fiske (1959), “Convergent and Discriminant 
Validity by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix,” Psychological Bulletin, 56 (2), 
81-105. 
 
Campbell, Donald T. and Edward J. O’Connell (1967), “Method Factors in Multitrait-
Multimethod Matrices: Multiplicative Rather Than Additive?” Multivariate 
Behavioral Research, 2 (4), 409-426. 
 
Campbell, John P. (1982), “Editorial: Some Remarks from the Outgoing Editor,” Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 67 (6), 691-700. 
 219
 
*Cannon, Joseph P. and Christian Homburg (2001), “Buyer-Supplier Relationships and 
Customer Firm Costs,” Journal of Marketing, 65 (January), 29-43. 
 
Capra, Fritjof (1996), The Web of Life, New York, NY: Anchor Books. 
 
Casti, John L. (1997), Would-Be Worlds, New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) (2007), “Women’s Health: Facts and Stats on Aging,” 
www.cdc.gov/women/natstat.aging.htm. 
 
Centre for Health Services Research Manual (2004), “Constructing Questionnaires based on the 
Theory of Planned Behavior: A Manual for Health Services Researchers,” 1-42. 
 
Cho, Jinsook and Jinkook Lee (2006), “An Integrated Model of Risk and Risk Reducing 
Strategy,” Journal of Business Research, 59 (1), 112-120. 
 
Chaiken, Shelly and Suzanne M. Yates (1985), “Attitude Schemacity and Thought-Induced 
Attitude Polarization,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1470-1481. 
 
Chandon, Pierre, Vicki G. Morwitz, and Werner J. Reinartz (2005), "Do Intentions 
Really Predict Behavior? Self-Generated Validity Effects in Survey Research,” 
Journal of Marketing, 69 (2), 1-14. 
 
*Cherry, John and John Fraerich (2002), “Perceived Risk, Moral Philosophy and 
Marketing Ethics: Mediating Influences on Sales Managers’ Ethical Decision-
Making,” Journal of Business Research, 55 (12), 951-62. 
 
Churchill, Gilbert A. (1979), “A Paradigm for Developing Better Measures of Marketing 
Constructs,” Journal of Marketing Research, 16 (1), 64-73. 
 
Cilliers, Paul (1998), Complexity and Postmodernism, New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Cohen, Sheldon and Thomas A. Wills (1985), “Stress, Social Support, and the Buffering 
Hypothesis,” Psychological Bulletin, 98 (2), 310-357. 
 
Conboy, Lisa, A. Domar, and E. O’Connell (2001), “Women at Mid-Life: Symptoms, Attitudes, 
and Choices,” Maturitas, 38, 128-136. 
 
Cote, Joseph A. and M. Ronald Buckley (1987), “Estimating Trait, Method, and Error 
Variance: Generalizing across 70 Construct Validation Studies,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 24 (3), 315-318. 
 
Cox, Donald F. (1967), “Clues for Advertising Strategists,” in Risk Taking and Information 
Handling in Consumer Behavior, ed. D. F. Cox, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
 220
Crampton, Suzanne M. and John A. Wagner (1994), “Percept-Percept Inflation in 
Microorganizational Research: An Investigation of Prevalence and Effect,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 79 (1), 67-76. 
 
Crites, Stephen L., Leandre R. Fabrigar, and Richard E. Petty (1994), “Measuring the Affective 
and Cognitive Properties of Attitudes: Conceptual and Methodological Issues,” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20 (6), 619-634. 
 
*Cronin, J. Joseph, Michael K. Brady, and G. Thomas M. Hult (2000), “Assessing the 
Effects of Quality, Value, and Customer Satisfaction on Consumer Behavioral 
Intentions in Service Environments,” Journal of Retailing, 76 (2), 193-218. 
 
Darden, William R. and Dub Ashton (1974), “Psychographic Profiles of Patronage Preference 
Groups,” Journal of Retailing, 50 (Winter), 99-112. 
Davis, Fred D., Richard P. Bagozzi, and Paul R. Warshaw (1989), “User Acceptance of 
Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two Theoretical Models,” Management 
Science, 35 (8), 982-1003.  
Davis, Larry E., Icek Ajzen, Jeanne Saunders, and T. Williams (2002), “The Decision of 
African American Students to Complete High School: An Application of the 
Theory of Planned Behavior,” Journal of Educational Psychology, 94 (4), 810-
819. 
 
Deber, R. (1994), “The Patient-Physician Partnership: Decision Making, Problem Solving and 
the Desire to Participate,” Canadian Medical Association Journal, 151 (4), 423-427. 
 
Deber, R., N. Kraetschmer, and J. Irvine (1996), “What Role Do Patients Wish to Play in 
Treatment Decision Making?” Archives of Internal Medicine, 156, 1414-1420. 
 
Deutsch, Morton and Harold B. Gerard (1955), “A Study of Normative and Informational 
Influence upon Individual Judgment,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51 
(November), 629-636. 
 
DeVellis, Robert F. (2003), Scale Development: Theory and Applications, 2nd edition, Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Donaldson, Stewart I. and Elisa J. Grant-Vallone (2002), “Understanding Self-Report 
Bias in Organizational Behavior Research,” Journal of Business and Psychology, 
17 (2), 245-260. 
 
*Donavan, D. Todd, Tom J. Brown, and John C. Mowen (2004), “Internal Benefits of 
Service-Worker Customer Orientation: Job Satisfaction, Commitment, and 




Downing, James W., Charles M. Judd, and Markus Brauer (1992), “Effects of Repeated 
Expressions on Attitude Extremity,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63 
(1), 17-29. 
 
Driver, Michael J., Kenneth R. Brousseau, and Phillip L. Hunsaker (1993), The Dynamic 
Decision-Maker: Five Decision Styles for Executive and Business Success, iUniverse. 
 
Driver, Michael J. and T. J. Mock (1975), “Human Information Processing, Decision Style 
Theory, and Accounting Information Systems,” Accounting Review, 50, 490-508. 
 
Driver, Michael J. and Alan J. Rowe (1979), "Decision Making Styles" in Behavioral Problems 
in Organizations, ed. C. Cooper, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Driver, Michael J. and Siegfried Streufert (1969), “Integrative Complexity: An Approach to 
Individuals and Groups as Information Processing Systems,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 14 (2), 272-285. 
 
Duhan, Dale F., Scott D. Johnson, James B. Wilcox, and Gilbert D. Harrell (1997), “Influences 
on Consumer Use of Word-of-Mouth Recommendation Sources,” Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 25 (4), 283-295. 
 
Eagly, Alice H. and Shelly Chaiken (1993), The Psychology of Attitudes, New York, NY: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
 Eagly, Alice H. and Shelly Chaiken (1998), “Attitude Structure and Function,” in The 
Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 1 (4th edition), ed. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan 
T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 269-322. 
 
Edwards, Kari (1990), “The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and 
Change,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 202-216. 
 
Edwards, Kari and W. von Hippel (1995), “Hearts and Minds: The Priority of Affective versus 
Cognitive Factors in Person Perception,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 
996-1011. 
 
Edwards, Ward (1954), “The Theory of Decision Making,” Psychological Bulletin, 51 (4), 380-
417.  
 
Eoyang, Glenda H., Lois Yellowthunder, and Victor Ward (1998), “A Complex Systems (CAS) 
Approach to Public Policy Decision Making,” Society for Chaos Theory in Psychology in 
the Life Sciences, August.  
 
Epstein, Seymour, Rosemary Pacini, Veronika Denes-Raj, and Harriet Heier (1996), “Individual 
Differences in Intuitive-Experiential and Analytical-Rational Thinking Styles,” Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 71 (2), 390-405. 
 
 222
Etter, William L. (1975), “Attitude Theory and Decision Theory: Where is the Common 
Ground?,” Journal of Marketing Research, 12 (4), 481-483. 
 
*Evanschitzky, Heiner, R. Iyer Gopalkrishnan, Josef Hesse, and Dieter Ahlert (2004), 
“E-Satisfaction: A Re-Examination,” Journal of Retailing, 80 (3), 239-47. 
 
Eve, Raymond A., Sara Horsfall, and Mary Lee (1997), Chaos, Complexity, and Sociology, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Fagerlin, Angela, Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher, and Peter A. Ubel (2005), “How Making a Risk 
Estimate can Change the Feel of that Risk: Shifting Attitudes toward Breast Cancer Risk 
in a General Public Survey,” Patient Education and Counseling, 57, 294-299. 
 
Faulkner, Dorothy L., Christopher Young, David Hutchins, and Jill S. McCollam (1998), 
“Patient Noncompliance with Hormone Replacement Therapy: A Nationwide Estimate 
Using Large Prescription Claims Database,” Menopause, 5 (4), 226-229. 
 
Feather, N. T. (1959), “Subjective Probability and Decision under Uncertainty,” 
Psychological Review, 66, 150-164. 
 
Feldman, Jack M. and John G. Lynch (1988), “Self-Generated Validity and Other Effects 
of Measurement on Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior,” Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 73 (3), 421-435. 
 
Ferguson, K. J., C. Hoegh, and S. Johnson (1989), “Estrogen Replacement Therapy: A Survey of 
Women’s Knowledge and Attitudes,” Archives of Internal Medicine, 149 (1), 133-136. 
 
Finlay, Krystina A., David Trafimow, and Donna Jones (1997), “Predicting Health Behaviors 
from Attitudes and Subjective Norms: Between-subjects and Within-subjects Analyses,” 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27 (22), 2015-2031. 
 
Fishbein, Martin and Icek Ajzen (1975), Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An 
Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Fisher, Jeffrey D. and William A. Fisher (1992), “Changing AIDS Risk Behavior,” 
Psychological Bulletin, 111, 455-474. 
 
Fisher, William A., M. Sand, W. Lewis, and R. Boroditsky (2000), “Canadian Menopause Study 
I: Understanding Women’s Intentions to Utilize Hormone Replacement Therapy,” 
Maturitas, 37, 1-14. 
 
Fletcher, Suzanne W. and Graham A. Colditz (2002), “Failure of Estrogen Plus Progestin 
Therapy for Prevention,” JAMA, 288, 366-368. 
 
Folkman, Susan and Richard S. Lazarus (1988), “Coping as a Mediator of Emotion,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 54 (3), 466-475. 
 223
 
Formisano, Roger A., Richard W. Olshavsky, and Shelley Tapp (1982), “Choice Strategy in a 
Difficult Task Environment,” Journal of Consumer Research, 8 (March), 474-479. 
 
Fornell, Claes D. and David F. Larcker (1981), “Evaluating Structural Equation Models with 
Unobservable Variables and Measurement Errors,” Journal of Marketing Research, 18 
(February), 39-50. 
 
Foundation for Informed Medical Decision Making, www.fimdm.org. 
 
*Garbarino, Ellen and Mark S. Johnson (1999), “The Different Roles of Satisfaction, 
Trust, and Commitment in Customer Relationships,” Journal of Marketing, 63 
(April), 70-87. 
 
Gentry, Lance and Roger Calantone (2002), “A Comparison of Three Models to Explain 
Shop-Bot Use on the Web,” Psychology and Marketing, 19 (11), 945-956. 
 
Gershoff, Andrew D. and Gita V. Johar (2006), “Do You Know Me? Consumer Calibration of 
Friends’ Knowledge,” Journal of Consumer Research, 32 (March), 496-503. 
 
Gershoff, Andrew D., Ashesh Mukherjee, and Anirban Mukhopadhyay (2007), “Few Ways to 
Love, but Many Ways to Hate: Attribute Ambiguity and the Positive Effect in Agent 
Evaluation,” Journal of Consumer Research, 33 (March), 499-505. 
 
Ghosh, Mrinal and George John (2005), “Strategic Fit in Industrial Alliances: An 
Empirical Test of Governance Value Analysis,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
42 (3), 346-357. 
 
Gibbons, Frederick X., Meg Gerrard, and Hart Blanton (1998), “Reasoned Action and 
Social Reaction: Willingness and Intention as Independent Predictors of Health 
Risk,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74 (5), 1164-1180. 
 
Gilovich, Thomas, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (2002), Heuristics and Biases, New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Giner-Sorolla, Roger (2004), “Is Affective Material in Attitudes More Accessible Than 
Cognitive Material? The Moderating Role of Attitude Basis,” European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 34, 761-780. 
 
Glick, William H., G. Douglas Jenkins, Jr., and Nina Gupta (1986), “Method versus 
Substance: How Strong Are Underlying Relationships between Job 




Godin, Gaston and Gerjo Kok (1996), “The Theory of Planned Behavior: A Review of Its 
Applications to Health-Related Behaviors,” American Journal of Health Promotion, 11 
(2), 87-98. 
 
Goldstein, Jeffrey (1994), The Unshackled Organization, Portland, OR: Productivity Press. 
 
Goldstein, Kenneth M. and Sheldon Blackman (1978), Cognitive Style: Five Approaches and  
 Relevant Research, New York, NY: Wiley-Interscience. 
 
*Grant, Ken, David W. Cravens, George S. Low, and William C. Moncrief (2001), “The 
Role of Satisfaction with Territory Design on the Motivation, Attitudes, and Work 
Outcomes of Salespeople,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 29 (2), 
165-78. 
 
Gregorc, Anthony F. (1982), Gregorc Style Delineator - Research Edition, Columbia, 
CT: Gregorc Associates, Inc. 
 
*Grewal, Dhruv, Julie Baker, Michael Levy, and Glenn B. Voss (2003), “The Effects of 
Wait Expectations and Store Atmosphere Evaluations on Patronage Intentions in 
Service-Intensive Retail Stores,” Journal of Retailing, 79 (4), 259-68. 
 
Griffiths, Frances (1999), “Women’s Control and Choice Regarding HRT,” Social 
Science & Medicine, 49, 469-481. 
 
Griffiths, Frances and K. Jones (1995), “The Use of Hormone Replacement Therapy: 
Results of a Community Survey,” Family Practice, 12 (2), 163-165. 
 
Guilford, J. P. (1980), “Cognitive Styles: What are They?” Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 40 (3), 715-735. 
 
Haddock, Geoffrey, Mark P. Zanna, and Victoria M. Esses (1994), “Mood and the 
Expression of Intergroup Attitudes: The Moderating Role of Affect Intensity,” 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 24 (1), 189-205. 
 
Hagerty, Bonnie M., J. Lynch-Sauer, K. L. Patusky, and M. Bouwsema (1993), “An 
Emerging Theory of Human Relatedness,” The Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 
25 (4), 291-296. 
 
Hair, Joseph F, Rolph E. Anderson, Ronald L. Tatham, and William C. Black (1998), 
Multivariate Data Analysis, 5th Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall 
 
Hansen, Flemming (1972), Consumer Choice Behavior, New York, NY: The Free Press 
 
Harrison, David A., Mary E. McLaughlin, and Terry M. Coalter (1996), “Context, 
Cognition, and Common Method Variance,” Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 68 (3), 246-261. 
 225
 
*Hartline, Michael D. and Keith C. Jones (1996), “Employee Performance Cues in a 
Hotel Service Environment: Influence on Perceived Service Quality, Value, and 
Word-of-Mouth Intentions,” Journal of Business Research, 35 (3), 207-15. 
 
Harvey, O. J (1963), “Authoritarianism and Conceptual Functioning in Varied 
Conditions,” Journal of Personality, 31 (4) 462-470. 
 
Harvey, O. J., David E. Hunt, and Harold M. Schroder (1961), Conceptual Systems and 
Personality Organization, New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Harvey, Robert J., Robert S. Billings, and Kevin J. Nilan (1985), “Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis of the Job Diagnostic Survey: Good News and Bad News,” Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 70 (3), 461-468. 
 
Henderson, John C. and Paul C. Nutt (1980), “The Influence of Decision Style on 
Decision Making Behavior,” Management Science, 26 (4), 371-386. 
 
Herr, Paul M. (1995), “Whither Fact, Artifact, and Attitude:  Reflections on the Theory of 
Reasoned Action,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 4 (4), 371-80.  
 
*Hightower, Roscoe, Michael K. Brady, and Thomas L. Baker (2002), “Investigating the 
Role of the Physical Environment in Hedonic Service Consumption: An 
Exploration Study of Sporting Events,” Journal of Business Research, 55 (9), 
697-707. 
 
Hlatky, Mark A., Derek Boothroyd, Eric Vittinghoff, Penny Sharp, and Mary Whooley 
(2002), “Quality-of-Life and Depressive Symptoms in Postmenopausal Women 
after Receiving Hormone Therapy: Results from the Heart and Estrogen/Progestin 
Replacement Study (HERS) Trial,” JAMA, 287, 591-597. 
 
Hogarth, Robin M., Claude Michaud, and Jean-Louis Mery (1980), “Decision Behavior 
in Urban Development: A Methodological Approach and Substantive 
Considerations,” Acta Psychologica, 45 (August), 95-117. 
 
Holden, Lela M. (2005), “Complex Systems: Concept Analysis,” Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, 52 (6), 651-657. 
 
*Houston, Mark B., Lance A. Bettencourt, and Sutha Wenger (1998), “The Relationship 
between Waiting in a Service Queue and Evaluations of Service Quality: A Field 
Theory Perspective,” Psychology and Marketing, 15 (8), 735-43. 
 
Howard, John A. and Jagdish N. Sheth (1969), The Theory of Buyer Behavior, New 
York, NY: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
 226
Hulley, Stephen, Deborah Grady, Trudy Bush, Curt Burberg, David Herrington, Betty 
Riggs, and Eric Vittinghoff (1998), “Randomized Trial of Estrogen Plus Progestin 
for Secondary Prevention of Coronary Heart Disease in Postmenopausal Women: 
Heart and Estrogen/Progestin Replacement Study (HERS) Research Group,” 
Journal of American Medical Association, 280, 65-613. 
 
Huysman, Jan H. B. M. (1970), The Implementation of Operations Research, New York, 
NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Iacobucci, Dawn, Amy Ostrom, and Ken Grayson (1995), “Distinguishing Service 
Quality and Customer Satisfaction: The Voice of the Consumer,” Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, 4 (3), 277-303. 
 
Im, Subin and John P. Workman Jr. (2004), “Market Orientation, Creativity, and New 
Product Performance in High-Technology Firms,” Journal of Marketing, 68 (2), 
114-132. 
 
Jaccard, James and Choi K. Wan (1996), LISREL Approaches to Interaction Effects in 
Multiple Regression, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Janis, Irving L. and Leon Mann (1977), Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of 
Conflict, New York, NY: Free Press. 
 
*Jayanti, Rama K. and Alvin C. Burns (1998), “The Antecedents of Preventive Health 
Care Behavior: An Empirical Study,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 26 (1), 6-15. 
 
*Johlke, Mark C., Dale F. Duhan, Roy D. Howell, and Robert W. Wilkes (2000), “An 
Integrated Model of Sales Managers’ Communication Practices,” Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 28 (2), 263-77. 
 
*Johnson, Julie T., Hiram C. Barksdale, and James S. Boles (2003), “Factors Associated 
with Customer Willingness to Refer Leads to Salespeople,” Journal of Business 
Research, 56 (4), 257-63. 
 
Jöreskog, Karl and Dag Sörbom (1996), LISREL8: User’s Reference Guide, Chicago, IL: 
Scientific Software International. 
 
Jung, Carl (1923), Psychological Types, New York, NY: Harcourt Brace. 
 
Kahn, Barbara and Jonathan Baron (1995), “An Exploratory Study of Choice Rules 




Kahn, Barbara E. and Mary Francis Luce (2003), “Understanding High-Stakes Consumer 
Decisions: The Problem of Mammography Adherence Following False Alarm 
Test Results,” Marketing Science, 22 (Summer), 393-410. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (1982), Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 
*Karson, Eric J. and Robert J. Fisher (2005), “Reexamining and Extending the Dual 
Mediation Hypothesis in an On-line Advertising Context,” Psychology and 
Marketing, 22 (4), 333-51. 
 
Kauffman, Stuart (1995), At Home in the Universe, New York, NY: Oxford. 
 
Kelly, George A. (1955), The Psychology of Personal Constructs, New York, NY: 
Norton. 
 
Kemery, Edward R. and William P. Dunlap (1986), “Partialling Factor Scores Does Not 
Control Method Variance: A Reply to Podsakoff and Todor,” Journal of 
Management, 12 (4), 525-544. 
 
*Kidwell, Blair and Robert D. Jewell (2003), “An Examination of Perceived Behavioral 
Control: Internal and External Influences on Intention,” Psychology and 
Marketing, 20 (7), 625-42. 
 
Kiel, L. Douglas (1997), Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government, San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey Barns. 
 
Kirton, Michael J. (1976), “Adaptors and Innovators: A Description of a Measure,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 61, 622-629. 
 
Kirton, Michael J. (1989), Adaptors and Innovators: Styles of Creativity and Problem-
Solving, New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
*Kohli, Ajay K. and Bernard J. Jaworski (1994), “The Influence of Coworker Feedback 
on Salespeople,” Journal of Marketing, 58 (October), 82-94. 
 
Kolb, David A. (1976), Learning Style Inventory Manual, Boston, MA: McBer and 
Company. 
 
_____ (1984), Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and 
Development, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Kraetschmer, Nancy, Natasha Sharpe, Sara Urowitz, and Raisa B. Deber (2004), “How 
Does Trust Affect Patient Preferences for Participation in Decision-Making?,” 
Health Expectations, 7 (4), 317-326. 
 
 228
*Krishnan, H. Shanker and Robert E. Smith (1998), “The Relative Endurance of 
Attitudes, Confidence, and Attitude-Behavior Consistency: The Role of 
Information Source and Delay,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 7 (3), 273-98. 
 
Kuhn, Deanna and Joseph Lao (1996), “Effects of Evidence on Attitudes: Is Polarization 
the Norm?” Psychological Science, 7 (2), 115-120. 
 
Kunreuther, Howard, Robert Meyer, Richard Zeckhauser, Paul Slovic, Barry Schwartz, 
Christian Schade, Mary Frances Luce, Steven Lippman, David Krantz, Barbara 
Kahn, and Robin Hogarth (2002), “High Stakes Decision Making: Normative, 
Descriptive, and Prescriptive Considerations,” Marketing Letters, 13 (3), 259-268. 
 
*Lacher, Kathleen T. and Richard Mizerski (1994), “An Exploratory Study of the 
Responses and Relationships Involved in the Evaluation of, and in the Intention to 
Purchase New Rock Music,” Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (2), 366-80. 
 
Lanzetta, John T. (1963), “Information Acquisition in Decision Making,” in Motivation 
and Social Interaction-Cognitive Determinants, ed. O. J. Harvey, New York, NY: 
Ronald Press. 
 
*Lapierre, Jozee, Pierre Filiatrault, and Jean-Charles Chebat (1999), “Value Strategy 
Rather Than Quality Strategy: A Case of Business-to-Business Professional 
Services,” Journal of Business Research, 45 (2), 235-46. 
 
Lastovicka, John L. (1982), “On the Validation of Lifestyle Traits: A Review and 
Illustration,” Journal of Marketing Research, 19 (1), 126-138. 
 
Lauer, P., S. P. Murphy, and M. J. Powers (1982), “Learning Needs of Cancer Patients: A 
Comparison of Nurse and Patient Perceptions,” Nursing Research, 31 (1), 11-16. 
 
Lauver, Diane R., Lori Settersten, Susan Marten, Juanita Halls (1999), “Explaining 
Women’s Intentions and Use of Hormones with Menopause,” Research in 
Nursing and Health, 22, 309-320. 
 
Lazarus, Richard S. (1991), Emotion and Adaptation, London, England: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Lee, Jinkook and Jinsook Cho (2005), “Consumers’ Use of Information Intermediary and 
the Impact on their Information Search Behavior in the Financial Market,” 
Journal of Consumer Affairs, 39 (1), 95-120. 
 
Lee, Richard M. and Steven B. Robbins (1998), “The Relationship between Social 
Connectedness and Anxiety, Self-Esteem, and Social Identity,” Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, 45 (3), 338-345. 
 
 229
Légaré, France, Gaston Godin, Sylvie Dodin, Lucile Turcot, and Louise Laperrière 
(2003), “Adherence to Hormone Replacement Therapy: A Longitudinal Study 
Using the Theory of Planned Behavior,” Psychology and Health, 18 (3), 351-371. 
 
Leonard, Nancy H., Richard W. Scholl, and Kellyann Berube Kowalski (1999), 
“Information Processing Style and Decision Making,” Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 20 (3), 207-420. 
 
Levin, Pamela F. (1999), “Test of the Fishbein and Ajzen Models as Predictors of Health 
Care Worker’s Glove Use,” Research in Nursing and Health, 22 (4), 295-307. 
 
Lewin, Roger (1992), Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos, Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
*Li, Zhan G., L. William Murray, and Don Scott (2000), “Global Sourcing, Multiple 
Country-of-Origin Facets, and Consumer Reactions,” Journal of Business 
Research, 47 (2), 121-33. 
 
Lichtenstein, Sarah and Paul Slovic (1971), “Reversals of Preference Between Bids and 
Choices in Gambling Situations,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 46-55. 
 
*Liljander, Veronica and Jan Mattsson (2002), “Impact of Customer Preconsumption 
Mood on the Evaluation of Employee Behavior in Service Encounters,” 
Psychology and Marketing, 19 (10), 837-60. 
 
Lindell, Michael K. and Christina J. Brandt (2000), “Climate Quality and Climate 
Consensus as Mediators of the Relationship between Organizational Antecedents 
and Outcomes,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 85 (3), 331-348. 
 
Lindell, Michael K. and David J. Whitney (2001), “Accounting for Common Method 
Variance in Cross-Sectional Research Designs,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 
86 (1), 114-21. 
 
Linville, Patricia W. (1982), “The Complexity-Extremity Effect and Age-Based 
Stereotyping,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 193-211. 
 
Linville, Patricia W. and Edward E. Jones (1980), “Polarized Appraisals of Out-Group 
Members,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 689-703. 
 
Lippman, Abby (1999), “Choice as a Risk to Women’s Health,” Health, Risk & Society, 
1 (3), 281-291. 
 
*Liu, Annie H., Mark P. Leach, and Kenneth L. Bernhardt (2005), “Examining Customer 
Value Perceptions of Organizational Buyers When Sourcing from Multiple 
Vendors,” Journal of Business Research, 58 (5), 559-568. 
 
 230
Loewenstein, George F., Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee, and Ned Welch (2001), 
“Risk as Feelings,” Psychological Bulletin, 127 (2), 267-286. 
 
Lord, Charles G., Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper (1979), “Biased Assimilation and 
Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered 
Evidence,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37 (11), 2098-2109. 
 
*Lotz, Sherry L., Soyeon Shim, and Kenneth C. Gehrt (2003), “A Study of Japanese 
Consumers’ Cognitive Hierarchies in Formal and Informal Gift-Giving 
Situations,” Psychology and Marketing, 20 (1), 59-85. 
 
Lucas, Chris (2007), The Complexity and Artificial Life Research Concept 
for Self-Organizing Systems, www.calresco.org. 
 
Luce, Mary Frances (1998), “Choosing to Avoid: Coping with Negatively Emotion-
Laden Consumer Decisions,” Journal of Consumer Research, 24 (4), 409-433. 
 
Luce, Mary Frances, James R. Bettman, and John W. Payne (1997), “Choice Processing 
in Emotionally Difficult Decisions,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23, 384-405. 
 
Luce, Mary Frances, John W. Payne, and James R. Bettman (1999), “Emotional Trade-
off Difficulty and Choice,” Journal of Marketing Research, 36 (May), 143-159. 
 
Luker, Karen A., Kinta Beaver, Samuel J. Leinster, R. Glynn Owens, Lesley F. Degner, 
and Jeffrey A. Sloan (1995), “The Information Needs of Women Newly 
Diagnosed with Breast Cancer,” Journal of Advanced Nursing, 22, 134-141. 
 
*Luo, Yadong (2002), “Partnering with Foreign Businesses: Perspectives from Chinese 
Firms,” Journal of Business Research, 55 (6), 481-93. 
 
Lysonski, Steven, Srini Durvasula, and Yiorgos Zotos (1996), “Consumer Decision-
Making Styles: A Multi-Country Investigation,” European Journal of Marketing, 
30 (12), 10-21. 
 
Malhotra, Naresh K., Sung S. Kim, and Ashutosh Patil (2006), “Accounting for Common 
Method Variance in IS Research: Reanalysis of Past Studies Using a Marker-
Variable Technique,” Management Science, 52 (12), 1865-1883. 
 
Mansfield, P. K. and A. M. Voda (1998), “Woman-centered Information on Menopause 
for Health Care Providers: Findings from the Midlife Women’s Health Survey,” 
Health Care Women for International, 18, 55-72. 
 
Marsh, Herbert W. and Dennnis Hocevar (1988), “A New, More Powerful Approach to 
Multitrait-Multimethod Analysis: Application of Second-Order Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 73 (1), 107-117. 
 231
 
Mason, Richard O. and Ian I. Mitroff (1973), “A Program of Research on Management 
Information Systems,” Management Science, 19, 475-487. 
 
Mathwick, C., Naresh K. Malhotra, and Ed Rigdon (2001), “Experiential Value: 
Conceptualization, Measurement and Application in the Catalog and Internet 
Shopping Environment,” Journal of Retailing, 77, 39-56. 
 
*Mathwick, Charla and Edward Rigdon (2004), “Play, Flow, and the Online Search 
Experience,” Journal of Consumer Research, 31 (2), 324-32. 
 
Matthews, Karen A. (1992), “Myths and Realities of the Menopause,” Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 54 (1), 1-9. 
 
McGrath, Mary Ann and Cele Otnes (1995), “Unacquainted Influencers: When Strangers 
Interact in the Retail Setting,” Journal of Business Research, 32 (3), 261-272. 
 
McKenney, James L. and Peter Keen (1974), “How Managers’ Minds Work,” Harvard 
Business Review, 52, 79-90. 
 
McKinlay, Sonja, Donald Brambilla and Jennifer G. Posner (1992), “The Normal 
Menopause Transition,” Maturitas, 14 (1), 103-115. 
 
Mellers, Barbara A., Alan Schwartz and Alan Cooke (1998), “Judgment and Decision 
Making,” Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 447-477. 
 
Messick, Samuel (1976), “Personality Consistencies in Cognition and Creativity,” in S. 
Messick and associates, Individuality in Learning, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
 
_____ (1984), “The Nature of Cognitive Styles: Problems and Promise in Educational 
Practice,” Educational Psychologist, 2, 59-74. 
 
Millar, Murray G. and Abraham Tesser (1986), “Effects of Affective and Cognitive 
Focus on the Attitude-Behavior Relationship,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 51, 270-276. 
 
Millar, Murray G. and Karen U. Millar (1998), “The Effects of Prior Experience and 
Thought on the Attitude-Behavior Relation,” Social Behavior and Personality, 26 
(2), 105-114. 
 
Millsap, Roger E. (1990), “A Cautionary Note on the Detection of Method Variance in 
Multitrait-Multimethod Data,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 75 (3), 350-353. 
 
Mitroff, Ian and Ralph Kilmann (1975), “Stories Managers Tell: A New Tool for 
Organizational Problem Solving,” Management Review, 64 (7), 18-28. 
 232
 
*Mohr, Jakki I. and Ravipreet S. Sohi (1995), “Communication Flows in Distribution 
Channels: Impact on Assessments of Communication Quality and Satisfaction,” 
Journal of Retailing, 71 (4), 393-416. 
 
*Montoya-Weiss, Mitzi M., Glenn B. Voss, and Dhruv Grewal (2003), “Determinants of 
Online Channel Use and Overall Satisfaction with a Relational, Multichannel 
Service Provider,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 31 (4), 448-58. 
 
*Mooradian, Todd A. and James M. Olver (1997), “‘I Can’t Get No Satisfaction:’ The 
Impact of Personality and Emotion on Postpurchase Processes,” Psychology and 
Marketing, 14 (4), 379-93. 
 
Morrison, Ian (2000), Health Care in the New Millennium: Vision, Values, and 
Leadership, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.   
 
Moschis, George P. (1976), “Shopping Orientations and Consumer Uses of Information,” 
Journal of Retailing, 52 (Summer), 61-70. 
 
Mourali, Mehdi, Michel Laroche, and Frank Pons (2005a), “Antecedents of Consumer 
Relative Preference for Interpersonal Information Sources in Pre-purchase 
Search,” Journal of Consumer Behavior, 4 (5), 307-318. 
 
Mourali, Mehdi, Michel Laroche, and Frank Pons (2005b), “Individualistic Orientation 
and Consumer Susceptibility to Interpersonal Influence,” The Journal of Services 
Marketing, 19 (3), 164-173. 
 
Murray, Keith (1991), “A Test of Services Marketing Theory: Consumers Information 
Acquisition Activities,” Journal of Marketing, 55 (1), 10-25. 
 
*Murry, John P. and Peter A. Dacin (1996), “Cognitive Moderators of Negative Emotion 
Effects: Implications for Understanding Media Context,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 22 (March), 439-47. 
 
*Murry, John P., Thomas Brashear-Alejandro, and James S. Boles (2004), “A Cross-
National Model of Job-Related Outcomes of Work Role and Family Role 
Variables: A Retail Sales Context,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
32 (1), 49-60. 
 
Murtagh, Madeleine J. and Julie Hepworth (2005), “Narrative Review of Changing 
Medical and Feminist Perspectives on Menopause,” Psychology, Health & 
Medicine, 10 (3), 276-290. 
 
Myers, Isabel Briggs (1962), Manual: The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, Palo Alto, CA: 
Consulting Psychologists Press. 
 
 233
Myers, Isabel Briggs and Mary H. McCaulley (1985), Manual: A Guide to the 
Development and Use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, Palo Alto, CA: 
Consulting Psychologists Press.   
 
Netemeyer, Richard G., and William O. Bearden (1992), "A Comparative Analysis of 
Two Models of Behavioral Intention Formation," Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 20 (1), 49-60.  
 
*Newell, Stephen J. and Ronald E. Goldsmith (2001), “The Development of a Scale to 
Measure Perceived Corporate Credibility,” Journal of Business Research, 52 (3), 
235-47. 
 
Nicolis, Gregoire and Ilya Prigogine (1989), Exploring Complexity, New York, NY: W. 
H. Freeman and Co. 
 
NIH (2005), “NIH Research and Other Efforts Related to The Menopausal Transition,” 
working paper, http://orwh.od.nih.gov/pubs/menopauseupdate2005.pdf. 
 
Nunally, Jum C. and Ira H. Bernstein (1994), Psychometric Theory, 3rd Edition, New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Olson, James M. and Mark P. Zanna (1982), “Repression-Sensitization Differences in 
Responses to a Decision,” Journal of Personality, 50, 46-57. 
 
Pacini, Rosemary and Seymour Epstein (1999), “The Relation of Rational and 
Experiential Information Processing Styles to Personality, Basic Beliefs, and the 
Ratio-Bias Phenomenon,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76 (6), 
972-987. 
 
Paramo, M. F. and C. Tinajero (1990), “Field Dependence/Independence and 
Performance in School: An Argument against Neutrality of Cognitive Style,” 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 70, 1079-1087. 
 
Payne, John W., James R. Bettman, and Eric J. Johnson (1993), The Adaptive Decision 
Maker, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 
*Pechmann, Cornelia, Guangzhi Zhao, Marvin E. Goldberg, and Ellen Thomas Reibling 
(2003), “What to Convey in Antismoking Advertisements for Adolescents: The 
Use of Protection Motivation Theory to Identify Effective Message Themes,” 
Journal of Marketing, 67 (April), 1-18. 
 
Peck, Joann and Terry L. Childers (2003), “Individual Differences in Haptic Information 
Processing: On the Development, Validation, and Use of the ‘Need for Touch’ 
Scale,” Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (3), 430-442. 
 
 234
Perry, Michael and B. Curtis Hamm (1969), “Canonical Analysis of Relations between 
Socioeconomic Risk and Personal Influence in Purchase Decisions,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 6 (3), 351-355. 
 
Peter, J. Paul (1981), “Construct Validity: A Review of Basic Issues and Marketing 
Practices,” Journal of Marketing Research, 18 (2), 133-145. 
 
Petty, Richard E., Duane T. Wegener, and Leandre R. Fabrigar (1997), “Attitudes and 
Attitude Change,” Annual Review of Psychology, 48, 609-647. 
 
Pilote, Louise and Mark A. Hlatky (1995), “Attitudes of Women toward Hormone 
Therapy and Prevention of Heart Disease,” American Heart Journal, 129 (6), 
1237-1238. 
 
Plsek, Paul E. and Trisha Greenhalgh (2001), “Complexity Science: The Challenge of 
Complexity in Health Care,” British Medical Journal, 323, 625-628. 
 
*Podsakoff, Philip M. and Scott B. MacKenzie (1994), “Organizational Citizenship 
Behaviors and Sales Unit Effectiveness,” Journal of Marketing Research, 31 
(August), 351-63. 
 
Podsakoff, Philip M. and Dennis W. Organ (1986), “Self-Reports in Organizational  
 Research: Problems and Prospects,” Journal of Management, 12 (4), 531-544. 
 
Podsakoff, Philip M., Dennis Organ, Jeong-Yeon, Lee, and Nathan P. Podsakoff (2003), 
“Common Method Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the 
Literature and Recommended Remedies,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 88 (5), 
879-903. 
 
Podsakoff, Philip M. and Williams D. Todor (1985), “Relationships between Leader 
Reward and Punishment Behavior and Group Processes and Productivity,” 
Journal of Management, 11 (1), 55-73. 
 
Powell, Martha C. and Russell H. Fazio (1984), “Attitude Accessibility as a Function of 
Repeated Attitudinal Expression,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 10 
(1), 139-148. 
 
Quine, Lyn and R. Rubin (1997), “Attitude, Subjective Norm, and Perceived Behavioural 
Control as Predictors of Women’s Intentions to Take Hormone Replacement 
Therapy,” British Journal of Health Psychology, 2, 199-216. 
 
*Rahtz, Don R. and M. Joseph Sirgy (2000), “Marketing of Health Care within a 
Community: A Quality-of-Life / Needs Assessment Model and Method,” Journal 
of Business Research, 48 (3), 165-76. 
 
 235
Raman, Niranjan, Prithviraj Chattopadhyay, and Wayne Hoyer (1995), “Do Consumers 
Seek Emotional Situations: The Need for Emotion Scale,” in Advances in 
Consumer Research, 22, ed. Frank Kardes and Mita Sujan, 537-542. 
 
Ratner, Rebecca and Barbara Kahn (2002), “The Impact of Private versus Public 
Consumption on Variety Seeking Behavior,” Journal of Consumer Research, 29 
(September), 246-257. 
 
*Rawwas, Mohammed Y. A., Scott J. Vitell, and James H. Barnes (1997), “Management 
of Conflict Using Individual Power Sources: A Retailers’ Perspective,” Journal of 
Business Research, 40 (1), 49-64. 
 
Richins, Marsha L. and Scott Dawson (1992), “A Consumer Values Orientation for 
Materialism and Its Measurement: Scale Development and Validation,” Journal 
of Consumer Research, 19, 303-316. 
 
Robinson, A. and R. Thomson (2001), “Variability in Patient Preferences for 
Participating in Medical Decision Making: Implication for the Use of Decision 
Support Tools,” Quality in Health Care, 10 (Suppl. I), 34-38. 
 
*Rose, Gregory M. and Aviv Shoham (2004), “Interorganizational Task and Emotional 
Conflict with International Channels of Distribution,” Journal of Business 
Research, 57 (9), 942-50. 
 
*Rose, Randall L., William O. Bearden, and Kenneth C. Manning (2001), “Attributions 
and Conformity in Illicit Consumption: The Mediating Role of Group 
Attractiveness,” Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 20 (1), 84-92. 
 
Rosenstock, Irwin M. (1974), “Historical Origins of the Health Belief Model,” Health 
Education Monographs, 2 (4), 328-335. 
 
Roth, Philip L., Chris Hearp, and Fred S. Switzer III (1999), “The Effect of Method 
Variance on Relationships between the Work Ethic and Individual Difference 
Variables,” Journal of Business and Psychology, 14 (1), 173-186. 
 
Rowe, Alan J. and James D. Boulgarides (1992), Managerial Decision Making, New 
York, NY: Macmillan. 
 
Rowe, Alan J. and Richard O. Mason (1987), Managing with Style: A Guide to 
Understanding, Assessing and Improving Decision Making, San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass. 
 
Ryan, Michael J. (1982), “Behavioral Intention Formation: The Interdependency of 




Rymer, Janice, Ruth Wilson and Karen Ballard (2003), “Making Decisions about 
Hormone Replacement Therapy,” British Medical Journal, 326, 322-326. 
 
Sadler-Smith, Eugene  (2004), “Cognitive Style and the Management of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises,” Organization Studies, 25 (2), 155-181. 
 
Salkeld, Glenn, Michael Solomon, Leonie Short, and Phyllis Butow (2004), “A Matter of 
Trust – Patient’s Views on Decision-making in Colorectal Cancer,” Health 
Expectations, 7, 104-114. 
 
Say, Rebecca E., Madeleine J., Murtagh and Richard Thomson (2005), “What Influences 
Patients’ Preference for Involvement in Medical Decision Making? A Narrative 
Review,” Patient Education and Counseling, 60 (2), 102-114. 
 
_____, _____, and _____ (2006), “Patients’ Preference for Involvement in Medical 
Decision Making: A Narrative Review,” Patient Education and Counseling, 60 
(2), 102-114. 
 
Say, Rebecca E. and Richard Thomson (2003), “The Importance of Patient Preferences in 
Treatment Decisions – Challenges for Doctors,” British Medical Journal, 327 
(September 6), 542-545. 
 
Schifter, D. E. and Icek Ajzen (1985), “Intention, Perceived Control, and Weight Loss: 
An Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 49, 843-851. 
 
Schroder, Harold M., Michael J. Driver, and S. Streufert (1967), Human Information 
Processing, New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 
Schwartz, Barry, Andrew Ward, John Monterosso, Sonja Lyubomirsky, Katherine White, 
and Darrin R. Lehman (2002), “Maximizing versus Satisficing: Happiness is a 
Matter of Choice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83 (5), 1178-
1197. 
 
*Schwepker, Charles H. (2001), “Ethical Climate’s Relationship to Job Satisfaction, 
Organizational Commitment, and Turnover Intention in the Salesforce,” Journal 
of Business Research, 54 (1), 39-52. 
 
Sheehy, Gail (1992), The Silent Passage: Menopause, New York, NY: Random House. 
 
Sheeran, Paschal and Steven Taylor (1999), “Predicting Intentions to Use Condoms: A 
Meta-Analysis and Comparison of the Theories of Reasoned Action and Planned 
Behavior,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29 (8), 1624-1675. 
 
 237
Sheppard, Blair H., Jon Hartwick, and Paul R. Warshaw (1988), “The Theory of Reasoned 
Action: A Meta-Analysis of Past Research with Recommendations for 
Modifications and Future Research,” Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (3), 325-43. 
 
Shim, Soyeon (1996), “Adolescent Consumer Decision-Making Styles: The Consumer 
Socialization Perspective,” Psychology and Marketing, 13 (6), 547-569. 
 
*Shim, Soyeon, Mary Ann Eastlick, Sherry L. Lotz, and Patricia Warrington (2001), “An 
Online Purchase Intentions Model: The Role of Intention to Search,” Journal of 
Retailing, 77 (3), 397-416. 
 
*Siguaw, Judy A., Gene Brown, and Robert E. Widing, II (1994), “The Influence of the 
Market Orientation of the Firm on Sales Force Behavior and Attitudes,” Journal 
of Marketing Research, 31 (February), 106-16. 
 
Simons, Jeffrey and Kate B. Carey (1998), “A Structural Analysis of Attitudes toward 
Alcohol and Marijuana Use,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24 (7), 
727-735. 
 
Simonson, Itamar (1989), “Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and 
Compromise Effects,” Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (September), 158-174. 
 
*Simpson, James T. and Donna T. Mayo (1997), “Relationship Management: A Call for 
Fewer Influence Attempts?” Journal of Business Research, 39 (3), 209-18. 
 
Sinclair, H. K., C. M. Bond, and R. J. Taylor (1993), “A Survey of Women’s Knowledge 
of and Attitudes to Hormone Replacement Therapy,” British Journal of General 
Practice, 43 (374), 365-370. 
 
*Singh, Jagdip (1998), “Striking a Balance in Boundary-Spanning Positions: An 
Investigation of Some Unconventional Influences on Role Stressors and Job 
Characteristics on Job Outcomes of Salespeople,” Journal of Marketing, 62 
(July), 69-86. 
 
*_____ (2000), “Performance Productivity and Quality of Frontline Employees in 
Service Organizations,” Journal of Marketing, 64 (April), 15-34. 
 
*Singh, Jagdip, Jerry R. Goolsby, and Gary K. Rhoads (1994), “Behavioral and 
Psychological Consequences of Boundary Spanning Burnout for Customer 
Service Representatives,” Journal of Marketing Research, 31 (November), 558-
69. 
 
*Singh, Kulwant, Siew Meng Leong, Chin Tiong Tan, and Kwei Cheong Wong (1995), 
“A Theory of Reasoned Action Perspective of Voting Behavior: Model and 
Empirical Test,” Psychology and Marketing, 12 (1), 37-51. 
 
 238
*Singhapakdi, Anusorn (1999), “Perceived Importance of Ethics and Ethical Decisions in 
Marketing,” Journal of Business Research, 45 (1), 89-99. 
 
Slovic, Paul (1995), “The Construction of Preference,” American Psychologist, 50 (5), 
364-371. 
 
Slovic, Paul, M. Finucane, E. Peters, and D. MacGregor (2001), “The Affect Heuristic,” 
in Intuitive Judgment: Heuristics and Biases, ed. T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. 
Kahneman, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sojka, Jane Z. and Joan L. Giese (1997), “Thinking or Feeling: An Examination of 
Interaction between Processing Styles,” Advances in Consumer Research, 24, 
438-442. 
 
Sommer, Barbara, Nancy Avis, Peter Meyer, Marcia Ory, Tom Madden, Marjorie 
Kagawa-Singer, Charles Mouton, Niki O’Neill Rasor, and Shelley Adler (1999), 
“Attitudes toward Menopause and Aging across Ethnic/Racial Groups,” 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 61, 868-875. 
 
Spatz, Barbara A., Dennis L. Thombs, T. Jean Byrne, and Betsy J. Page (2003), “Use of 
the Theory of Planned Behavior to Explain HRT Decisions,” American Journal of 
Health Behavior, 27 (4), 445-455. 
 
Spector, Paul E. (1987), “Method Variance as an Artifact in Self-Reported Affect and 
Perceptions at Work: Myth or Significant Problem?” Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 72 (3), 438-443. 
 
_____ (1992), Summated Rating Scale Construction: An Introduction, Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
 
Spielberger, Charles D. (1972), Anxiety: Current Trends in Theory and Research, New 
York, NY: Academic Press. 
 
Sproles, George B. and Elizabeth Kendall (1986), “A Methodology for Profiling 
Consumers’ Decision-Making Styles,” Journal of Consumer Affairs, 20 (2), 267-
279. 
 
Sproles, George B. and Elizabeth K. Sproles (1990), “Consumer Decision-Making Styles 
as a Function of Individual Learning Styles,” The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 24 
(Summer), 134-147. 
 




Steenkamp, Jan-Benedict E.M. and Hans Baumgartner (1998), “Assessing Measurement 
Invariance in Cross-National Consumer Research,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 25 (June), 78-90. 
 
Sutton, Stephen (1998), “Predicting and Explaining Intentions and Behavior: How Well 
are We Doing?,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28 (15), 1317-1338. 
 
Swait, Joffre and Wiktor Adamowicz (2001), “The Influence of Task Complexity on 
Consumer Choice: A Latent Class Model of Decision Strategy Switching,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 28 (1), 135-148. 
 
*Szymanski, David M. and Richard T. Hise (2000), “E-Satisfaction: An Initial 
Examination,” Journal of Retailing, 76 (3), 309-22. 
 
Tesser, Abraham and C. Leone (1977), “Thought-Induced Attitude Change: The Effects 
of Schema Structure and Commitment,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 51 (2), 259-269. 
 
Theroux, Rosemary and Kristin Taylor (2003), “Women’s Decision Making about the 
Use of Hormonal and Nonhormonal Remedies for the Menopausal Transition,” 
Journal of Obstetric, Gynecologic, and Neonatal Nursing, 32, 712-723. 
 
Thurstone, L. L. (1928), “Attitudes Can Be Measured,” American Journal of Sociology, 
33, 529-544. 
 
Trafimow, David (1994), “Predicting Intentions to Use a Condom from Perceptions of 
Normative Pressure and Confidence in those Perceptions,” Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 24 (24), 2151-2163. 
 
Trafimow, David and Krystina A. Finlay (1996), “The Importance of Subjective Norms 
for a Minority of People: Between-subjects and Within-subjects Analyses,” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22 (8), 820-828. 
 
_____ and _____ (2001), “Evidence for Improved Sensitivity of Within-Participants 
Analyses in Tests of the Theory of Reasoned Action,” Social Science Journal, 38, 
629-635.  
 
Trafimow, David and Paschal Sheeran (1998), “Some Tests of the Distinction between 
Cognitive and Affective Beliefs,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34 
(4), 378-397. 
 
Trafimow, David, Paschal Sheeran, Bridget Lombardo, Krystina A. Finlay, Jennie 
Brown, and Christopher J. Armitage (2004), “Affective and Cognitive Control of 
Persons and Behaviours,” British Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 207-224. 
 
Triandis, Harry C. (1977), Interpersonal Behavior, Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
 240
 
Tuckman, Bruce W. (1966), “Integrative Complexity: Its Measurement and Relation to 
Creativity,” Educational & Psychological Measurement, 26, 369-382. 
 
Tversky, Amos (1969), “Instransitivity of Preferences,” Psychological Review, 76, 31-48. 
 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1986), “Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions,” Journal of Business, 59 (4), 251-278. 
 
Utian, Wulf H. (1999), “The International Menopause Society Menopause Related 
Terminology Definitions,” Climacteric, 2, 284-286. 
 
Verplanken, Bas, Godelieve Hofstee, and Heide J. Janssen (1998), “Accessibility of 
Affective versus Cognitive Components of Attitudes,” European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 28 (1), 23-35. 
 
*Voss, Glenn B., A. Parasuraman, and Dhruv Grewal (1998), “The Roles of Price, 
Performance, and Expectations in Determining Satisfaction in Service 
Exchanges,” Journal of Marketing, 62 (October), 46-61. 
 
Wagner, John A. and Richard Z. Gooding (1987), “Shared Influence and Organizational 
Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of Situational Variables Expected to Moderate 
Participation-Outcome Relationships,” Academy of Management Journal, 30 (3), 
524-541. 
 
*Wakefield, Kirk L. and James H. Barnes (1996), “Retailing Hedonic Consumption: A 
Model of Sales Promotion of a Leisure Service,” Journal of Retailing, 72 (4), 
409-27. 
 
Waldrop, M. Mitchell (1992), Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and  
 Chaos, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Watson, David, Lee A. Clark, and Anke Tellegen (1988), “Development and Validation of Brief 
Measures of Positive and Negative Affect: The PANAS Scales,” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 54 (June), 1063-1070. 
 
*Webb, Dave, Cynthia Webster, and Areti Krepapa (2000), “An Exploration of the 
Meaning and Outcomes of a Customer-Defined Market Orientation,” Journal of 
Business Research, 48 (2), 101-12. 
 
Wesley, Scarlett, Melody LeHew, and Arch G. Woodside (2006), “Consumer Decision-making 
Styles and Mall Shopping Behavior: Building Theory Using Exploratory Data Analysis 
and the Comparative Method,” Journal of Business Research, 59, 535-548. 
 
Wheatley, Margaret (1992), Leadership and the New Science: Learning about Organization from 
an Orderly Universe, San Francisco, CA: Berrett Koehler. 
 241
 
White, Tiffany Barnett (2005), “Consumer Trust and Advice Acceptance: The Moderating Roles 
of Benevolence, Expertise, and Negative Emotions,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
15 (2), 141-148. 
 
Wickliffe, Vanessa Prier (2004), “Refinement and Re-assessment of the Consumer Decision-
making Style Instrument,” Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 11, 9-17. 
 
Williams, Larry J. and Barbara Brown (1994), “Method Variance in Organizational 
behavior and Human Resources Research: Effects on Correlations, Path 
Coefficients and Hypothesis Testing,” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 57 (2), 185-209. 
 
Williams, Larry J., Joseph A. Cote, and M. Ronald Buckley (1989), “Lack of Method 
Variance in Self-Reported Affect and Perceptions at Work: Reality or Artifact,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 74 (3), 462-468. 
 
Wilson, Tim, Tim Holt, and Trisha Greenhalgh (2001), “Complexity Science: Complexity and 
Clinical Care,” British Medical Journal, 323 (September 22), 685-688. 
 
*Wirtz, Jochen, Anna S. Mattila, and Rachel L. P. Tan (2000), “The Moderating Role of 
Target-Arousal on the Impact of Affect on Satisfaction – An Examination in the 
Context of Service Experiences,” Journal of Retailing, 76 (3), 347-65. 
 
Witkin, Herman A. (1950), “Individual Differences in the Ease of Perception of Embedded 
Figures,” Journal of Personality, 19, 1-15. 
 
Witkin, Herman A., H. B. Lewis, M. Hertzman, K. Machover, P. B. Meissner, and W. Wapner 
(1954), Personality through Perception, New York, NY: Harper. 
Witkin, Herman A., P. K. Oltman, E. Raskin, and S. A. Karp (1971), Group Embedded 
Figures Test Manual, Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.  
Wong, Nancy and Tracey King (2008), “The Cultural Construction of Risk Understandings 
through Illness Narratives,” Journal of Consumer Research, forthcoming.  
 
Writers for the Center for the Study of Healthcare Management, “Applying Complexity Science 
to Health and Healthcare,” www.hsr.umn.edu/mha/center/11261.pdf. 
 
Writing Group for the Women’s Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial (2002), “Risks 
and Benefits of Estrogen plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal 





*Yilmaz, Cengiz, Bulent Sezen, and Ebru Tumer Kabaday (2004), “Supplier Fairness as 
a Mediating Factor in the Supplier Performance-Reseller Satisfaction 
Relationship,” Journal of Business Research, 57 (8), 854-63. 
 
*Yoo, Boonghee, Naveen Donthu, and Sungho Lee (2000), “An Examination of Selected 
Marketing Mix Elements and Brand Equity,” Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 28 (2), 195-211. 
 
Zajonc, Robert B. (1968), “Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology. 
 
Zajonc, Robert B. (1980), “Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences,” American 
Psychologist, 35, 151-175. 
 
Zajonc, Robert B. (1984), “On the Primacy of Affect,” American Psychologist, 36, 117-123. 
 
Zimmerman, Branda (1999), “Complexity Science: A Route through Hard Times and 
Uncertainty,” Health Forum Journal, 42 (2), 42-48. 
 
Zimmerman, Brenda, Curt Lindberg, and Paul Plsek (1998), Edgeware: Insights from 
Complexity Science for Health Care Leaders. Irving, TX: VHA. 
 
Zmud, Robert W. (1979), “Individual Differences and MIS Success: A Review of the 
Empirical Literature,” Management Science, 25 (10), 966-975. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
